Dynamic traffic equilibria with route and departure time choice by Frascaria, Dario
VU Research Portal




Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Link to publication in VU Research Portal
citation for published version (APA)
Frascaria, D. (2021). Dynamic traffic equilibria with route and departure time choice.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal ?
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
E-mail address:
vuresearchportal.ub@vu.nl
Download date: 12. Dec. 2021
Dynamic traffic equilibria with route
and departure time choice
Dario Frascaria
Dynamic traffic equilibria with route and
departure time choice
Dario Frascaria
The author was supported by the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO);
grant details: number 614.001.510
title “Understanding dynamic aspects of traffic”
The illustration on the cover was made by Chorong Yoo.
ISBN: 978-90-361-0665-8
© Dario Frascaria, 2021
VRIJE UNIVERSITEIT
Dynamic traffic equilibria with route and
departure time choice
ACADEMISCH PROEFSCHRIFT
ter verkrijging van de graad Doctor aan
de Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam,
op gezag van de rector magnificus
prof.dr. C.M. van Praag,
in het openbaar te verdedigen
ten overstaan van de promotiecommissie
van de School of Business and Economics
op dinsdag 26 oktober 2021 om 9.45 uur




geboren te Foggia, Italië
promotor: prof.dr. L. Stougie
copromotor: dr. N.K. Olver










1.1 Topic of the thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 The perspective from optimization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.3 The perspective from transportation economics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.4 Contributions and outline of the thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2 Preliminaries: flows over time 11
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.2 Network structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.3 Static flows . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.4 Flows over time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3 Algorithms for flows over time with scheduling costs 17
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3.2 Model and preliminaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3.3 A combinatorial algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
3.4 Optimality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3.4.1 Duality-based certificates of optimality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3.4.2 The dual prescription . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.5 Optimal tolls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.5.1 Strong vs weak enforcement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.5.2 Exogenous demand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.6 General scheduling costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
4 Dynamic equilibria with endogenous departure time choice 43
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
4.2 Model and preliminaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
4.3 Existence and uniqueness in the sensitive demand model . . . . . . . . . . 49
4.4 Existence and uniqueness in the insensitive demand model . . . . . . . . . 51
4.5 Reduction from equilibria with endogenous departure time choice to equi-
libria with exogenous ones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
v
Contents
4.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
5 Emergent hypercongestion in Vickrey bottleneck networks 55
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
5.2 Model and preliminaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
5.3 An instance exhibiting hypercongestion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
5.4 Sensitivity analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
5.5 First-best pricing can strictly increase the generalized price . . . . . . . . . 73
5.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
6 Revisiting the corridor problem with discrete bottlenecks 77
6.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
6.2 Model and preliminaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
6.2.1 The insensitive demand model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
6.2.2 The (purely) sensitive demand model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
6.3 Equilibria in the sensitive demand model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
6.3.1 Equilibrium conditions and existence in the sensitive model . . . . . 82
6.3.2 Equilibrium structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
6.3.3 Uniqueness and a bound on the number of phases . . . . . . . . . . 88
6.4 Existence and uniqueness with insensitive demand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
6.4.1 Algorithmic issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
6.5 Some examples of equilibrium behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
6.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
7 Long term behavior of dynamic equilibria with exogenous departure time
choice 105
7.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
7.2 Model and preliminaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
7.3 Characterization of steady states . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
7.3.1 Derivatives of the equilibrium in a steady state . . . . . . . . . . . 107
7.3.2 Queue lengths of a steady state . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
7.4 Candidate potential function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
7.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114






1.1 Topic of the thesis
Traffic congestion is a phenomenon widespread in the world with negative impacts on
several aspects of the society, environment and economy. Several measures have been
taken by authorities to alleviate this phenomenon, such as, to name a few, improvements
of road infrastructure (junction improvements, separate lanes for specific vehicle groups
etc.), policies to reduce the demand of roads (road pricing, parking costs, number plate
restrictions etc.) or policies to increase the supply of roads (increase in the number of
lanes or creation of new routes). However, sometimes these measures can be ineffective
or even counter-productive, as in the case of creating a new route, which can worsen the
congestion instead of improving it [Braess, 1968, Kolata, 1990].
One of the key causes of traffic congestion relies on people behavior. People do not
coordinate their actions in order to avoid the creation of traffic jams but rather behaves
selfishly, in the sense that everyone makes decisions that favor himself and not the com-
munity. The goal of every road user is, indeed, to arrive at his destination in the most
favorable way, e.g. in the fastest or cheapest way. This means that each user makes his
own choices, for example regarding the route or the departure time, with no regard for
the consequences of these on others. However, the congestion and delays encountered by
a user depend partly on the behavior of other individuals and thus users have to adapt
their choices according to others’ choices. Since different user choices affect each other,
the following question can be posed:
Can a user make choices that turn out to be the best possible ones?
This question finds an answer in the notion of Nash equilibria, or just equilibria [Nash,
1951]. These are situations where nobody has an incentive to unilaterally change their
current choices; in other words, situations where everyone is satisfied with his own choices
and would not benefit from changing them.
Traffic equilibria can be static or dynamic. In static equilibria, also called Wardrop
user equilibria due to the work of Wardrop [1952], the transit time on a road depends
on the total amount of users traversing it and does not vary over time, thus establishing
interactions among all the users that take the same road. Static equilibria thus do not
possess the dimension of time. Conversely, in dynamic equilibria the congestion and transit
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time of a road changes over time, depending on the amount of traffic that has crossed it
up to that specific moment and independently on the pattern of traffic that will cross it
at a later time.
Clearly traffic conditions vary over time and, hence, dynamic equilibria are more ac-
curate than the static ones in representing traffic behavior. For this reason in this thesis
we focus exclusively on dynamic equilibria.
From an academic point of view the topic of traffic congestion has received substantial
attention from many different communities, each with their own perspective. However, in
spite of all the effort that has been put in studying the problem, our theoretical under-
standing of it is still very limited. For instance, we are not yet able to predict with any
confidence where and when congestion happens and, as a consequence, we do not know
how to prevent it.
Several models have been introduced for forecasting traffic congestion (see [Peeta and
Ziliaskopoulos, 2001] for a survey). Some of them are empirical, where traffic flow is
forecast by running and observing simulations on these models. These are very flexible in
modeling the behavior of individual vehicles but cannot be thoroughly investigated. Other
models are not completely realistic but are used to identify, analytically, the properties
that characterize the equilibrium behavior. When choosing a model there is always a
trade-off between accuracy and efficiency.
In this thesis we focus on dynamic mathematical models where all the vehicles are
identical and where the delays on a road are not caused by traffic lights, car accidents
etc., but depend exclusively by the routing choices of the users. These models are built
on models used in two different communities: the optimization community and the trans-
portation economics community. They are not completely realistic but they capture the
essence of the dynamics behind traffic congestion. In fact, the intent of this thesis is to
identify and illustrate concepts regarding traffic behavior and not to represent actual traf-
fic conditions. This aspect is especially important for transportation economists who are
interested in investigating the effects of transportation policies. Since traffic involves many
types of vehicles, locations, demands and supplies, dealing with fully accurate models is
analytically intractable.
To be more specific, we represent traffic dynamics utilizing the Vickrey bottleneck con-
gestion model [Vickrey, 1969] (also known as the fluid queuing model). Here traffic flow is
treated as a fluid in a pipeline system and each vehicle is represented by an infinitesimally
small particle. This implies that the model can be used also when the number of vehicles
is gigantic. To each link of the network are associated two parameters, one that indicates
how much mass of vehicles can travel in parallel along the link and the other indicates
the length of link. If too many vehicles try to enter the link at the same time, some of
them pile up at the entrance thus forming a queue (see Figure 1.1). This queue has no
physical dimension, in the sense that it can grow indefinitely and that the vehicles joining
the queue arrive at the back of it instantaneously and independently of the size of it. A
queue on a link does not interfere with traffic on other links and, hence, the total travel
time required to traverse a link depends only on its length and on the waiting time spent
in its queue.
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 1.1: Chronological sequence showing the dynamics of the Vickrey bottleneck con-
gestion model. In blue the moving flow and in red the flow waiting in the queue.
As mentioned earlier, this thesis connects the optimization and transportation eco-
nomics literatures and tackles questions that are of interest for both communities, such as
the following:
- Does an equilibrium always exist?
- Can there be different equilibria?
- How can an equilibrium behavior be computed?
- How can one set tolls on roads so that, in an equilibrium, there is no congestion and
social welfare is maximized?
Outline of the chapter. We first discuss the optimization literature on dynamic equi-
libria, in Section 1.2. Then, in Section 1.3, we discuss the perspective of the transportation
economics literature related to it. Finally, in Section 1.4 we give an outline of the thesis.
1.2 The perspective from optimization
In the past decades dynamic equilibria have been receiving increasing attention from the
optimization community. This line of literature focuses on settings with homogeneous
users, given inflow rates and general networks and contains results regarding existence,
uniqueness, structural properties, computational difficulties and inefficiency of the equi-
libria.
One of the earliest works on dynamic equilibria in general networks is the one of
Janson [1991], who modeled the problem as a mathematical program. Since the work of
Janson, mathematical programming formulations received considerable examination (see
Peeta and Ziliaskopoulos [2001] for a review). In these formulations, both the number of
users and the time period are discretized and, furthermore, some limitations are present,
as the inadequacy to model delay functions that well represent traffic dynamics.
Friesz et al. [1993] were the first to formulate and analyze dynamic equilibria using
variational inequalities1. Since then variational inequalities formulations have received
1Inequalities involving functionals, which have to be solved for all possible values of a given variable.
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substantial attention (see [Friesz and Han, 2019] for a survey). They are mostly path-
based and, consequently, often computationally intractable. Their results thus concern
principally the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium.
Recently, dynamic equilibria have been analyzed from the perspective of algorithmic
game theory. Most of the results concern nonatomic settings, i.e. setting where there are
an infinite number of users, each controlling an infinitesimally small amount of flow. The
community has focused more on nonatomic settings mainly because their mathematical
structure seems to be more amenable to giving insights and because it’s an excellent
approximation. Example of atomic settings, however, are the following [Hoefer et al.,
2011, Cao et al., 2017, Ismaili, 2017, Scarsini et al., 2018, Werth et al., 2014]
Anshelevich and Ukkusuri [2009] considered a discrete time setting with nonatomic
players and general delay functions. They showed that, for flow-dependent delays function
obeying FIFO and networks with a single origin-destination pair, an equilibrium always
exists and can be computed efficiently while, for networks with multi origin-destination
pairs, equilibria may not exist.
All of the works discussed so far do not provide any insights into the structure of the
equilibria. The first model to shed light on these is the one of Koch and Skutella [2011],
based on the Vickrey bottleneck congestion model [Vickrey, 1969] and the flow over time
models [Ford and Fulkerson, 1958]. The authors considered a setting with a single origin-
destination pair where users are released over time at a constant rate, called inflow rate
into the network (or simply inflow rate). They provided an elegant characterization of
the equilibrium based on the derivatives (with respect to time) of the distance between
the origin and any other vertex. Furthermore, they showed that the equilibrium can
be decomposed into static flows, with specific structures, that they called thin flows with
resetting. Using these static flows they developed an algorithm to construct an equilibrium.
They did not provide, however, any bounds on the time complexity of the algorithm, i.e.
on the amount of time required to run the algorithm. The work of Koch and Skutella
[2011] serves as a basis for all the work listed in the remainder of this review.
Cominetti et al. [2015] proved the existence of thin flows with resetting and they turned
the algorithm of Koch and Skutella [2011] in a proof of existence of equilibria for the case of
a piecewise constant inflow rate. They also showed that, in the case of piecewise constant
inflow rate, the rate of change of the queues in an equilibrium are, under some technical
conditions, unique. Moreover the authors, using variational inequalities, extended the
existence result also to the case of inflow rate functions belonging in the Lp space and also
to multiple origin-destination settings.
Kaiser [2020] showed that computing a thin flow with resetting is a linear complemen-
tarity problem and that can be solved in polynomial time in series-parallel networks. The
complexity on general networks remains unknown.
Cominetti et al. [2017] showed that the equilibrium flow reaches a steady state in finite
time when the inflow rate into the network is a constant not bigger than the min-cut
capacity of the network. A steady state is an unbounded time interval in which the
queue delays and the transit times do not change anymore, and thus a state where the
queue lengths are frozen. They also prove that the equilibrium can have an exponential
number of phases, making the complexity of the Koch-Skutella algorithm to construct an
equilibrium at least exponential.
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Some works focused on the inefficiency of the equilibria for different objectives [Koch
and Skutella, 2011, Bhaskar et al., 2011, Correa et al., 2019]. The inefficiency of the
equilibria is measured with the price of anarchy [Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou, 1999,
Papadimitriou, 2001], that is defined as the worst possible ratio between the total cost of
an equilibrium and the one of a social optimum – an optimal behavior that minimizes the
average cost of all the agents (i.e. maximizes the social welfare) but that, usually, is not
an equilibrium.
Macko et al. [2010] studied a new type of Braess’s paradox appearing in this model.
Namely they consider the maximum experienced latency of a flow particle and they con-
jecture a necessary and sufficient condition for the paradox.
Recently the model has been extended to include further traffic elements. Sering and
Skutella [2018] generalized the thin flows with resetting to multiple origin-destination pairs
networks, where the outflow of every origin is routed to the destinations proportionally
with respect to a global pattern. Their model, however, assumes that flow particles are
essentially equal, apart from their origin or destination. In fact, once they meet at any
location, flow particles with different origins and or destinations cannot be distinguished.
Sering and Vargas Koch [2019] extended the model by dropping the assumption that
queues can grow indefinitely. Instead, they introduced an upper bound on total amount
of flow present on a link at any time. When the flow exceeds this value, the congestion
propagates backwards to the preceding links. This dynamic is called spillback. The authors
generalized the thin flows with resetting to this setting, showed existence of the equilibria
and suggested an algorithm for their computation.
All the aforementioned studies assumed the flow particles to have complete information
on the state of the network for all points in time. This means that all the road users know
all others’ route choices and can exactly foresee the travel times of all the paths. This is
justified by assuming that the equilibrium behavior repeats itself as a daily routine and
hence that users have learnt each others’ choices over several trips. Graf and Harks [2019]
introduced a setting where this does not occur and where, instead, users have knowledge
only on the current network conditions, i.e. on the current queuing delays. Therefore
users do not predict how the queue lengths will change during their trip but, instead,
they choose, at any intersection, the shortest route according to the current queues. The
authors proved existence and nonuniqueness [Graf and Harks, 2019, Graf et al., 2020],
provided an upper bound on the price of anarchy [Graf and Harks, 2020b] and presented
complexity results on the computation of the equilibrium [Graf and Harks, 2020a].
In spite of the elegance of the Koch-Skutella model and of all the attention that it
has received, many fundamental problems remain unsolved and several apparently obvi-
ous properties remain hard to demonstrate. An example is given by the monotonicity
conjecture found in [Correa et al., 2019], which relates the travel time of particles to the
inflow rate. Other similar conjectures can be found in Chapter 4 of this thesis.
1.3 The perspective from transportation economics
In this section we discuss the perspective of the transportation economics literature con-
nected to the work discussed in Section 1.2.
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Transportation economists focus especially on settings where the users’ interactions
are more intricate. Their motivations rely on the basis that traffic congestion is not just a
physical phenomenon but it occurs as a consequence of people’s decisions and these vary
from individual to individual, according to personal factors or preferences. Their models,
therefore, incorporate other aspects of user utility besides route transit times and, often,
exhibit heterogeneous groups of users. This goes to the detriment of the network topology
which is often very simple, like a single-link or multiple parallel-links network.
A very standard setting, motivated by morning rush-hour traffic, is the scheduling cost
one. This was introduced in the bottleneck model together with the bottleneck congestion
dynamic [Vickrey, 1969]. Since then it has been elaborated in many works (see [Small,
2015, Li et al., 2020]). Here users desire to arrive at their destination at a particular time
and their total disutility, called travel cost, consists of two components:
• a journey time cost, precisely the time between the departure of the user from the
origin and their arrival at the destination, scaled by a factor α (the value of time);
and
• a scheduling cost, based on the arrival time of the user compared to a fixed desired
arrival time. We write ρ(θ) for the scheduling cost associated with arriving at time
θ.
A very standard choice for a scheduling cost function is
ρ(θ) =
{
β(T ∗ − θ) if T ∗ ≥ θ
γ(θ − T ∗) otherwise (1.1)
where T ∗ represents the desired arrival time and where 0 < β < α < γ (it is very bad
to be late, but time spent in the office early is better than time spent in traffic). This
scheduling cost function is represented in Figure 1.2.
T ∗T ∗ − 2
2β
T ∗ + 2
2γ
β γ
Figure 1.2: The horizontal axis represents the arrival time. The dashed line indicates the
scheduling cost function.
With this setting, in an equilibrium users choose not only their routes but also their
departure times. This means that inflow rate into the network is not given but depends
on the aggregate choices of all the users. We will use this setting in most of the thesis,
namely in Chapters 3 to 6.
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While the optimization literature investigates more the computational difficulties and
structural properties of the equilibria, this line of research investigates more policies and
their effects. An example of such policies is pricing. This is used as a tool to persuade
people to make socially efficient choices and thus increasing the social welfare. Since the
first works of Pigou [1920], Knight [1924], Walters [1961], Vickrey [1963], this subject has
received substantial attention from the transportation economics community (see [Lind-
sney and Verhoef, 2001] for a survey). However, for the optimal tolls, i.e. the ones that
induce an equilibrium that maximizes the social welfare, this line of literature does not
provide an elegant characterization but rather contains iterative toll adjustment proce-
dures (trial-and-error implementation schemes) and dynamic equilibrium simulators that
compute them (as, for example, [De Palma et al., 2005] or [Yang et al., 2004, Meng et al.,
2005]). A novel characterization for these tolls is given in Chapter 3 of this thesis.
Another difference is given by the fact that, although both communities use the Vickrey
bottleneck congestion model, transportation economists consider also different kinds of
congestion delay functions (see [Lindsey and Verhoef, 1999] for a survey). The interest in
different delay functions resides in representing empirically observed behavior, like the one
of hypercongestion. A classic way to model traffic congestion, of particular importance in
modelling highway traffic, is by utilizing three variables that represent traffic speed, traffic
density and traffic flow, measured, respectively, in distance per unit of time, number of
vehicles per unit of length and number of vehicles per unit of time [Walters, 1961]. Traffic
flow equals the product of speed and density and these, usually, are in a negative linear
relationship: speed decreases as density increases (Figure 1.3c). Traffic flow is thus an
inverse u-shaped function of speed and density (Figures 1.3a and 1.3b) and the same
value, when not maximized, can be obtained by two different combinations of speed and
density. The flow is said to be congested when it stems from high speed and low density
and hypercongested when it stems from low speed and high density. We will discuss


















(c) Speed-density (or fundamental) dia-
gram.
Figure 1.3: Fundamental diagrams of traffic flow.
1.4 Contributions and outline of the thesis
This thesis combines models of the optimization and the transportation economics litera-
tures.
The methodology we use follows the treatments in the optimization literature. More
precisely, we study equilibria by extending the model introduced by Koch and Skutella
[2011] and further elaborated by Cominetti et al. [2015] and we analyze traffic streams
utilizing flows over time. These are discussed in Chapter 2.
We mainly focus on homogeneous settings with arbitrary network topologies using
Vickrey bottleneck congestion and scheduling costs. Our intent is thus to extend the
classical Vickrey bottleneck model to general networks.
In Chapter 3 we present a combinatorial algorithm for computing the social optimum
– the behavior that minimizes the average total cost of all users (i.e., maximizing the
social welfare) – in a setting with scheduling costs. Here we consider any scheduling cost
function. Moreover, we show how to set optimal tolls, i.e. tolls that induce an equilibrium
that corresponds to a social optimum. We will use these tolls in Chapter 5. Furthermore,
we also show that our construction of optimal tolls is applicable to the exogenous demand
model, i.e. the model where users are released at constant rate into the network. This
model will be considered in Chapter 7.
In Chapter 4 we define the model of the dynamic equilibria with endogenous departure
8
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time choice, equilibria where users choose both their route and their departure time. For
the latter we consider a setting with scheduling costs, similar to the one of Chapter 3 but
restricted to convex functions. This model is applied in Chapters 5 and 6.
Additionally, we show existence and uniqueness under two very plausible conjectures
about continuity and monotonicity of equilibria. Finally, we demonstrate how this model
generalizes the one where users do not choose the departure time and that will be treated
in Chapter 7.
In Chapter 5 we study hypercongestion. Hypercongestion is the phenomenon when
an increase of traffic densities corresponds to a decrease of traffic throughput. It is well
understood at the single-link level but it has also been observed in a macroscopic form at
the level of traffic networks; for instance, in morning rush-hour traffic into a downtown
core. For this reasons, transportation economists employ link delay functions that exhibit
hypercongestion. In this chapter we show that macroscopic hypercongestion can occur as
a purely emergent effect of dynamic equilibrium behavior on a network, even when it is
not present in the link delay function.
In Chapter 6 we study the traffic corridor problem, initialized by Arnott [2001], Arnott
and DePalma [2011a]. Here the network is a corridor connecting a continuum of residential
locations to a single point, the central business district (CBD), and that is subject to
flow congestion. Arnott and DePalma [2011a] studied the equilibrium behavior using
the kinematic model [Lighthill and Whitham, 1955, Richards, 1956] and they determine
important properties of an equilibrium, if it exists. However they argue that an equilibrium
does not always exist for their model. Akamatsu et al. [2015] studied a version of the
problem where the corridor is not continuous but is modeled as a series-link network2
and where the Vickrey bottleneck congestion model is used. They showed that model
can be formulated as a linear complementarity problem and, by utilizing Kakutani’s fixed
point theorem, they proved existence. Furthermore, for a range of parameter choices that
excludes the homogeneous case, they proved uniqueness. It is worth noting that they
discretized time to simplify the analysis.
In our work we improve the results of [Akamatsu et al., 2015] by proving existence
and uniqueness of the equilibrium (without discretizing time) for the homogeneous case,
we provide a description of the structure of the equilibrium and we develop a polynomial
time algorithm for computing the equilibrium flow.
In the final chapter, Chapter 7, we consider dynamic equilibria with exogenous departure
time choice – equilibria where users do not choose their departure time but are released at
a constant inflow rate. Here the cost of a user is just its journey time. This is the model
that has received most attention from the optimization community (see Section 1.2).
Cominetti et al. [2017] studied the equilibrium behavior under an assumption on the
inflow rate into the network and showed that, in finite time, the equilibrium reaches a
steady state, a state where the behavior of the equilibrium stabilizes, in the sense that
queue delays and transit times do not change anymore. Their proof is based on a potential
function that is monotone along the evolution of the equilibrium.
In this chapter we provide a more general definition and characterization of steady
2A graph that consists of a series of arcs.
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states and we drop the assumption on the inflow rate into the network. This characteriza-
tion leads to the definition of a potential function that is quite natural and that generalizes
the one used in [Cominetti et al., 2017]. However, we found a network and queue lengths
configuration where the potential function is not monotone. We do not know if such con-
figuration is ever achieved by the equilibrium and we conjecture that further insights into
the relation between consecutive thin flows with resetting are needed in order to solve this
problem.
Figure 1.4 shows the connections among chapters.
Chapter 2
Chapter 3 Chapter 4
Chapter 6Chapter 5 Chapter 7
Figure 1.4: Graph showing the connections among the chapters. The solid arc from a
chapter A to a chapter B indicates that the results of chapter A are used in chapter B.
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Preliminaries: flows over time
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter we introduce the flow over time models and the notation used in the rest
of the thesis.
The study of flows over time is a classical one in combinatorial optimization; it began
already with the work of Ford and Fulkerson [1958] in the 50s. It is a natural extension of
static flows, which associates a single numerical value to each arc, representing the total
quantity or rate of flow that can traverse the arc. In a flow over time, a second value
associated with each arc represents the time it takes for flow particles to traverse it; the
flow is then described by a function on each arc, representing the rate of flow entering the
arc as a function of time. We consider flows over time in continuous-time settings; here, a
flow over time is characterized by flow rates that indicate how much flow passes a certain
point (tail or head of the arc) per unit of time.
We use flow over time models in all the remaining chapters of the thesis.
Outline of the chapter. Before introducing the flow over time formally (in Section 2.4),
we introduce the network structure (in Section 2.2) and static flows (in Section 2.3).
2.2 Network structure
The network is described by a given directed graph. We usually write G = (V,E) to
indicate a graph G with vertex set V and arc set E. We restrict ourselves to the setting of
a common source (or origin), which we denote by s, and a common sink (or destination)
which we denote by t. Moreover, we assume that every vertex is reachable from s and
that there is no directed cycle with zero transit time. A path that starts at v and ends at
w is called v-w-path. We use δout(v) to denote the set of arcs with tail v, and δin(v) the
set of arcs with head v. We also call the arcs in δin(v) the in-going arcs of v and the arcs
in δout(v) the out-going arcs of v.
11
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2.3 Static flows
Let R+ indicate the set of nonnegative reals and consider some function x : E → R+
that assigns flow values to the arcs of the network. Each arc e ∈ E is associated with a
nonnegative capacity νe, which indicates how much flow can be assigned to it.
For any vertex v ∈ V , we define the net flow at v (denoted ∇xv) to be the difference
between the total amount of flow on the in-going arcs of v and the total amount of flow








We say that x is a (static) s-t-flow if
(i) ∇xv = 0 for all v ∈ V \ {s, t}
(ii) xe ≤ νe for all e ∈ E
(iii) −∇xs ≥ 0.
Think of x as an instantaneous moving flow. The first condition, called flow conservation,
states that, for any vertex apart from s and t, the amount of flow entering the vertex
equals the amount of flow leaving it. The second condition states that the amount of flow
on an arc cannot exceed its capacity. Finally the last condition specifies the source and,
as consequence of flow conservation, the sink. Furthermore, we say that a (static) s-t-flow
has value Q if the amount of net flow leaving s equals Q, i.e. if −∇xs = ∇xt = Q.
2.4 Flows over time
Contrary to static flows, flows over time are functions of time. Here flow particles require
a certain amount of time to travel through an arc and different flow particles can enter
and exit arcs at different times and still affect each other.
Each arc e ∈ E has a capacity νe and a free transit time τe associated with it (both
nonnegative). The capacity indicates how much flow can cross a point of the arc in any
instant and the free transit time indicates how long it takes to cross the entire arc when
there is no waiting (waiting may be caused by congestion).
We can describe the flow on an arc e by functions f ine , f oute : R → R+; f ine (θ) denotes
the inflow rate into arc e at time θ, and similarly f oute (θ) the outflow rate. We require
these functions to be measurable and defined almost everywhere (for the flows that we
will consider in this thesis, they are in fact piecewise constant).
The total amount of flow that has entered arc e by time θ is




and the total amount of flow that has left arc e by time θ is
F oute (θ) =
∫ θ
−∞
f oute (ξ)dξ .
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Traffic is treated as divisible, and vehicles therefore as a continuous flow, and so these
functions can take on arbitrary nonnegative values, without any integrality restrictions.
Since flow can exit an arc only if it has previously entered it, we have the following
inequality:
F oute (θ + τe) ≤ F ine (θ) ∀e ∈ E, θ ∈ R. (2.1)
Similarly to the static case, for any vertex v ∈ V , we define the net flow into v at
time θ (denoted ∇fv(θ)) to be the difference between the total amount of flow leaving the
in-going arcs of v and the total amount of flow entering the out-going arcs of v. Namely,







f ine (θ) .
We use two definitions of flow over time, one used in chapter Chapter 3, where particles
wait in queues on the vertices, and one used in all the remaining chapters, where particles
wait on queues at the entrance of the arcs. These definitions are conceptually the same.
A s-t flow over time with waiting on the arcs is defined as a family (f ine , f oute )e∈E of arc
inflows, outflows such that




(iii) f oute (θ) ≤ νe for any e ∈ E and almost every θ.
One can think of a flow over time as a fluid in a pipeline system. The first condition, called
strict flow conservation, states that, for any vertex apart from s and t, the flow entering
a vertex at any time cannot wait on the vertex but has to immediately leave. The second
condition specifies the source and, as consequence of strict flow conservation, the sink.
The third condition states that the outflow rate of an arc cannot exceed its capacity.
For an s-t flow over time with waiting on the vertices we replace the conditions (i) and
(iii) with the conditions
(iv) f ine (θ) ≤ νe for any e ∈ E and almost every θ
(v) f ine (θ) = f oute (θ + τe) for any e ∈ E and almost every θ.
Condition (iv) states that the inflow rate into an arc cannot exceed its capacity and
condition (v) states that, once inside an arc, flow particles have to immediately move
towards the head of the arc without the possibility to wait on it.
Furthermore, we call a flow over time without waiting if it satisfies all the conditions.
Finally, we say that a s-t-flow over time has value (or mass) Q if the amount of flow





In the following, we present an example of a flow over time.
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Example 2.1. Consider a network with V = {s, a, b, t}, E = {sa, sb, ab, bt}, νe = 1








Figure 2.1: Network of Example 2.1. The label of an arc represents the capacity (first
element) and the free transit time (second element).
Here the inflow into the network is positive only for one unit of time, from time 1.0 till
time 2.0, in which it equals 2. More precisely, the inflow into the network is
ν0(θ) :=
2 θ ∈ [1, 2]0 θ /∈ [1, 2].
Rather than specifying the inflow and outflow rate for any arc and any point in time,
we define this flow over time using the flow particles point of view: Upon entry in the
network, each particle of flow split evenly between the paths sabt and sbt and moves
towards the sink as fast as possible, i.e. waiting only when necessary. This means that
the particles leave a queue according to the First-In-First-Out (FIFO) principle.
We describe it with a sequence of snapshots of the network (see Figure 2.2):
(a). At time 0.0 the network is empty and there is no flow.
(b). At time 1.0 the first particles of flow appear at the source.
(c). At time 1.5, after half unit of time since departure, the particles that departed first
arrive at the middle points of the arcs sa and sb.
(d). At time 2.0 the inflow into s drops to 0 and the particles that departed first arrive at
a and b.
(e). At time 2.5 the inflow into b becomes 2. Since b has only one ongoing arc with
capacity 1, some particles have to wait and they will form a queue. The rate of grow
of this queue equals 1, the difference between the inflow into bt and its capacity. In
Figure 2.2f we represent the situation when they wait on the arc bt rather than on b.
(f). At time 3 the inflow into b becomes 1 and therefore the queue on bt stops growing.
The total amount of mass waiting on the arc bt is equal to 0.5.
(g). At time 3.5 the inflow into b becomes 0 and therefore the queue on bt will decrease
with rate 1, the difference between the capacity of bt and its inflow.
14
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(h). At time 4.0 the queue on bt is completely depleted.
(i) and (j). In the final two phases, all remaining particles arrive at the sink. The final



















































































Figure 2.2: Chronological sequence of snapshots of the flow over time discussed in Exam-





Algorithms for flows over time with
scheduling costs
The results in this chapter appear in [Frascaria and Olver, 2020].
3.1 Introduction
Classical optimization problems involving static flows have natural analogs in the flow over
time setting (see the surveys [Köhler et al., 2009, Skutella, 2009]). For example (restricting
the discussion to single commodity flows), the maximum flow over time problem asks to
send as much flow as possible, departing from the source starting from time 0 and arriving
to the sink by a given time horizon T ; this can be solved in polynomial time [Ford and
Fulkerson, 1958, 1962, Fleischer and Tardos, 1998]. A quickest flow asks, conversely, for the
shortest time horizon necessary to send a given amount of flow. Of particular importance
for us is the notion of an earliest arrival flow: this has the very strong property that
simultaneously for all T ′ ≤ T , the amount of flow arriving by time T ′ is as large as
possible [Gale, 1959]. Such a flow can also be characterized as minimizing the average
arrival time [Jarvis and Ratliff, 1982]. Earliest arrival flows can be “complicated”, in
that they can require exponential space (in the input size) to describe [Zadeh, 1973], and
determining the average arrival time of an earliest arrival flow is NP-hard [Disser and
Skutella, 2015]. But they can be constructed in time strongly polynomial in the sum of
the input and output size [Baumann and Skutella, 2006].
In this chapter we focus on flow over time in a setting with scheduling costs (see
Section 1.3). We allow general scheduling cost functions, though for most of the chapter
we focus on strongly unimodal cost functions; these are the most relevant, and this avoids
some distracting technical details.
Two very natural questions can be posed at this point. The first is a purely optimization
question, with no attention paid to the decentralized nature of traffic.
Question 3.1. How can one compute a flow over time minimizing the average total cost
paid by users, i.e., maximizing the social welfare?
From now on, we will call a solution to this problem simply an optimal flow.
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It is well understood that users typically do not coordinate their actions to induce a
flow that minimizes total disutility. There is a huge body of literature (particularly in the
setting of static flows [Nisan et al., 2007]) investigating this phenomenon. In the traffic
setting, the relevance of an optimal flow represented by an answer to this question comes
primarily via the possibility of pricing. By putting appropriate tolls on roads, we can
influence the behavior of users and the resulting dynamic equilibrium. Thus:
Question 3.2. How can one set tolls (possibly time-varying) on the arcs of a given instance
so that an optimal flow is obtained in dynamic equilibrium?
One subtlety is that since dynamic equilibria need not be precisely unique, there is a
distinction between tolls that induce an optimal flow as an equilibrium, compared to tolls
for which all dynamic equilibria are optimal. We will call this weak and strong enforcement
of optimality, respectively, and will return to this subtlety shortly. (See Harks [2019] for
some related notions of enforcement in a general pricing setting.)
Questions like these are of great interest to transportation economists. However, most
work in that community has focused on obtaining a fine-grained understanding of very
restricted topologies (such as a single link, or multiple parallel links).
Both of these questions (for general network topologies) were considered by Yang
and Meng [1998] in a discrete time setting, by exploiting the notion of time-expanded
graphs. This is a standard tool in the area of flows over time; discrete versions of all
the optimization questions concerning flows over time mentioned earlier can (in a sense)
be dealt with in this way. A vertex v in the graph is expanded to a collection (v, i) of
vertices, for i ∈ Z in a suitable interval, and an arc vw with free transit time τvw becomes
a collection of arcs ((v, i), (w, i + τvw)) (this assumes a scaling so that τvw is a length in
multiples of the chosen discrete timesteps). Scheduling costs are encoded by appropriately
setting arc costs from (t, i) to a supersink t′ for each i, and the problem can be solved
by a minimum cost static flow computation. A primary disadvantage of this approach
(and in the use of time-expanded graphs more generally) is that the running time of the
algorithm depends polynomially on the number of time steps, which can be very large.
Further, it cannot be used to exactly solve the continuous time version (our interest in
this chapter); by discretizing time, it can be used to approximate it, but the size of the
time-expanded graph is inversely proportional to the step size of the discretization. In the
same work [Yang and Meng, 1998], the authors also observe that in the discrete setting,
an answer to the second question can be obtained from the time-expanded graph as well.
Taking the LP describing the minimum cost flow problem on the time-expanded graph,
the optimal dual solution to this LP provides the necessary tolls to enforce (weakly) an
optimal flow. (This is no big surprise—dual variables can frequently be interpreted as
prices.)
An assumption on the scheduling cost function ρ. Suppose we consider a schedul-
ing cost function ρ in the standard form given in (1.1), but with β > α. This means that
commuting is considered to be less unpleasant than arriving early. A user arriving earlier
than time T ∗ at the sink would be better off “waiting” at the sink before leaving, in order
to pay a scheduling cost of 0. Whether waiting in this way is allowed or not depends on
18
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the precise way one specifies the model, but it is most natural (and convenient) to allow
this. If we do so, then it is clear that a scheduling cost function ρ can be replaced by
ρ̂(θ) := min
ξ≥θ
ρ(ξ) + α(ξ − θ)
without changing the optimal flow (except there is no longer any incentive to wait at the
sink, and we need not even allow it). Then θ → ρ̂(θ) + αθ is nondecreasing. From now
on, we always assume that ρ satisfies this; we call it the growth bound on ρ.
Our results. We give a combinatorial algorithm to compute an optimal flow. Similarly
to the case of earliest arrival flows, this flow can be necessarily complicated, and involves
a description length that is exponential in the input size.
The algorithm is also similar to that for computing an earliest arrival flow. It is based
on the (possibly exponentially sized) path decomposition of a minimum cost flow into
successive shortest paths. In particular, suppose we choose the scheduling cost function to
be
ρ(θ) =
−αθ if θ ≤ 0∞ if θ > 0. (3.1)
Then the disutility a user experiences is precisely described by how much before time 0
they depart; all users must arrive by time 0 to ensure finite cost. This is precisely the
reversal (both in time and direction of all arcs) of an earliest arrival flow, from the sink
to the source. (By writing the average arrival time objective as the integral over time of
the total flow not yet arrived by this time, this exact correspondence is easy to see.) Our
algorithm, in this case, is the same (up to the time reversal) as the usual algorithm for
earliest arrival flow Fleischer and Tardos [1998].
This also shows that there are instances where all optimal solutions to Question 3.1
require exponential size (as a function of the input encoding length), since this is the case
for earliest arrival flows [Zadeh, 1973].
Despite the close relation to earliest arrival flows, the proof of optimality of our algo-
rithm is rather different. A key reason for this is the following. As mentioned, earliest
arrival flows have the strong property that the amount of flow arriving before a given dead-
line T ′ is the maximum possible, simultaneously for all choices of T ′ (up to some maximum
depending on the total amount of flow being sent). This implies that an earliest arrival flow
certainly minimizes the average arrival time amongst all possible flows [Jarvis and Ratliff,
1982], but this is a substantially stronger property. A natural analog of this stronger
property in our setting would be to ask for a flow for which, simultaneously for any given
cost horizon C ′ ≤ C, the amount of flow consisting of agents experiencing disutility at
most C ′ is as large as possible. Unfortunately, in general no such flow exists. The example
can be found at Section 5.5 of Chapter 5 of this thesis.
Since the proofs for earliest arrival flows [Gale, 1959, Minieka, 1973, Wilkinson, 1971,
Baumann and Skutella, 2006] show this stronger property which does not generalize, we
take a different approach. Our proof is based on duality (of an infinite dimensional LP,
though we do not require any technical results on such LPs). The main technical challenge
in our work comes from determining the correct ansatz for the dual solution, as well
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as exploiting properties of the residual networks obtained from the successive shortest
paths algorithm in precisely the right way to demonstrate certain complementary slackness
conditions.
We remark that some of the work on maximum flow over time does make the connection
to infinite dimensional LPs; see [Sharkey, 2011] for a survey and some further references.
In particular, we point out the flow-over-time version of max-flow min-cut by [Philpott,
1990], which can be viewed as a derivation of strong duality for the corresponding infinite
linear program.
As was the case with the time-expanded graph approach, the optimal dual solution
immediately provides us with corresponding tolls for which the optimal flow is an equi-
librium. However, we obtain an explicit formula for the optimal tolls, in terms of the
successive shortest paths of the graph (see Section 3.3). This may be useful in obtaining a
better structural understanding of optimal tolls, beyond just their computation. We also
remark that a corollary of our result is that there is always an optimal solution without
waiting (except at the source).
Consider for a moment the model where users cannot choose their departure time,
but instead are released from the source at a fixed rate ν0, and simply wish to reach the
destination as early as possible. This is the game-theoretic model that has received the
most attention from the flow over time perspective (see Section 1.2 of Chapter 1 of this
thesis). Our construction of optimal tolls is applicable to this model as well, as discussed in
Section 3.5. As far as we are aware, no explicit description of optimal tolls was previously
known even in this setting.
We now return to the subtlety alluded to earlier: the distinction between strongly
enforcing an optimal flow, and only weakly enforcing it.
s a t
νa = 2, τa = 0
νb = 2, τb = 1
νc = 1, τc = 0
Figure 3.1: An instance where time-varying arc tolls cannot enforce that all equilibria are
optimal flows.
Consider the simple instance in Figure 3.1. Suppose that the outflow of arc a is larger
than 1 for some period in the optimum flow, due to the choice of scheduling cost function.
In this period, one unit of flow would take the bottom arc c, and the rest will be routed
on b. Since the total cost (including tolls) of all users is the same in a tolled dynamic
equilibrium, a toll of cost equivalent to a unit delay on arc c is needed in this period to
induce the optimal flow. But then it will also be an equilibrium to send all flow in this
period along b.
To strongly enforce an optimal flow, we need more flexible tolls. One way that we can
do it is by “tolling lanes”. If we are allowed to dynamically divide up the capacity of an
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arc into “lanes” (say a “fast lane” and a “slow lane”), and then separately set time-varying
tolls on each lane, then we can strongly enforce any optimal flow. We discuss this further
in Section 3.5. We are not aware of settings where this phenomenon has been previously
observed, and it would be interesting to explore this further in a more applied context.
Outline of the chapter. We introduce some basic notation and notions, as well as
formally define our model, in Section 3.2. In Section 3.3, we describe our algorithm, and
show that it returns a feasible flow over time; we restrict ourselves to the most relevant
case of a strictly unimodal scheduling cost function. In Section 3.4 we show optimality of
this algorithm, and in Section 3.5 we derive optimal tolls from this analysis. Finally, in
Section 3.6 we discuss general scheduling cost functions.
3.2 Model and preliminaries
We consider flow over time with waiting on the vertices. We refer to Chapter 2 for the
network structure, notation and flow over time definitions.
We assume all graphs to be simple, and that there are no digons (i.e., there are no pairs
v, w ∈ V so that vw and wv are both arcs). This is for notational convenience only—this
restriction can easily be lifted.
The notation (z)+ is used to denote the nonnegative part of z, i.e., (z)+ := max{z, 0}.
Given v ∈ RX and A ⊆ X, we will use the shorthand notation v(A) := ∑a∈A v(a).
Residual networks. Given a static s-t-flow f , its residual network Gf = (V,Ef ) is
defined by
Ef = {vw : vw ∈ E and fvw < νvw} ∪ {vw : wv ∈ E and fwv > 0}.
Call arcs in Ef ∩E forward arcs and arcs in Ef \E backwards arcs. The residual capacity
νfe of an arc e ∈ Ef is then νfvw := νvw − fvw for vw a forward arc, and νfvw := fwv for vw
a backwards arc. We also define τvw := −τwv for all backwards arcs vw.
Given a subset F ⊆ E, we use χ(F ) to denote the characteristic vector of F . In
particular, if P is a path from v to w, then χ(P ) is a unit flow from v to w.




+ as a flow in (V,
←→
E) if for every vw ∈ E, either gvw = 0 or gwv = 0. Given two such
flows f and g, we define their sum f + g by taking the sum as vectors, and then cancelling
flows on oppositely directed arcs if necessary (so (f + g)vw and (f + g)wv are never both
nonzero). Define f − g similarly.
Given a choice of value Q, a minimum cost flow is an s-t-flow f ∗ minimizing ∑e∈E feτe
(amongst all s-t-flows f of value Q). An s-t-flow f (of the correct value) is a minimum cost
flow if and only if Ef contains no negative cost cycles, i.e., cycles C ⊆ Ef with τ(C) < 0.
We also have a natural notion of a residual network in the flow over time setting. Given
a flow over time f with waiting on the vertices, define, for any θ ∈ R,
Ef (θ) = {vw : vw ∈ E ∧ fvw(θ) < νvw} ∪ {vw : wv ∈ E ∧ fwv(θ − τwv) > 0}.
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Minimizing scheduling cost. We are concerned with the following optimization prob-
lem. Given a scheduling cost function ρ : R → R+, as well as a value α > 0, deter-





−∞ fe(θ)dθ and the scheduling cost
∫∞
−∞∇ft(θ) · ρ(θ)dθ. As already discussed,
we assume that ρ satisfies the growth bound, i.e., that θ → ρ(θ) + αθ is nondecreasing.
This ensures that waiting at t is not needed, which is in fact disallowed by our definition1,
and makes various arguments cleaner. We will also make the assumption that ρ is strongly
unimodal2. We then assume w.l.o.g. that the minimizer of ρ is at 0, and that ρ(0) = 0.
For further technical convenience, by adjusting ρ on a set of measure zero we take ρ to be
lower semi-continuous3..
The above conditions will suffice for our structural characterization of an optimum flow
and its analysis, but more is needed in order to be able to implement the algorithm. The
algorithm will require not just oracle access to ρ, but also to ρ−1. That is, given y > 0, we
are able to query the pair of solutions (one positive, one negative) that map to y under ρ.
In order to ensure that the optimal solution has a rational description, we should require
not only that ρ maps rationals to rationals, but that ρ−1 does too; a simple function like
ρ(θ) = θ2 that violates this can lead to irrational optimum solutions, as we will remark on
later. For algorithmic purposes, it is sensible to restrict attention to scheduling costs that
are explicitly given as piecewise linear functions; we will focus primarily on this case.
The assumption of strong unimodality is not necessary; the algorithm and analysis can
be extended (with some additional effort). We postpone this discussion to the end of the
chapter.
3.3 A combinatorial algorithm
In this section we present an algorithm that computes an optimal flow over time, assuming
that ρ is strongly unimodal. The proof of optimality is discussed in Section 3.4.
We begin by recalling the successive shortest paths (SSP) algorithm for computing a
minimum cost static flow. It is not a polynomial time algorithm, so it is inefficient as an
algorithm for static flows, but it provides a structure that is relevant for flows over time.
This is of course well known from its role in constructing earliest arrival flows, which we
will briefly detail.
The SSP algorithm construct a sequence of paths (P1, P2, . . .) and associated amounts






and let Gj denote the residual graph of f (j) (G0 being the original network). Also let
dj(v, w) denote the length (w.r.t. arc free transit times τ in Gj) of a shortest path from v
to w in Gj (this may be infinite). By construction, Gj will contain no negative cost cycles,
1Were this really needed, one could simply add a dummy arc tt′ to a new sink t′.
2I.e., strictly decreasing until some moment, and then strictly increasing.
3Since an increasing function is continuous almost everywhere, we can replace ρ(θ) by limε↓0 ρ(θ + ε)
for all θ ≥ 0; and similarly with limε↑0 ρ(θ + ε) for θ < 0.
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so that dj is computable. If dj(s, t) =∞, we are done; set m := j. Otherwise, define Pj+1
to be any shortest s-t-path in Gj, and xj+1 the minimum capacity in Gj of an arc in Pj+1.
It can be shown that ∑rj=1 x̃jχ(Pj), with r and x̃ defined such that x̃j = xj for j < r,
0 ≤ x̃r ≤ xr and
∑r
j=1 x̃j = M , is a minimum cost flow of value M , as long as M is not
larger than the value of a maximum flow.
To construct an earliest arrival flow with time horizon T , we (informally) send flow at
rate xj along path Pj for the time interval [0, T − τ(Pj)], for each j ∈ [m] (if τ(Pj) > T ,
we send no flow along the path). By this, we mean that for each e = vw ∈ Pj, we increase
by xj the value of fe(θ) for θ ∈ [dj−1(s, v), T − dj−1(v, t)] (or if e is a backwards arc, we
instead decrease fwv(θ − τwv)). An argument is needed to show that this defines a valid
flow, since we must not violate the capacity constraints, and moreover, Pj may contain
reverse arcs not present in G (see, e.g., [Skutella, 2009]).
We are now ready to describe our algorithm for minimizing the disutility, which is a
natural variation on the earliest arrival flow algorithm. It is also constructed from the
successive shortest paths, but using a cost horizon rather than a time horizon. For now,
consider C to be a given value (it will be the “cost horizon”). For each j ∈ [m] with
αdj−1(s, t) ≤ C, we send flow at rate xj along path Pj for the time interval [aj, bj] chosen
maximally so that
ρ(ξ + dj−1(s, t)) ≤ C − αdj−1(s, t) for all ξ ∈ [aj, bj].
(If ρ is continuous, then of course ρ(aj + dj−1(s, t)) = ρ(bj + dj−1(s, t)) = C −αdj−1(s, t)).
Note that a user leaving at time aj or bj and using path Pj, without waiting at any
moment, incurs disutility C; whereas a user leaving at some time θ ∈ (aj, bj) and using
path Pj will incur a strictly smaller travel cost.
As we will shortly argue, this results in a feasible flow over time f . Given this, its value
will be ∑mj=1 xj(bj − aj). Since ρ is strongly unimodal, this value changes continuously
and monotonically with C. Thus a bisection search can be used to determine the correct
choice of C for a given value Q, at least to within some predetermined error ε. Determining
the precisely correct value of C may not be possible without some additional information
about ρ.
If ρ is piecewise linear (as is the case, in particular, for the “standard” β/γ choice
generally used in the transportation economics literature), bisection search can be avoided.
Let Kl and Kr denote the number of linear segments of ρ to the left and right of 0,
respectively, and let K = Kl + Kr. Write aj(C) and bj(C) to explicitly indicate the
dependence of the interval in which flow is sent along Pj as a function of C. Then let
Qj(C) := xj(bj(C) − aj(C)); this is the total mass sent along path Pj in the solution
obtained with time horizon C. Now notice that aj(C) is a piecewise linear function with
at most Kl + 1 linear segments; it is defined by ρ(aj(C) + dj−1(s, t)) = C − αdj−1(s, t)
for C ≥ αdj−1(s, t), and aj(C) = −dj−1(s, t) otherwise. Similarly, bj(C) is a piecewise
linear function with at most Kr + 1 linear segments. The total value
∑m
j=1Qj(C) is thus
piecewise linear with at most m(K+ 2) linear segments. Thus, even the entire parametric
curve of cost horizon C against flow value Q can be computed in time O(mK), once the
successive shortest paths have been computed.
Before proving the correctness of our algorithm, we show an example of a flow over
time minimizing a given scheduling cost, as would be constructed by our algorithm.
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Figure 3.2: The network and the successive shortest paths of Example 3.1.
Example 3.1. Consider the graph G = (V,E) illustrated in Figure 3.2a, with V =
{s, a, b, t}, E = {sa, sb, ab, at, bt} and capacities νe and free transit times τe as indicated
in the figure, in the order (νe, τe).
The successive shortest paths are P1 = {s, a, b, t}, with length 3, P2 = {s, a, t} and
P3 = {s, b, t}, both with length 4, and P4 = {s, b, a, t} with length 5. All the associated
amounts are equal to 1 (see Figures 3.2b to 3.2d).
Consider now a cost horizon C equal to 6 and the standard scheduling cost function
given in Equation (1.1) with α = 1, β = 0.5, γ = 2 and T ∗ = 0. Our algorithm then
sends 1 unit of flow along P1 for the time interval [−9,−1.5]; 1 unit of flow along P2 and
1 along P3 for the time interval [−8,−3]; and 1 unit of flow along P4 for the time interval
[−7,−4.5]. The resulting flow is described in Figure 3.3 with a sequence of snapshots of
the network.
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Figure 3.3: Chronological sequence of snapshots of the optimal flow for the instance given
in Example 3.1. 25
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Feasibility. In the following we show that the resulting flow f is a feasible flow over
time. Given a vertex v ∈ V , a time θ ∈ R and j ∈ [m], let
cj(v, θ) = αdj−1(s, t) + ρ(θ + dj−1(v, t)).
If v ∈ Pj then cj(v, θ) is the travel cost of a user that utilizes path Pj and passes through
vertex v at time θ; there does not seem to be a simple interpretation if v /∈ Pj however.
Now define
J(v, θ) = max{j ∈ [m] : cj(v, θ) ≤ C}, (3.2)
with the convention that the maximum over the empty set is 0. We remark for future
reference that since dm(s, t) =∞, we do have that
αdJ(v,θ)(s, t) + ρ(θ + dJ(v,θ)(v, t)) > C. (3.3)
The motivation for this definition comes from the following theorem, which completely
characterizes f in terms of the static flows arising from successive shortest paths. (If
preferred, one could even think of this theorem as providing the definition of f .)
Theorem 3.1. fvw(θ) = f (J(v,θ))vw for any vw ∈ E and θ ∈ R.
Before proving Theorem 3.1, we need the following lemma.
Lemma 3.2. cj(v, θ) is nondecreasing with j for any θ ∈ R.
Proof. Consider any j ∈ [m − 1]; we show that cj+1(v, θ) ≥ cj(v, θ). Suppose R is a
shortest v-t-path in Gj−1, so τ(R) = dj−1(v, t). Consider the unit v-t flow g = χ(Pj+1)−
χ(Pj) + χ(R) in
←→
E . Now observe that the support of g is contained in Gj: Pj+1 and
←−
Pj are certainly contained in Gj; and if e ∈ R ∩ (Ej−1 \ Ej), then e ∈ Pj, which means
ge = 0. Since Gj contains no negative cost cycles, the cost of g is at least that of a shortest
v-t-path in Gj, and so
dj(v, t) ≤ τ(Pj+1)− τ(Pj) + τ(R) = dj(s, t)− dj−1(s, t) + dj−1(v, t) .
Finally, we can conclude
αdj(s, t) + ρ(θ + dj(v, t)) = αdj(s, t) + ρ(θ + dj−1(v, t))− ρ(θ + dj−1(v, t)) + ρ(θ + dj(v, t))
≥ αdj(s, t) + ρ(θ + dj−1(v, t))− α(dj(v, t)− dj−1(v, t))
≥ αdj−1(s, t) + ρ(θ + dj−1(v, t)),
where the first inequality follows from the growth bound, using dj(v, t) ≥ dj−1(v, t).
Proof of Theorem 3.1. Fix some vw ∈ E and θ ∈ R. Consider now any j ∈ [m] for which
ατ(Pj) ≤ C (so that Pj is used for a nontrivial interval) and vw ∈ Pj. Since Pj is a
shortest path in Gj−1, if we send flow along this path starting from some time ξ, it will
arrive at v at time ξ + dj−1(s, v). Considering the definition of the interval [aj, bj], we
see that Pj contributes flow to vw at time θ if cj(v, θ) ≤ C. By Lemma 3.2, this occurs
precisely if j ≤ J(v, θ).
Considering in similar fashion paths Pj with wv ∈ Pj (and noting that J(w, θ+ τvw) =









xj = f (J(v,θ))vw .
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Feasibility of f is now immediate.
Corollary 3.3. f is a feasible flow over time without waiting.
Proof. By the way that we constructed f , it has value Q, satisfies flow conservation, and
has no waiting. Only nonnegativity and the capacity constraint remain, which follows
from Theorem 3.1.
3.4 Optimality
In this section, we show that our proposed algorithm does return an optimal flow.
3.4.1 Duality-based certificates of optimality




















∇fs(θ)dθ = −Q∫ ∞
−∞
∇ft(θ)dθ = Q∫ θ
−∞
∇fv(ξ)dξ = zv(θ) ∀v ∈ V \ {s, t}, θ ∈ R
fe(θ) ≤ νe ∀e ∈ E, θ ∈ R
z, f ≥ 0
(3.4)
Here, zv(θ) represents the amount of flow waiting at node v at time θ (which must al-
ways be nonnegative). Both fe for any e ∈ E and zv for any v ∈ V should be bounded
and measurable functions with compact support. This implies that in fact zv is abso-
lutely continuous for each v ∈ V . Note that the objective function captures separately
the contribution to the journey time coming from actually travelling across arcs, and the
contribution from waiting at nodes. As a further remark, this linear program does not ex-
plicitly prevent flow from departing and then returning to t; only the aggregate constraint∫∞
−∞∇ft(θ) = Q is imposed. The growth condition on ρ, however, ensures that it is never
profitable to do this; the reduction of scheduling cost is never more than the journey time
cost (including waiting at nodes).
Given that this is an infinite-dimensional linear program, one may reasonably expect
to be able to write down a dual, and make use of weak and strong duality, as well as
complementary slackness conditions. However, care is needed: the situation for infinite
(even countable) dimensional linear programs is subtle. Strong duality and even weak
duality may fail to hold, even for infinite linear programs with a countable number of
variables and constraints [Romeijn et al., 1992]. Here, our primal variables live in the space
of bounded measurable functions, and there are an uncountably infinite set of constraints:
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it is a continuous linear program (see [Sharkey, 2011] for a review of some of the relevant
literature). Fortunately, the particular structure of our continuous linear program is of a
well-behaved form.
A continuous time linear program [Reiland, 1980] is (after a possible change of vari-





s.t. B̃(θ)y(θ) ≥ b̃(θ) +
∫ θ
T̃0
K̃(ξ, θ)y(ξ)dξ ∀ T̃0 ≤ θ ≤ T̃1
y(θ) ≥ 0 ∀ T̃0 ≤ θ ≤ T̃1.
Here, [T̃0, T̃1] is a compact interval, c̃ and b̃ are vectors of bounded measurable functions,
and B̃, K̃ are matrices of bounded measurable functions. Note that K̃(ξ, θ) is only required
for ξ ≤ θ. The components of a feasible solution y are required also to be bounded and





s.t. B̃>(θ)w(θ) ≤ c̃(θ) +
∫ T̃1
θ
K̃>(θ, ξ)w(ξ)dξ ∀ T̃0 ≤ θ ≤ T̃1
w(θ) ≥ 0 ∀ T̃0 ≤ θ ≤ T̃1.
Strong duality does not hold without further assumptions, but weak duality (and hence
sufficiency of related complementary slackness conditions) do hold [Reiland, 1980, Theorem



















K̃(θ, ξ)w(ξ)dξ − B̃>(θ)w(θ)
)]
= 0,
then y and w are both optimal. Reiland [1980] gives constraint qualifications under which
a version of this is both necessary and sufficient for optimality, i.e., where strong duality
holds; we will not need this, and so don’t discuss this further here.
Our continuous LP (3.4) fits within this class. First, we note that while we wrote
the program with an unbounded interval, this was purely for notational convenience; any
optimal solution must be contained in the interval {θ : |θ| ≤ Q/νSP +τSP}, where νSP is the
minimum capacity of an arc of some shortest s-t-path in G, and τSP is the length of this
path. (This comes from considering a solution that minimizes the average journey time,
and has minimum scheduling cost subject to this.) One may introduce the additional
variables Fe(θ) =
∫ θ
−∞ fe(ξ)dξ, after which it is straightforward to place things in the
desired form.
After writing down the dual constraints and the complementary slackness conditions,
the following sufficient conditions for optimality to (3.4) are obtained. The theorem is
stated only for the case where the primal flow has no waiting: our algorithm produces
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such a flow, and so this is the case of interest to us (it will thus be an immediate corollary
of our result that there is always an optimal flow without waiting). For completeness
and convenience, we give a short, self-contained proof of this theorem; none of the above
discussion will be used.
Theorem 3.4. Let f be a flow over time without waiting and with value Q, and suppose
that π : V × R→ R satisfies the following, for some choice of C:
(i) θ → πv(θ)− αθ is nonincreasing.
(ii) πw(θ + τvw) ≤ πv(θ) + ατvw for all θ ∈ R, vw ∈ Ef (θ).
(iii) πs(θ) = 0 for all θ ∈ R.
(iv) πt(θ) = (C − ρ(θ))+ for all θ ∈ R, and ∇ft(θ) = 0 whenever ρ(θ) > C.
Then f is an optimal solution.
Proof. We will need the following technical lemma (obvious via integrating by parts in the
case that h is also absolutely continuous).
Claim 3.5. Let h : R→ R be a nonincreasing function, and z : R→ R+ be an absolutely
continuous nonnegative function with compact support. Then
∫∞




′(θ)dθ = 0, we may assume by shifting if necessary that h is nonnegative
on the support of z. Let µ be a measure so that µ([θ,∞)) = h(θ) for almost every θ in













from which we obtain the result by applying Fubini’s theorem.
Define, for each vw ∈ E,
µvw(θ) := (πw(θ + τvw)− πv(θ)− ατvw)+.
Now let g, z be any feasible solution to (3.4) with compact support. Consider any
v ∈ V \ {s, t}, and observe that∫ ∞
−∞
πv(θ)∇gv(θ) + αzv(θ)dθ =
∫ ∞
−∞
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The final inequality comes from observing that the first term is nonnegative by Claim 3.5
(applied with h(θ) = πv(θ)−αθ, which is nonincreasing by property (i), and z(θ) = zv(θ)),
and that the second term is zero since z has compact support.





















































Inequality (∗) follows from property (iv) of π, along with the definition of µe. The equality
(∗∗) follows by recombining the ge(θ) terms and recalling that πs ≡ 0 and that g has value
Q. Finally, (∗∗∗) follows from (3.5), and the inequalities µe(θ) ≥ 0 and ge(θ) ≤ νe that
hold for all e ∈ E and θ ∈ R.
To complete the proof of the theorem, we now observe that all of the inequalities in
the above hold with equality if g = f and (consistent with the no-waiting assumption on
f) z = 0. Property (ii) implies that if fvw(θ) > 0 (so that wv ∈ Ef (θ)), then µvw(θ) =
πw(θ + τvw) − πv(θ) − ατvw, yielding equality in (∗). It also implies that if fvw(θ) < νvw
(so that vw ∈ Ef (θ)) then µvw(θ) = 0. This, together with z = 0, implies the equality in
(∗∗∗).
As is often the case, the optimal dual solution also provides us the prescription for
tolls to induce the optimum flow. We delay this discussion to Section 3.5.
3.4.2 The dual prescription
We now give a certificate of optimality π : V ×R→ R for (3.4) that satisfies the conditions
of Theorem 3.4. Given a vertex v ∈ V and a time θ ∈ R let
πv(θ) = max{π̂v(θ), π̄v(θ), 0}
where
π̂v(θ) = −αdJ(v,θ)(v, s),
π̄v(θ) = C − αdJ(v,θ)(v, t)− ρ(θ + dJ(v,θ)(v, t)).
Some intuition for this choice of π can be obtained by thinking in terms of “temporal”
shortest paths in the residual Ef (θ) of the flow f returned by the algorithm. For some
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Figure 3.4: Dual values to show optimality of the flow in Example 3.1. πs(θ) = 0 for all
θ ∈ R, and is not shown.
v ∈ V and θ ∈ R, consider a shortest s-v-path P = (s = v0, v1, . . . , vk−1, vk = v) in f (J(v,θ)).
This path can be turned into a “temporal” path that ends at v at time θ, in the obvious
way: the path should visit node vi at time θi, such that θi = θi−1 + τvi−1vi for each i ∈ [k],
and θk = θ. It turns out that every arc in this temporal path lies in the residual Ef (θ),
and given that πs ≡ 0, this implies an upper bound on πv(θ) by Theorem 3.4 property
(ii); this upper bound motivates the definition of π̂. A similar consideration of a shortest
t-v-path in G(J(v,θ)), along with the requirement that πt(θ) = (C − ρ(θ))+, motivates π̄.
Example 3.2. Figure 3.4 shows the dual values πv for the instance of Example 3.1. The
conditions for Theorem 3.4 are all satisfied; for example, 0 < fsb(−7) < νsb, and so we
should have that πb(−7 + 3) = πs(−7) + α · 3 = 3, which is indeed the case.
Lemma 3.6. We have πs(θ) = 0 and πt(θ) = (C − ρ(θ))+ for all θ ∈ R.
Proof. Notice that
π̂s(θ) = −αdJ(s,θ)(s, s) = 0
and π̄s(θ) = C − αdJ(s,θ)(s, t)− ρ(θ + dJ(s,θ)(s, t) < 0;
the last inequality comes from (3.3). Thus πs(θ) = 0 for all θ.
Next, set j = J(t, θ) and observe that
π̄t(θ) = C − αdj(t, t)− ρ(θ + dj(t, t)) = C − ρ(θ).
For π̂t(θ), we consider two cases.
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• If j = 0, then π̂t(θ) = −αd0(t, s) ≤ 0.
• If j ≥ 1, then by (3.2) (and using dj−1(t, t) = 0),
αdj−1(s, t) + ρ(θ) ≤ C.
Since dj−1(s, t) is equal to the length of path Pj, and the reverse of Pj is a t-s-path
in Gj, we deduce that dj(t, s) ≤ −dj−1(t, s), and hence that π̂t(θ) = αdj(t, s) ≤
C − ρ(θ).
In either case, πt(θ) = max{C − ρ(θ), 0}.
Thus conditions (iii) and (iv) of Theorem 3.4 hold. For the remaining conditions, we
begin with some basic facts about distance labels associated with successive shortest paths
(statements of a similar flavour can be found in Ahuja et al. [1993], for example).
Lemma 3.7. For every v ∈ V , dj(v, s) is nonincreasing with j, and dj(v, t) is nonde-
creasing in j.
Proof. We show that dj−1(v, s) ≥ dj(v, s) for all v ∈ V and j ∈ [m]. If dj−1(v, s) is infinite,
there is nothing to prove; by possibly restricting to a subgraph in the following argument,
assume that all nodes are reachable from s in Gj−1. For any node labels σ ∈ RV , and any
vw ∈
←→
E , let cσvw := cvw + σw − σv. Notice that for any `, if σ is such that cσvw ≥ 0 for all
vw ∈ E`, then σv − σs ≥ d`(s, v) for all v ∈ V .
Now define σv = dj−1(s, v) for each node v; then cσvw ≥ 0 for all vw ∈ Ej−1, with
equality if v lies on a shortest path from s to w. Thus all arcs vw in the path Pj satisfy
cσvw = 0. Hence cσvw ≥ 0 for all vw ∈ Ej, and hence dj−1(s, v) = σv − σs ≥ dj(s, v) for all
v ∈ V .
A similar argument “in reverse” applies for distances to t. This time, define σv =
dj(v, t); then cσvw ≥ 0 for all vw ∈ Ej, with equality for all arcs of Pj. So cσvw ≥ 0 for all
vw ∈ Ej−1, and hence dj(v, t) = σt − σv ≥ dj−1(v, t) for all nodes v.
Lemma 3.8. For all j ∈ [m] and v ∈ V , dj−1(v, t)− dj−1(s, t) = dj(v, s).
Proof. First of all, notice that dj−1(v, t) is finite precisely if dj(v, s) is, since a v-t-path in
Gj−1 can be combined with the reverse of Pj to obtain a v-s-path in Gj, and vice versa.
Since dj−1(s, t) is always finite, the claim holds if dj−1(v, t) = dj(v, s) =∞, so we assume
both are finite in what follows.
Let R be a shortest v-s-path in Gj, and let R′ be a v-t-path contained in Pj +R (arcs
in opposite directions are cancelled). Then R′ is in Gj−1; if e is an arc in R not in Gj−1,
then e is the reverse of an arc of Pj, and hence not in Pj + R. So dj−1(v, t) ≤ τ(R′). But
since Gj−1 has no negative cost cycles, τ(R′) ≤ τ(R) + τ(Pj).
To show that dj−1(v, t)−dj−1(s, t) ≥ dj(v, s), let R̄ be a shortest v-t-path in Gj−1. Let
w be the first (i.e., closest to v) vertex present in both R̄ and Pj (notice that w might be
equal to v or t) and let R be the v-w-path contained in R̄. Then
dj−1(v, t) = dj−1(w, t) + τ(R). (3.6)
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Since R ⊆ Ej, we have that:
dj(v, s) ≤ dj(w, s) + τ(R)
= dj−1(w, t)− dj−1(s, t) + τ(R) since w ∈ Pj
= dj−1(v, t)− dj−1(s, t) by (3.6).
This concludes the proof.
Now we are ready to show that π satisfies conditions (i) and (ii) of Theorem 3.4.
Lemma 3.9. θ → πv(θ)− αθ is nonincreasing.
Proof. Fix any θ ∈ R and ε ≥ 0. We show that πv(θ) ≥ πv(θ + ε) − αε. Let j := J(v, θ)
and ` := J(v, θ + ε).
• Case 1: πv(θ + ε) = −αd`(v, s).
If ` ≤ j, then by Lemma 3.7
πv(θ) ≥ π̂v(θ) = −αdj(v, s) ≥ −αd`(v, s) = πv(θ + ε).
So suppose ` > j. By the definition of J(v, θ + ε), we know that
αd`−1(s, t) + ρ(θ + ε+ d`−1(v, t)) ≤ C. (3.7)
As a consequence, we have that:
πv(θ) ≥ π̄v(θ)
= C − αdj(v, t)− ρ(θ + dj(v, t))
(∗)
≥ C − αdj(v, t)− ρ(θ + ε+ d`−1(v, t))− α (ε+ d`−1(v, t)− dj(v, t))
≥ αd`−1(s, t)− αε− αd`−1(v, t) by (3.7)
= −αε− αd`(v, s) by Lemma 3.8
= πv(θ + ε)− αε.
Inequality (∗) follows from the growth bound on ρ combined with the fact that
θ + ε+ d`−1(v, t) ≥ θ + dj(v, t) by Lemma 3.7.
• Case 2: πv(θ + ε) = C − αd`(v, t)− ρ(θ + ε+ d`(v, t)).
If ` ≥ j, then:
πv(θ) ≥ π̄v(θ)
= C − αdj(v, t)− ρ(θ + dj(v, t))
= C − αdj(v, t)− ρ(θ + ε+ d`(v, t)) + ρ(θ + ε+ d`(v, t))− ρ(θ + dj(v, t))
≥ C − αdj(v, t)− ρ(θ + ε+ d`(v, t))− α (ε+ d`(v, t)− dj(v, t))
= C − ρ(θ + ε+ d`(v, t))− αε− αd`(v, t)
= πv(θ + ε)− αε.
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The second inequality follows again from the growth bound, this time combined with
the inequality d`(v, t) ≥ dj(v, t).
If ` < j, by definition of J(v, θ + ε) we have that
αd`(s, t) + ρ(θ + ε+ d`(v, t)) > C.
From this, we obtain
πv(θ) ≥ π̂v(θ)
= −αdj(v, s)
> C − αd`(s, t)− ρ(θ + ε+ d`(v, t))− αdj(v, s)
≥ C − αd`(s, t)− ρ(θ + ε+ d`(v, t))− αd`+1(v, s) by Lemma 3.7
= C − αd`(v, t)− ρ(θ + ε+ d`(v, t)) by Lemma 3.8
= πv(θ + ε).
• Case 3: πv(θ + ε) = 0.
This case is immediate from the definition of πv.
Lemma 3.10. If vw ∈ Ef (θ), then πw(θ + τvw) ≤ πv(θ) + ατvw.
Proof. Let j := J(v, θ) and ` := J(w, θ + τvw). Note that since vw ∈ Ef (θ), Theorem 3.1
implies that vw ∈ Ej.
• Case 1: πw(θ + τvw) = −αd`(w, s).
If ` ≤ j, then
πv(θ) ≥ −αdj(v, s)
≥ −ατvw − αdj(w, s) since vw ∈ Ej
≥ −ατvw − αd`(w, s) by Lemma 3.7
= πw(θ + τvw)− ατvw.
So suppose ` > j. By the definition of J(w, θ + τvw) we know that
αd`−1(s, t) + ρ(θ + τvw + d`−1(w, t)) ≤ C. (3.8)
Since vw ∈ Ej and dj(w, t) ≤ d`−1(w, t) by Lemma 3.7, we also have
θ + dj(v, t) ≤ θ + τvw + d`−1(w, t). (3.9)
Thus
πv(θ) ≥ C − αdj(v, t)− ρ(θ + dj(v, t))
≥ C − αdj(v, t)− ρ(θ + τvw + d`−1(w, t))− α (τvw + d`−1(w, t)− dj(v, t))
≥ αd`−1(s, t)− ατvw − αd`−1(w, t) by (3.8)
= −ατvw − αd`(w, s) by Lemma 3.8
= πw(θ + τvw)− ατvw
where the second inequality follows from the growth bound and from (3.9).
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• Case 2: πw(θ + τvw) = C − αd`(w, t)− ρ(θ + τvw + d`(w, t)).
If ` ≥ j, since vw ∈ Ej and dj(w, t) ≤ d`(w, t) by Lemma 3.7, we have that
θ + dj(v, t) ≤ θ + τvw + d`(w, t). (3.10)
As a consequence, exploiting also the growth bound, we have
πv(θ) ≥ π̄v(θ)
= C − αdj(v, t)− ρ(θ + dj(v, t))
= C − αdj(v, t)− ρ(θ + τvw + d`(w, t)) + ρ(θ + τvw + d`(w, t))− ρ(θ + dj(v, t))
≥ C − αdj(v, t)− ρ(θ + τvw + d`(w, t))− α (τvw + d`(w, t)− dj(v, t))
= C − ρ(θ + τvw + d`(w, t))− ατvw − αd`(w, t)
= πw(θ + τvw)− ατvw.
If ` < j, by definition of J(w, θ + τvw) we have that
αd`(s, t) + ρ(θ + τvw + d`(w, t)) > C. (3.11)
Thus
πv(θ) ≥ −αdj(v, s)
≥ −αdj(w, s)− ατvw since vw ∈ Ej
≥ −αd`+1(w, s)− ατvw by Lemma 3.7
> C − αd`(s, t)− ρ(θ + τvw + d`(w, t))− αd`+1(w, s)− ατvw by (3.11)
= C − αd`(w, t)− ρ(θ + τvw + d`(w, t))− ατvw by Lemma 3.8
= πw(θ + τvw)− ατvw.
• Case 3: πw(θ + τvw) = 0.
By Lemma 3.9, we have πv(θ) + ατvw ≥ πv(θ + τvw), which is nonnegative by the
definition of πv.
This completes the proof that π satisfies all conditions of Theorem 3.4 with respect to
the flow over time f produced by the algorithm, hence demonstrating the optimality of
the algorithm.
3.5 Optimal tolls
Tolls µ : E × R → R+ are per-arc, time-varying and nonnegative. The value µe(θ)
represents the toll a user is charged upon entering the link at time θ.
We have the following theorem.
Theorem 3.11. Let (f, π) be an optimal primal-dual solution to (3.4) (as constructed in
Section 3.3 and Section 3.4) and define, for each vw ∈ E,
µvw(θ) = (πw(θ + τvw)− πv(θ)− ατvw)+.
Then f is a dynamic equilibrium under tolls µ.
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Of course, to make sense of this theorem we must know what is meant by a dynamic
equilibrium under tolls. Informally, it means that no user (represented as an infinitesimal
flow particle) has an alternative strategy (route choice and departure time combination) of
strictly smaller disutility. Making this precise in general requires defining precisely what
disutility a user would incur for any given route and departure time choice, by considering
the full game-theoretic Vickrey bottleneck congestion model [Vickrey, 1969, Koch and
Skutella, 2011]. Tolls and departure time choice can be introduced into the definition
of a dynamic equilibrium discussed in these works. However, the complexity of this is
only needed because in general, a user may have to incur additional waiting time on arcs
that are fully utilized, meaning that the disutility of a particular strategy depends in a
complicated way on the actions of the other users. Instead we show that even if a user is
allowed to traverse any link at any time—as if the other users were not present—there is
no incentive to deviate. This is clearly a stronger property than any reasonable notion of
equilibrium.
Let C be the cost horizon associated with (f, π). We will show that all users experience
a disutility of exactly C with f under tolls µ, and in addition that the disutility of any
other possible choice is at least C. To see this, consider any s-t-path P in G, along with
departure times θv for each v ∈ P valid for this path, meaning that θw = ε+ θv + τvw for
every vw ∈ P , with ε ≥ 0. (So we allow the possibility of waiting at a vertex). Thus by
the definition of µ and by properties (i) and (ii) of Theorem 3.4,
µvw(θv + ε) + α(τvw + ε) ≥ πw(θw)− πv(θv + ε) + αε ≥ πw(θw)− πv(θv) ,




[α(θw − θv) + µe(θw − τe)]
≥ ρ(θt) + πt(θt)− πs(θs)
= ρ(θt) + (C − ρ(θt))+
≥ C.
The inequalities are all tight if for all vw ∈ P , θw = θv + τvw and fvw(θv) > 0, by the
previous observations as well as property (iv). So if the aggregate choices of the users are
described by f , all users pay exactly C. This completes the proof of Theorem 3.11
3.5.1 Strong vs weak enforcement
As already discussed, we cannot in general strongly enforce an optimal flow, i.e., set
tolls such that every dynamic equilibrium is optimal. The following shows that the “lane
tolling” approach suffices to do this.
Theorem 3.12. Let f, π and µ be as in the previous theorem, and suppose g is any
dynamic equilibrium satisfying ge(θ) ≤ fe(θ) for all e ∈ E, θ ∈ R. Then g is optimal.
Proof. The cost of g cannot exceed the cost of f , and so it must be optimal.
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Essentially, being able to dynamically split and separately toll the capacity of a link
allows us to easily rule out all other potential equilibria just by using tolls to artificially
constrict the capacities (in addition to choosing tolls that weakly enforce the desired
flow, which is still needed). Tolling in this way seems quite distant from what could
be imaginable in realistic traffic scenarios. But it does raise the interesting question of
whether there is a tolling scheme which can strongly enforce an optimum flow, but which
is more restricted (and more plausible) than fully dynamic lane tolling. Another natural
question would be to determine if an optimum flow can be strongly enforced using lane
tolling only on certain specified arcs. We leave these as open questions.
3.5.2 Exogenous demand
Now let us consider the case of exogenous, and fixed, demand. Users depart from the source
s at a fixed rate u0 over a time interval [0, T ], and simply wish to reach the destination t
as early as possible. Note that there is no longer any departure time choice; as such, users
departing at different times need not experience the same disutility in an equilibrium.
We can view this within our setting as follows. Let G′ = (V ′, E ′) be the instance
obtained by adding a node s′ and an arc s′s of capacity u0 and delay 0; s′ becomes the
new source. The total flow to send is Q = Tu0. The arc s′s ensures that the amount
of flow departing s by time θ in any flow over time cannot exceed u0θ. A flow over time
need not saturate the arc s′s in the interval [0, T ]; however, we can easily convert it to one
that does, by simply adjusting the flow to send flow from s′ to s earlier, saturating s′s on
[0, T ], and then waiting at s (that is, we do not modify the flow on any other arcs). This
clearly has no impact on arrival times. As such, we can view the restriction to G of any
flow over time on G′ as a potential solution to the exogenous demand problem.
Now let Ḡ be obtained from G′ by reversing all arcs. We consider now the source to be
t and the sink s′, and the scheduling cost function described in (3.1). Let f̄ be an optimal
flow of value Q = Tu0, and let µ̄ be the optimal tolls from Theorem 3.11 that induce it.
We now “reverse time”. For any arc vw ∈ E ′, and θ ∈ R, let fvw(θ) = f̄wv(τvw − θ),
and let µvw(θ) = µ̄wv(τvw − θ). Then f is an earliest arrival flow in G′: since f̄ minimizes
the average departure time from t in Ḡ, f minimizes the average arrival time at t in G′.
Lemma 3.13. The tolls µ restricted to E induce the restriction of f to G as a dynamic
equilibrium under exogenous demand.
Proof. First, we observe that the tolls µ induce f as a dynamic equilibrium in G′. This
is simply because given any s′-t-path P and valid departure times (θv)v∈P , these can be
mapped to a reversed path P̄ from t to s′ in Ḡ, along with corresponding reversed departure
times (θ̄v)v∈P̄ (given by, for any vw ∈ P , θ̄w = τvw − θv). The disutility experienced by a
user in G′ choosing the strategy described by P and (θv)v∈P is then precisely equal to the
disutility experienced by a user in Ḡ choosing the strategy described by P̄ and (θ̄v)v∈P .
All that remains is to go from G′ to G; that is, we need to argue that the restriction of
µ to V does induce the restriction of f to G. The role of µs′s in G′ is only to ensure equal
costs between particles that traverse s′s at different times. This is not a requirement of an
equilibrium in the exogenous setting. Some care is required however, since by restricting
f to G, we are possibly introducing waiting at s.
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Let θ′ = inf{θ ≥ 0 : fs′s(θ) < u0}. Then µs′s(θ) = 0 for all θ > θ′ with fs′s(θ) > 0. To
see this, consider any θ̃ ∈ (θ, θ′) for which fs′s(θ̃) < u0. Then s′s ∈ Ef (θ̃), implying by
property (ii) of the dual solution π (see Theorem 3.4) that µs′s(θ̃) = 0. But then if µs′s(θ′)
were larger than 0, it would be an improving deviation to traverse s′s at time θ̃ and then
wait at s, so this is not possible.
It follows that there is no waiting at s for users departing before time θ′ in G (since f
had no waiting, and fs′s(θ) = u0 until time θ′), whereas all users departing after time θ′
experience the same disutility. Thus, no user has an incentive to deviate, and we have a
dynamic equilibrium in G.
3.6 General scheduling costs
We now consider general scheduling costs, satisfying only the growth bound as well as the
following fairly unrestrictive condition. We will assume that for any C, {θ ∈ R : ρ(θ) ≤ C}
consists of a finite number of compact intervals, and this number is uniformly bounded
by some value K. Insisting that this set has finite measure ensures that the total mass
associated with any given choice of cost horizon is finite. The assumption that this set is
always closed, or in other words, that ρ is lower semicontinuous, is a matter of convenience,
and was already assumed in the strongly unimodal case. Given a scheduling function that
does not satisfy this, but with a finite number of discontinuities, the property can be
obtained by adjusting ρ only at points of discontinuity, and without affecting the optimal
solution. Finally, the assumption that the number of intervals is bounded by some K
ensures that the algorithm has a finite description, and also rules out various pathological
choices of ρ.
In order to actually implement the algorithm, oracle access to ρ will not suffice. Instead,
we assume that given C, we are able to obtain the sets ρ−1((−∞, C]) and ρ−1({C}),
described as collections of intervals. Note that ρ−1({C}) consists of a union of at most
2K intervals, since ρ−1({C}) = ρ−1((−∞, C]) \ ⋃ε>0 ρ−1((−∞, C − ε]).
There are essentially two separate complications that arise compared to the strongly
unimodal case. The first complication is that the set of arrival times where the scheduling
cost is bounded by some value need no longer be an interval. The second is that the total
mass corresponding to a given cost horizon C need no longer depend continuously on C,
meaning that once we have found the “correct” choice of cost horizon, the algorithm as
stated might send too much mass.
Let us begin by dealing with the first complication alone. So suppose that in addition to




is a continuous function of C, where throughout
this section µ(A) denotes the Lebesgue measure of a set A. The use of bisection search (or,
if ρ is given as a piecewise constant function, perhaps parametrized search) to determine
the correct cost horizon will thus not be affected. We need only describe how the algorithm
and analysis for finding an optimal solution for a given cost horizon should be modified.
The principle of the algorithm remains identical to its description in Section 3.3. All
that changes is that for a path Pj obtained from successive shortest paths, the set of times
respecting the cost horizon C is no longer an interval. Thus, we let Ij ⊆ R be a maximal
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set such that
ρ(ξ + dj−1(s, t)) ≤ C − αdj−1(s, t) for all ξ ∈ Ij. (3.12)
Given our assumptions on ρ, Ij is a finite set of compact intervals. The resulting flow f
has precisely the same definition as before, namely fvw(θ) = f (J(v,θ))vw , where the definition
of J(v, θ) also remains unchanged. The proof of feasibility of this flow, and the proof of
its optimality, both did not depend on any way on Ij being an interval, and the existing
proofs stand as written. Note that the value of the flow is ∑mj=1 µ(Ij); as expected, our
current assumptions ensure that this is a continuous function of C.





idea is as follows.
• The algorithm as described will find the maximum mass corresponding to a given
cost horizon C. We can also find the minimum corresponding mass, by slightly
adjusting the algorithm.
• Once we have determined the correct value of C via bisection or parametric search,
we must choose a solution that in a sense interpolates between the minimum and
maximum mass solutions. Some care is required to ensure that we have a feasible
flow. In particular, consider removing flow sent along a generalized path Pj coming
from the SSP decomposition for some interval of time. If an arc e is a forward arc in
Pj, then removing flow on it for a certain period of time may not be possible without
also removing flow from a generalized path that uses e in the opposite direction.
We now describe the algorithm. As previously, a bisection search (or possibly para-
metrized search) is used to find the correct cost horizon. However, given a current guess
C, we will compute a corresponding interval [Qmin(C), Qmax(C)] of possible total masses
corresponding to this. To do this, we construct, for each path Pj obtained from successive
shortest paths, two sets Iminj and Imaxj defined as follows. Imaxj is defined precisely as
before, i.e., according to (3.12). Iminj is defined instead as
Iminj := cl
(
Imaxj \ {ξ : ρ(ξ + dj−1(s, t)) = C − αdj−1(s, t)}
)
,
where cl(A) denotes the closure of the set A ⊆ R. Again, our assumptions on ρ ensure
that Iminj is a finite collection of compact intervals. This results in two different flows over








respectively. (Feasibility and optimality of fmin has not yet been demonstrated; we will
return to this point.)
Once we have found C such that Q ∈ [Qmin(C), Qmax(C)], we proceed as follows. Let
θ0 ∈ R be a value we will choose later. For each j ∈ [m], let
Iθ0j := Iminj ∪
(
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so Iminj ⊆ Iθ0j ⊆ Imaxj (see Figure 3.5 for an example). Now take f θ0 to be the flow over
time obtained by sending flow on path Pj for times in Iθ0j , for each j. Delaying concerns
about feasibility, the value of this flow is Q(θ0) :=
∑m
j=1 µ(Iθ0j ). Since this is continuous
and piecewise linear in θ0, with
Qmin(C) = inf
θ
Q(θ) ≤ Q ≤ sup
θ
Q(θ) = Qmax(C),
we can easily determine the correct choice for θ0 so that Q(θ0) = Q. The output of the






Figure 3.5: An example of a general scheduling cost function, and intervals Iθ0j correspond-
ing to three paths of different lengths, for some particular choice of C and the indicated
value of θ0.
It remains to show the correctness of this algorithm, by demonstrating that the flow
over time f constructed by this algorithm is both feasible and optimal. This could be done
by suitably tweaking the arguments in Section 3.3 and Section 3.4. We will however avoid
this, and instead proceed as follows. Suppose we are able to define a family of perturbed
scheduling cost functions ρ(ε) and flows f (ε) for all ε > 0 such that the following hold:
(i) ρ(ε) converges uniformly to ρ as ε → 0. Note that this implies that the cost of
an optimal solution under scheduling cost ρ(ε) converges to the cost of an optimal
solution under ρ.
(ii) f (ε) is an optimal flow of maximum total mass with cost horizon C, with respect to
the cost function ρ(ε), and f (ε) converges to f as ε→ 0.
Together, this implies feasibility and optimality of f for ρ.
We define ρ(ε) as follows:
ρ(ε)(θ) =

ρ(θ) if θ ≤ θ0
ρ(θ) + ε if θ > θ0
min{ρ(θ0), limθ′→θ+0 ρ(θ
′) + ε} if θ = θ0
.
(That is, we increase ρ by ε to the right of θ0, choosing the value at θ0 so that ρ(ε) is lower
semicontinuous.) Property (i) is then immediate. Property (ii) follows from (3.12) applied




In this chapter we studied the optimization problem of finding a flow over time of value
Q with minimum total cost, where the cost of each flow particle equals the journey time
cost plus the scheduling cost (as discussed in Section 1.3). This objective function is very
popular and frequently studied in the traffic and transportation literature but had not
been studied in the optimization literature yet.
As a first contribution, we showed how to modify the successive shortest paths algo-
rithm for earliest arrival flows in order to compute an optimal flow for this new setting.
The key difference with the algorithm for earliest arrival flows lies in the new concept of
computing and using a cost horizon C rather than a time horizon. However, our proof of
optimality is completely different than the ones for earliest arrival flows and it is based on
duality of an infinite dimensional LP.
As a second main contribution, we showed how to define, providing explicit formula,
time-varying tolls that induce the social optimum as an equilibrium flow. These tolls are
derived from the optimal dual solution and apply in both the endogenous and the exoge-
nous model. This contribution is likely to be of independent interest to the transportation
science community.
Since an optimal solution, both in terms of flows and corresponding inducing tolls, is
based on the successive shortest paths, it possesses a clear combinatorial structure. This
structure might be useful to investigate different research questions. As an example, the
question of proving bounds on the the price of anarchy – i.e. the worst possible ratio
between the total cost of an equilibrium and the one of a social optimum.
We will use these results in Chapter 5, where we will compare the equilibria with




Dynamic equilibria with endogenous
departure time choice
This chapter contains unpublished results obtained thanks to the collaboration of Neil Olver.
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter we define the model of dynamic equilibria with endogenous departure time
choice and we study their existence and uniqueness. Here users are able to choose both
their route and their departure time. They are then concerned not only with their journey
time, but also their arrival time at the destination and, in addition to the journey time
costs, incur also scheduling costs for arriving either early or late (see Section 1.3). A
dynamic equilibrium (or simply equilibrium) occurs then when no user has a unilateral
deviation that strictly decreases their disutility. This implies that the inflow rate into the
network it is not part of the input, as it is in the exogenous demand model, but depends
on the equilibrium behavior.
We represent traffic dynamics utilizing the Vickrey bottleneck congestion model [Vick-
rey, 1969] (see Section 1.1) and traffic flow utilizing the flow over time model with waiting
on the arcs defined in Section 2.4. Here each user is represented by a divisible infinitesi-
mally small particle that possesses no mass. We focus on an homogeneous setting where
users share origin, destination and scheduling cost function and therefore a setting where
all the users share the same strategy set (i.e., the same collection of routes and departure
times). This implies that all the agents incur the same cost.
In fact, instead of specifying the total mass of users Q, we consider a cost horizon C
that represents the cost that the agents are willing to pay. That is, an agent will commute
if their total cost for doing so is strictly below C, and is indifferent to commuting or not
if this cost is exactly C, but will not commute at any larger cost.
While in the previous chapter we considered any scheduling cost function, in this
chapter we focus only on convex scheduling cost functions ρ for which θ → ρ(θ) + αθ is
increasing. The latter condition, that we call the growth bound on ρ and that is similar to
the condition of the same name of Chapter 31, is a necessary condition for the existence of
1With the difference that the latter was nondecreasing instead of increasing.
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the equilibrium with arbitrary cost horizon C. We postpone this discussion to Section 4.2.
This setting (with the more restricted scheduling cost function defined in Equation (1.1))
is very common in transportation literature (see [Small, 2015, Li et al., 2020] for a survey)
but most of the attention received has been on simple networks, like single-link, parallel-
links networks or networks with very few arcs [Arnott et al., 1993, Kuwahara, 1990, Zhang
et al., 2008]; in this chapter we consider arbitrary network topologies, which have received
much less attention. The perspective we take here follows the treatments in the optimiza-
tion literature (e.g., [Cominetti et al., 2015, Koch and Skutella, 2011]), where users do not
choose their departure time but are released into the network at a given inflow rate.
Dynamic equilibria with endogenous departure time choice are used in the rest of the
thesis except for Chapter 7.
Our results and outline of the chapter. We formally define the model in Section 4.2.
We will refer to this section also in Chapter 7, where we will study dynamic equilibria
with exogenous departure time choice.
In Section 4.3 we show existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium in a sensitive
demand model, where each user have some fixed disutility that they are willing to suffer,
and otherwise will not travel. Then, in Section 4.4, under two very plausible conjectures
about continuity and monotonicity of equilibria, we extent the existence and uniqueness
results to the insensitive model.
Finally, in Section 4.5 we show how dynamic equilibria with endogenous departure
time choice generalize the ones where users do not choose the departure time.
4.2 Model and preliminaries
As mention earlier, in this chapter we follow the methodology used in the optimization
literature (e.g., [Cominetti et al., 2015, Koch and Skutella, 2011]) and many proofs rely on
the same concepts and ideas. We refer to Chapter 2 for the network structure, notation
and flow over time definition.
Link dynamics. In this model we consider flow over time with waiting on arcs and not
on vertices. This means that strict flow conservation is satisfied and that, if the inflow rate
into an arc exceeds the capacity, a queue forms at the entrance. We use ze(θ) to denote
the total mass of the queue on arc e at time θ, which equals the total amount of flow that
has entered e by time θ minus the total amount of flow that has exit e by time θ+ τe, i.e.:
ze(θ) = F ine (θ)− F oute (θ + τe) .
Queues are vertical and spaceless, in the sense that they possess no physical dimension and
can become arbitrarily large without interfering with traffic not using the arc in question
(there is no spillback). So one can equivalently think of the queue as being formed at the
exit of the arc. Additionally, users arrive at the end of the queue instantaneously and
independently on the size of it.
Once inside the network, users want to arrive at their destination as soon as possible,
a feature that results from the growth bound of the scheduling cost function. This implies
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that users leave a queue according to the First-In-First-Out (FIFO) principle and that
queues evacuate at the maximum possible rate, i.e. the capacity νe. As a result, a particle
that enters the arc at time θ experiences a queueing delay of
qe(θ) := ze(θ)/νe . (4.1)
The time at which the particle exits the arc equals thus the sum of the entrance time into
the arc, the queueing delay and the free transit time of the arc:
Te(θ) := θ + qe(θ) + τe. (4.2)




f ine (θ)− νe if ze(θ) > 0max{f ine (θ)− νe, 0} if ze(θ) = 0. (4.3)
The outflow rate at time θ + τe is also clear: if there is no queue, it is equal to the inflow
rate, and if there is a queue, then it is equal to the capacity.
f oute (θ + τe) =
f ine (θ) if ze(θ) = 0νe if ze(θ) > 0. (4.4)
Given a collection of inflow functions (f ine )e∈E, the corresponding outflow functions
f oute and queue functions ze can be deduced from (4.3) and (4.4). Therefore we specify a
flow over time by just using its inflow functions (f ine )e∈E.
Earliest arrival functions and dynamic shortest path network. Consider some
flow over time (f ine )e∈E, we define the earliest arrival functions `v, for v ∈ V , such that
`v(θ) is equal to the earliest time a particle can arrive at v, given that it leaves s at time
θ. Let us be more precise and let’s define `v(θ) using the dynamic Bellman’s equations`s(θ) = θ ∀θ ∈ R`w(θ) = min
vw∈E
Tvw(`v(θ)) ∀w ∈ V \ {s}, θ ∈ R .
(4.5)
Let the entrance time of a particle be the time this particle departs from s. We say
that an arc e = vw is active at entrance time θ if `w(θ) = Te(`v(θ)). This means that it is
possible for a particle leaving s at time θ to arrive at w as early as possible, namely at time
`w(θ), by a path that includes the arc e. Moreover, if the active arc e = vw hosts a queue
at time `v(θ), we call it resetting at entrance time θ. Let E ′θ, E∗θ ⊆ E ′θ be, respectively, the
set of all the active arcs and the set of all the resetting arcs at entrance time θ, formally:
E ′θ := {e = vw ∈ E : `w(θ) = Te(`v(θ))}
and
E∗θ := {e = vw ∈ E ′θ : `w(θ) > `v(θ) + τe} .
The network Gθ = (V,E ′θ, E∗θ ) is called the shortest path network at time θ. Note that
Gθ is acyclic since the complete network has no directed cycle with zero transit time (see
Section 2.2) and because of Equation (4.5).
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User costs and choices. Each individual user is considered to control a negligible
fraction of the total flow, so that there are an infinite number of infinitesimally small,
divisible users. We think of each user as being able to freely choose both their departure
time and their route through the network. The joint choices of all these users should
then induce a corresponding flow over time. We restrict our attention to a setting with
completely homogeneous users, with origin s, destination t and desired arrival time T ∗.
As in in Chapter 3, we consider a scheduling cost setting: the total disutility of a user
is the sum of their scheduling cost and their journey time, scaled by some factor α > 0
representing his value of time (see Section 1.3). We use ρ(θ) to denote the scheduling cost










Dynamic equilibria and induced cumulative flow. A dynamic equilibrium (or sim-
ply equilibrium) is a joint choice amongst all the users in the system of routes and depar-
ture times, with the property that no user has a unilateral deviation that strictly decreases
their disutility. This results in a flow over time which we call equilibrium flow. Since all
users have the same strategy set (i.e., the same collection of routes and departure times)
and are homogeneous, all users should experience the same disutility in a deterministic
equilibrium. Then the following condition is a requirement for a flow to be an equilibrium:
Condition 4.1. For all e = vw ∈ E and almost every θ for which f ine (`v(θ)) > 0, e is
active at entrance time θ.
Condition 4.1 says that the equilibrium flow uses only paths in the current shortest
path network and ensures that all users are satisfied with their choice of route, given their
choice of departure time. This can be expressed through the following lemma:
Lemma 4.2 ([Cominetti et al., 2015, Theorem 1]). If a flow over time (f ine )e∈E is a
dynamic equilibrium then F ine (`v(θ)) = F oute (`w(θ)) for each arc e = vw ∈ E and θ ∈ R.
It follows that the functions xe(θ) := F ine (`v(θ)), called cumulative flow induced by a







0 if v 6= s, t∫ θ
−∞ ν0(ξ)dξ if v = s,
(4.7)
where ν0(θ) is the (non-negative) rate of users departing from s at time θ (note that a user
might “depart” s at some moment but then immediately be forced to wait on an arc).
We must add to Condition 4.1 a condition that ensures all users are satisfied with their
choice of departure time as well. Thus we have
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C
T ∗first arrival last arrival
journey time
cost
Figure 4.1: The horizontal axis represents the arrival time. The dashed line indicates the
scheduling cost function. The top black line indicates the cost of an agent. The vertical
distance between the top black line and the dashed line indicates the journey time cost
for an agent arriving at time indicated by the horizontal axis.
Let T ∗ denote the time when the scheduling cost is minimum, i.e. T ∗ = argminθ ρ(θ).
Condition 4.3 implies that all the particles of the equilibrium flow have the same cost.
This means that the particles that arrive at the sink first incur a small journey time cost
but a big scheduling cost. On the other hand, the particles that arrive at the sink closely
to time T ∗ incur a small scheduling cost but a big journey time cost (see Figure 4.1).
Additionally, let the starting-time and the ending-time, denoted as θf and θl, be the
departure time of, respectively, the first and last particle that arrives at t. Note that
Condition 4.1 implies that the particle that arrives first (last) at t is also the particle that
departs first (last) from s. Since ρ is continuous and convex, θf and θl are uniquely defined
such that θf ≤ θl, ρ(θf + τSP) = C−α · τSP and ρ(θl + τSP) = C−α · τSP, where C denotes
the cost horizon of the equilibrium flow, i.e. the total cost of any user.
A consequence of Condition 4.3 is the following lemma:
Lemma 4.4. For the earliest arrival functions (`v)v∈V of an equilibrium we have that
`′t(θ) = αα+ρ′(`t(θ)) for θ ∈ (θf , θl).
Proof. Let’s consider two particles that depart at time θ and θ + ε, where ε > 0 and



























`t(θ + ε)− `t(θ)
)
taking the limit as ε goes to zero, the statement follows.
Growth bound of the scheduling cost function. As already discussed, we assume
that ρ satisfies the growth bound, i.e that θ → ρ(θ) + αθ is increasing.
This condition, as Lemma 4.4 suggests, is necessary for the existence of the equilibrium
with arbitrary cost horizon C. Consider a scheduling cost function ρ where ρ′(θ) ≤ −α for
some maximal interval I = [θ1, θ2). This implies that the particles arriving at destination
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at time θ ∈ I could “wait” at the sink until time θ2 without increasing their scheduling
cost and therefore that all the particles that arrive at t within the time interval I have
the same scheduling cost. But then, since in an equilibrium everyone has the same total
cost (by Condition 4.3), all these particles have also the same journey time cost. This
happens only if they all depart and arrive at the same time. Additionally, note that these
particles encounter no queue delays because, otherwise, they should arrive at destination
immediately after the agents that arrive at destination before time θ1.
As a consequence, there cannot be a cost horizon larger than ρ(θ2) + ατSP, where τSP
is the travel time of the shortest s-t-path.
Derivatives of a dynamic equilibrium. For almost every θ ∈ (θf , θl), let x′ := dxdθ and
`′ := d`
dθ
be the derivatives of the cumulative flow (xe)e∈E and the earliest arrival functions
(`v)v∈V . By differentiating Equation (4.7) we see that x′(θ) is a static flow. Moreover, by
the Bellman equations (4.5), by Lemma 4.4 and by the equilibrium conditions (4.1), (4.2),
(4.3) and (4.4) we have that x′, `′ fulfill the following definition.
Definition 4.5 (Endogenous Thin Flow with Resetting (ETF)). We say that the pair
(x′, `′) is an Endogenous Thin Flow on Gθ = (V,E ′θ, E∗θ ) if:








η(`′v, x′vw) ∀v ∈ V \ {s}











vw /∈ E∗θ .
Note that the definition of endogenous thin flow with resetting matches the one of the
Normalized Thin Flows introduced in [Cominetti et al., 2015], with the only difference
that the latter fixes the inflow into s while the former fixes the value of `′t. We reproduce
it here for convenience.
Definition 4.6 (Normalized Thin Flow with Resetting (NTF)[Cominetti et al., 2015]).
We say that the pair (x′, `′) is a Normalized Thin Flow on Gθ = (V,E ′θ, E∗θ ) if:





η(`′v, x′vw) ∀v ∈ V \ {s}
`′w = η(`′v, x′vw) ∀vw ∈ E ′θ with x′vw > 0
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vw /∈ E∗θ .
4.3 Existence and uniqueness in the sensitive demand
model
In this section we prove the existence and uniqueness of equilibria with endogenous depar-
ture time choice in a sensitive demand model, where users travel only if and only if their
disutility is below a fixed cost horizon C.
The next theorem shows the existence of the endogenous thin flow with resetting.
Theorem 4.7. Let Gθ = (V,E ′θ, E∗θ ) be the current shortest path network. Unless `′t(θ) < 1
and E∗θ = ∅, there exists an ETF on Gθ. Moreover, all the ETFs on Gθ have the same
labels (`′v)v∈V .
In order to prove Theorem 4.7 we need the following Lemma.
Lemma 4.8. Let ψ : R+ → R+ be a function defined such that ψ(ν0) is the value of `′t(θ)
of the NTFs on Gθ with inflow ν0. If E∗θ = ∅ then, for any σ ∈ [1,∞), there exists a
value of ν0 such that ψ(ν0) = σ. If E∗θ 6= ∅ then, for any σ ∈ (0,∞), there exists a value
of ν0 such that ψ(ν0) = σ.
Proof. For the first part of the statement consider the min-cut capacity ς of the shortest
path network. From the algorithm to compute a thin flow with resetting for the special
case of E∗θ = ∅ ([Koch and Skutella, 2011]), we know that, if ν0 ≤ ς then `′t = 1 and that
if ν0 = σ · ς, for any σ ≥ 1, then `′t = σ.
For the second part of the statement we know that, given a constant inflow and a
shortest path network Gθ, there exists a NTF on Gθ ([Cominetti et al., 2015, Theorem 3]).
Our goal is hence to show that there exists an inflow ν0 such that `′t = σ, for any σ > 0.
From [Cominetti et al., 2015, Kaiser, 2020] we know that ψ is a continuous function
and from [Kaiser, 2020, Theorem 14], or by slightly modifying the proof of [Cominetti
et al., 2015, Theorem 4], we know that it is monotonically nondecreasing. Thus we just
need to show that ψ has a minimum that is not larger than the desired value of `′t and a
maximum that is not smaller than the desired value of `′t.
Let ν∗ be the smallest capacity of an arc in the shortest path network, i.e. ν∗ =
min{νe : e ∈ E ′θ}. Since Gθ is acyclic, it follows that x′e ≤ ν0 for any arc e and that
`′w ≤ ν0νvw ≤
ν0
ν∗
for any resetting arc vw. By the flow conservation we know that from the
head of a resetting arc to t there exists a path carrying flow. This implies, from the thin
flow constraints, that `′t ≤ ν0ν∗ . As a consequence, by choosing an inflow rate ν0 smaller
than σ · ν∗ we obtain that `′t ≤ σ.
Now let υ indicate the sum of the capacities of the in-going arcs of t in the shortest
path network, i.e. υ = ∑e=vt∈E′
θ
νe. Since all the flow reaches t, there exists an arc e






. But then, by the thin flow constraints, we have
that `′t ≥ ν0υ . By choosing an inflow rate ν0 greater than σ · υ we get `
′
t ≥ σ, concluding
the proof.
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We are now ready to prove Theorem 4.7.
Proof of Theorem 4.7. As mention earlier, the endogenous thin flows with resetting are
similar to normalized thin flows with resetting (NTFs) with the difference that the former
fixes the value of `′t while the latter fixes the value of the inflow ν0. By [Cominetti et al.,
2015, Theorem 3], we know that, given a constant inflow and a shortest path network
Gθ, there exists a NTF on Gθ and that all the NTFs on Gθ have the same labels (`′v)v∈V
[Cominetti et al., 2015, Theorem 4]. Therefore, in order to prove our statement, we just
need to show that there is a value of ν0 such that the resulting NTF has the desired value
for `′t. This follows by Lemma 4.8.
We remark that there does not exist an ETF (x′, `′) with `′t < 1 and E∗θ = ∅ since, in
this case, we have that `′t ≥ `′s = 1.
The next theorem shows existence and uniqueness for any cost horizon C. As in the
case of the exogenous demand model, our uniqueness result concerns only right-continuous
equilibria, i.e. equilibria whose earliest arrival functions (`v)v∈V are right-continuous.
Theorem 4.9. For any cost horizon C, there exists an equilibrium. Moreover, the earliest
arrival functions (`v)v∈V are the same for all equilibria with cost horizon C and that are
right-continuous.
Proof. The first part of the statement follows by Theorem 4.7 and by the equilibrium
extension procedure of Koch and Skutella [2011], Cominetti et al. [2015]. This procedure
consists in integrating the thin flows in phases during which the thin flows do not change.
More precisely, these phases are maximal time intervals in which the inflow into the source
is constant, no arc is added to the shortest path network and no queue totally depletes.
One step of the procedure is called κ-extension2 and formally consists in choosing the
largest value of κ such that
`w(θ)− `v(θ)− τvw + κ · (`′w − `′v) ≥ 0 ∀vw ∈ E∗θ (4.8)
`w(θ)− `v(θ)− τvw + κ · (`′w − `′v) ≤ 0 ∀vw ∈ E \ E ′θ (4.9)
where (x′, `′) is an ETF on the shortest path network Gθ = (V,E ′θ, E∗θ ). Equation (4.8)
ensures that no queue length becomes negative (it holds with equality when the queue
completely depletes). Equation (4.9) ensures that the arcs not present in the shortest
path network are unattractive (it holds with equality when the arc vw is added to the
shortest path network). Once found the value of κ, the shortest path network for time
θ + κ is computed.
To construct an endogenous equilibrium with endogenous departure time choice we can
proceed similarly to the case of exogenous demand: we apply the κ-extension procedure
from the starting-time θf (that depends on C) until the ending-time θl, which corresponds
to the time departure of the last particle that arrives at the sink and that experiences no
waiting.
Each extension is referred to as a phase in the evolution of the equilibrium. Note that
we do not have a lower bound for the length of a phase (see [Cominetti et al., 2017]).
2Originally called α-extension and here renamed since the variable α indicates the value of time.
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Therefore, if the number of phases is not finite, we define the equilibrium by using the
point-wise limit of the labels (`′v)v∈V , which exists since the earliest arrival functions (`v)v∈V
are nondecreasing and have bounded derivatives.
The equilibrium thus constructed is right-continuous and the inflow in each phase
is constant. Consequently, the uniqueness result follows from [Cominetti et al., 2015,
Theorem 6]: Suppose that the inflow into the network is piecewise constant. Then, the
earliest arrival functions (`v)v∈V are the same for all dynamic equilibria which are right-
continuous.
4.4 Existence and uniqueness in the insensitive de-
mand model
In this section we discuss the relation between the cost horizon C and the total mass Q
of users in an equilibrium.
Consider for a moment the case where the scheduling cost function is the most common
one; where users arriving at a time θ ≤ T ∗ experience a cost of β(T ∗−θ), and users arriving
at a time θ > T ∗ experience a cost of γ(θ − T ∗) (see Equation (1.1) and Figure 1.2). As
a consequence of Theorem 4.9, and by the fact that the value of `′t(θ) does not change
for θ < θ∗, we have that the evolution of a right-continuous equilibrium with starting-
time θf , in the time interval [θf , θf + ϑ], with θf + ϑ ≤ θ∗, matches the evolution of a
right-continuous equilibrium with starting-time θ̄f ≤ θf in the time interval [θ̄f , θ̄ + ϑ].
This implies that the amount of flow arriving at the sink before T ∗ continuously and
monotonically increases with C, or equivalently, increases when the starting-time of the
equilibrium decreases.
Unfortunately, we could not prove this monotonicity property to be true also for the
amount of flow arriving at the sink after time T ∗ and, more generally, we could not prove
it for more general convex scheduling cost functions. Nonetheless we believe it to be true.
More precisely, let the function Υ : R+ → R+ be defined such that Υ(C) equals the
amount of flow of a right-continuous equilibrium with cost horizon C. We believe the
following conjectures to hold.
Conjecture 4.10. Υ is a continuous function.
Conjecture 4.11. Υ is a monotonically nonincreasing function.
Notice that there is then a one-to-one map between Q and the cost horizon C and,
consequently, if Conjecture 4.10 holds, then we have the existence of an equilibrium of
mass Q, for any Q > 0; additionally, if Conjecture 4.11 holds, then we have that the
earliest arrival functions (`v)v∈V are the same for all the equilibria that have mass Q and
that are right-continuous.
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4.5 Reduction from equilibria with endogenous de-
parture time choice to equilibria with exogenous
ones
In this section we show how the equilibria with endogenous departure time choice gener-
alizes the ones where users depart from the source s at a given constant positive rate over
a time interval [0, T ), and simply wish to reach the destination t as early as possible.
Given an equilibrium (x̄, ¯̀) of an instance in the exogenous model with constant inflow
rate ν̄0 and graph G = (V,E), we will construct an instance for the endogenous model
that induces an equilibrium (x, `) matching the dynamics and inflow rate of (x̄, ¯̀). We
achieve this by modifying G and by selecting an appropriate scheduling cost function.
Let G′ = (V ′, E ′) be the graph obtained from G by adding a new vertex t′ and a
new arc tt′ of capacity ν∗ and free transit time 0, where 0 < ν∗ < min{νe, ν̄0} for any
e ∈ E; t′ becomes the new sink. By choosing such capacity for the new arc tt′ we make
sure that this arc is always resetting and thus that the label `′t′(θ) is always equal to
ν0(θ)/ν∗: consider an arbitrary time θ that admits an ETF, since Gθ is acyclic, we have
that x′e(θ) ≤ ν0(θ) for any arc e and, therefore, that `′w(θ) ≤ max{1, ν0(θ)/νe} < ν0(θ)/ν∗
for any arc e = vw ∈ E ′θ. This implies that `′t(θ) < ν0(θ)/ν∗ and that `′t′(θ) = ν0(θ)/ν∗.
Now let α = ν̄0/ν∗ be the journey time cost, τ0 be the length of the shortest path in
G and consider the following scheduling cost function
ρ(θ) =
{
(α− 1)(T ∗ − θ) if θ < T ∗
γ(θ − T ∗) if θ ≥ T ∗ (4.10)
where T ∗ = τ0 + (α · T ) and γ is an arbitrarily chosen positive value. Note that this
scheduling cost function represents the standard α-β-γ scheduling cost function given in
Equation (1.1) with β = α− 1.
Consider now the cost horizon C = τ0+(α−1)T ∗. This cost horizon and the scheduling
cost function ensure that the departure time of the first agent occurs at time 0, that
`′t′(θ) = ν̄0/ν∗ for all points θ ∈ [0, T ) and that the arrival time of the particle that departs
at time T is T ∗. We will only consider the dynamics of the particles that depart in the
time interval [0, T ).
It follows that, in order to get `′t′(θ) = ν̄0/ν∗, the flow on tt′ has to be equal to ν̄0 and
hence we have that ν0(θ) = ν̄0. But then there is no difference between the endogenous
thin flows and the normalized thin flows for any time θ ∈ [0, T ) in G (Definitions 4.5
and 4.6). Thus the exogenous and endogenous equilibria are essentially the same and we
can ignore the dynamics on tt′.
4.6 Conclusion
In this chapter we introduced a model to represent traffic equilibria where users are con-
cerned with both their route and their arrival time at destination. For the latter, as in
Chapter 3, we considered a scheduling cost setting, with the difference that here we re-
stricted our attention to convex functions. An equilibrium is a joint choice amongst all
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the users in the system of routes and departure times, with the property that no user has
a unilateral deviation that strictly decreases their cost. We also provided an algorithm to
compute an equilibrium.
Additionally we showed that, under two highly plausible conjectures, the equilibrium
always exists and it is unique.
This chapter represents the core of the thesis, hence the similarity of its title with
the thesis’ one. In fact, it is connected to Chapter 3 through the use of scheduling cost
functions; the model and algorithm here introduced will be used in Chapters 5 and 6 and,







The results in this chapter were published in [Frascaria, Olver, and Verhoef, 2020].
5.1 Introduction
Empirical studies have shown that traffic throughput can be lower during peak hours of
high demand than during less congested hours. This phenomenon is called hypercongestion.
Hypercongestion has been studied for single links, as well as for networks as a whole. For
single links, it is understood through the fundamental diagrams of traffic flow (Figures 5.1a
to 5.1c) that relate traffic density, traffic speed and traffic flow, and these mechanisms are
of particular importance in modelling highway traffic flow. In highway traffic, it is a well-
understood and intuitive fact that speed is negatively related to density. Since flow is the
product of speed and density, maximum flow is achieved at some intermediate value of
density. Increasing density beyond that point (or equivalently, decreasing speed) yields to
decreased throughput; this is hypercongestion.
For networks as a whole, representing, for example, the downtown core of a city,
“macroscopic” versions of the fundamental traffic diagram have been empirically observed
(e.g., [Geroliminis and Daganzo, 2008, Daganzo et al., 2011]). Figure 5.1d reproduces Fig-
ure 9 from [Daganzo et al., 2011]: here the vertical axis represents the number of vehicles
passing, per lane and per unit of time, the points of measurement and the horizontal axis
represents the density of the network, which is proportional to the number of vehicles
present in the network.
The effect has been discussed in the context of bathtub models [Arnott, 2013, Fosgerau,
2015, Arnott et al., 2016], and indeed is a key motivation for these models. Here, speed
and density are uniform across the space, even though agents have different routes with
different lengths. With this strong spatial homogeneity assumption, the network structure
of the city and its road structure is abstracted away and network interactions1 are com-
pletely absent. A negative relationship (e.g., Greenshields’ linear relation [Greenshields,
1935]) is then prescribed between the (spatially averaged) density and speed. This leads
1Temporary and spatially separate events that affect each other.
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(c) Speed-density (or fundamental) diagram. (d) Macroscopic fundamental diagram from [Da-
ganzo et al., 2011, Fig.9].
Figure 5.1: Fundamental diagrams of traffic flow.
to hypercongestion when density exceeds some critical value, for the same reason as for a
single link.
While these models do an excellent job of matching empirically observed behavior such
as the macroscopic fundamental diagram of Figure 5.1d, they do not provide an explana-
tion for the source of this negative relationship, and hence the source of hypercongestion.
In particular, they typically lack explicit modelling of entry into and exit out of the bath-
tub, while even for single-link models it has been shown that hypercongestion can only
build up if exit capacity is restricted (i.e., there is a downstream bottleneck), while entry
capacity should not be below the downstream exit capacity (e.g., [Verhoef, 2001, 2003]).
To the extent that the bathtub is modeled as a simple congestible facility, one might expect
the same type of necessary conditions for hypercongestion to occur in these models, which
would justify an explicit consideration of entry and exit mechanisms. In any case, it seems
worthwhile to search for a deeper explanation of the precise causes of hypercongestion in
urban traffic, as this may produce new insights on optimal transport (pricing) policies.
The most obvious explanation for this relationship between averaged density and speed
would be that the relationship holds at the level of individual links. In other words: if
hypercongestion occurs at the level of individual links, we would expect it to occur in the
macroscopic level as well. Hypercongestion at the link level can be considered as expected
on highways entering the city, given that downstream capacity is limited. But within
the city, is is less evident that one should expect substantial per-link hypercongestion.
56
5.1. Introduction
This is especially relevant given that the Vickrey bottleneck model [Vickrey, 1969] is
generally considered to be a good “workhorse” dynamic economic model for the most
heavily congested links in the context of urban traffic. However, in its purest form, this
model does not exhibit the flow drops that are characteristic for hypercongestion at the
link level.
An alternative source for hypercongestion is through spillback (coined “triggerneck
congestion” by Vickrey [1969]). If traffic congestion in one part of the network can block
upstream intersections, it is relatively easy to construct examples where hypercongestion
occurs.2 In highly congested situations, the potential for “gridlock” caused by spillback
effects is a very plausible mechanism for hypercongestion in cities. But what about lower
levels of congestion where the impact of spillback is nonexistent or small? What about
the role of dynamic route choices and network interactions before triggerneck congestion
sets in and, therewith, the role of network design? Can that in itself be a source of
hypercongestion at the level of the network? In light of these considerations, we ask the
following natural question.
Question 5.1. Can hypercongestion occur in settings where (1) no hypercongestion occurs
at the link level, in that the flow-speed relationship does not exhibit a backward-bending
curve; and (2) there are no spillback effects?
Our assumptions in asserting whether dynamic network behavior can produce hyper-
congestion through route interaction are therefore conservative: if, in our model, hyper-
congestion is observed at the network level, it can be fully attributed to the network
interaction of multiple users, all aiming to minimize their travel costs.
Thus, in this work, we consider pure bottleneck congestion dynamics, with spaceless
vertical queues as introduced by Vickrey [1969] where, at the link level, an increase in
density never corresponds to a decrease of flow. We combine this with endogenous depar-
ture time choices, utilizing thus scheduling cost functions (defined in Section 1.3). This
model has received substantial attention from the transportation economic community but
mainly on single-link networks ([Small, 2015, Li et al., 2020]) . Here, it is well-known that
hypercongestion effects do not occur [Arnott et al., 1990]. Extending from a single link
to multiple perfectly parallel links (i.e., a collection of completely separate routes from
the origin to the destination) does not introduce any new behavior: hypercongestion still
does not occur. In this work, we will consider arbitrary network topologies, which have
received much less attention in the literature of hypercongestion.
We distinguish two aspects of hypercongestion that generally coincide for regular single-
link models, but that become useful to distinguish in our network setting.
Speed-flow hypercongestion. We consider this form of hypercongestion to occur when
a backward-bending curve manifests in a macroscopic equivalent of Figure 5.1a or
2For example, consider a highway with two consecutive off-ramps, with different destinations. If the
later off-ramp becomes sufficiently congested, the resulting queue can block traffic exiting on the first
off-ramp, resulting in a lower overall network capacity.
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Figure 5.1b, using appropriate macroscopic equivalents of speed, density and flow
(throughput). We will make this precise, and detail how we measure these quantities,
in Section 5.2.
Generally, we would expect that the network becomes more congested as the desired
arrival time approaches, after which it decreases. So this form of hypercongestion
may show itself as a period of time before the desired arrival where throughput
starts to decrease, or alternatively, a period after the desired arrival time where the
throughput increases.
Throughput hypercongestion. This form of hypercongestion is exhibited when the im-
position of optimal (first-best) pricing to decentralize the social (“system”) optimal
departure pattern leads to an increase in the (time-averaged) arrival flow at the des-
tination, compared to the original no-toll equilibrium. Put differently: tolls chosen
to minimize the average cost (journey time cost plus scheduling cost) lead not just
to a reduction of these average costs (a triviality), but also to a reduction in the gen-
eralized price, in which the toll is also included. Thus, as phrased by [Arnott, 2013]
in his discussion of the bathtub model, “[in] very congested cities optimal tolling
would still benefit commuters even if the toll revenue were completely squandered!”.
A reduction in the generalized price in a dynamic equilibrium with homogeneous
users necessarily implies that the duration of the peak—the time between the first
and last departure—decreases. Note that bottleneck models for heterogeneous users
have already shown that some users can gain from the imposition of optimal tolls
before revenues are recycled. But these gains do not result from an increase in rate
of arrivals at the destination, and hence a shortening of peak duration, but rather
from the replacement of travel delays as a dynamic equilibrium-restraint mechanism
by tolls. This tends to benefit users with a high value of time, for whom paying
with time is relative less attractive than paying with money [van den Berg and
Verhoef, 2011]. In the present model, the reduction in travel price stems from an
increase in the physical network usage and we obtain it under the, for this perspective
conservative, assumption of homogeneous preferences.
Our results. We answer the main question with a resounding yes. We show that both
forms of hypercongestion can occur, even in very small networks, and with all traffic having
the same origin and destination. Our result is perhaps surprising, and seems to differ from
what was generally believed. For example, Arnott et al. [2016, page 1] write on the model
of bottleneck congestion:
“While it has proved very adaptable and has generated a host of useful in-
sights, as a model of downtown traffic congestion it is flawed since it rules out
hypercongestion, assuming instead that under congested conditions aggregate
traffic flow is constant.”
Our primary goal is to show simply that hypercongestion can occur in a model with
bottleneck congestion, as soon as the network structure is explicitly taken into consid-
eration; and, that is true even if spillback congestion is ruled out. We do not examine
58
5.1. Introduction
realistic city-sized instances or compare with empirical data. But we do show that the
effect is robust, and does not require precise numerical tuning of the instance. Further,
the effect can be fairly significant; for example, we can exhibit a decrease of the average
generalized price using optimal tolling of approximately 20%. We examine some aspects
of the sensitivity of the hypercongestion effect to various parameters in Section 5.4.
We also emphasize upfront that unlike for a single bottleneck, the two forms of hyper-
congestion are no longer equivalent. In particular, it is possible for speed-flow hypercon-
gestion to occur while throughput hypercongestion does not, and vice versa.
The interesting feature of our result is that we obtain increased throughput and reduced
generalized prices for finite tolls that do not fully close down certain links, like one might
expect from Braess-type networks, and that satisfy necessary conditions for first-best
optimal (dynamic) congestion pricing. This has important policy implications regarding
the acceptability of optimal tolls.
In parallel-link networks with pure bottlenecks, the generalized price under optimal
tolls is the same as for the untolled equilibrium. Our main result shows that it can strictly
decrease in general. The reader may wonder whether optimal tolls can ever strictly increase
the generalized price in this model. In Section 5.5, we show that this is indeed possible.
Generalized prices increasing due to tolls are what commentators typically have in mind
when opposing road pricing. It is noteworthy that in our model this intuitive notion may
be confirmed, but may also be rejected.
Policy implications. Our findings are relevant for various pertinent policy questions
in urban transport.
First, we provide a framework in which we can separate hypercongestion as arising
from network interactions from hypercongestion as it may result from local, link-specific
travel time functions. Insights into causes and consequences of hypercongestion are of
great interest for efficient policy makings for cities around the world. Traffic congestion
is without doubt one of the main challenges facing contemporary cities and hyperconges-
tion is a particularly severe and wasteful phenomenon, representing traffic conditions for
which the same flow can be reached at a higher-speed, lower-density configuration. There-
fore, improving the understanding of hypercongestion helps better formulating policies to
combat the most severe types of congestion.
Second, we show how optimal pricing may not only eliminate queuing but in addition
decrease generalized prices before toll revenues are redistributed. This is an important
question for the political and social acceptability of pricing. Among multiple reasons, the
mere fact that congestion pricing normally brings societal benefits at the price of raising
the generalized price for road users is often seen as a dominant cause for the very limited
societal acceptability of road pricing (e.g., [Small and Verhoef, 2007]). Therefore, finding
instances of road pricing that addresses the most severe type of congestion while reducing
the generalized price of travel before recycling tax revenues is a particularly attractive
feature.
Third, we provide insight into how lessons that can be learned from spatially ho-
mogeneous bathtub or MFD models translate into link-specific, spatially differentiated
congestion pricing, as it is likely to be implemented in real applications: namely, when-
ever road pricing policies will not be defined to be homogeneous over space (as will be
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true for the archetype bathtub model), but will instead be differentiated over key links
and bottlenecks in the whole network.
Outline of the chapter. In Section 5.2 we formally define the model and the two as-
pects of hypercongestion that generally coincide for regular single-link models. Then, in
Section 5.3, we present an instance where both forms of hypercongestion occur and in
Section 5.4 we investigate further such instance. In Section 5.5 we show that, unfortu-
nately, it is not always true that optimal tolls decrease the generalized prices but there
are instances where the opposite occurs, i.e. where optimal pricing strictly increases the
generalized price. Finally, in Section 5.6 we summarize our results and their implications.
5.2 Model and preliminaries
Within the economics literature, the Vickrey bottleneck model has been principally studied
in the setting of single or purely parallel links. We will be particularly concerned with more
complicated network structures than purely parallel links and we refer to Chapter 2 and
Section 4.2 for a description of the network and equilibrium structures. We will indicate
an equilibrium with (f, `) and will use ze(θ) to denote the total mass of the queue on arc
e at time θ.
We consider the standard α-β-γ scheduling cost function given in Equation (1.1) with
α = 2, β = 1, γ = 3 (which imply quite standard ratios between these shadow prices α, β
and γ) throughout (our results can easily be reproduced for other reasonable choices3).
Tolls. When pricing is implemented, a (possibly time-varying) toll constitutes a third
type of disutility. It is part of the generalized price of travel, but since it constitutes a
monetary transfer, it does not make up a societal cost of travel.
To discuss throughput hypercongestion, it is helpful to consider optimal tolls as a
means to decentralize the societal (system-)optimum outcome. Our tolls will be charged
on a per-link basis, and moreover, we will allow them to be time-varying. However, all
users traversing a link at the same moment incur the same toll on the link. The only
other restriction we will have is that tolls must be nonnegative. Under our assumption of
inelastic overall demand, this assumption is innocent (for optimal tolls with price-sensitive
demand, it will still be satisfied).
So formally, we describe the tolling scheme on a link e by a function µe : R → R+.
Then µe(θ) will be the toll charged to a flow particle entering the link at time θ.
The essential notion of a dynamic equilibrium in the tolled setting remains unchanged,
aside from the adjustment to the disutility of a user. No user should be able to change
their route or departure time in a way that decreases their generalized price, which is the
sum of the journey time cost, scheduling cost, and tolls paid by the user. All users should
experience the same generalized price in a tolled equilibrium. The generalized cost for
a user refers to the sum of journey time costs and scheduling costs only; note that this
may differ between users in the presence of tolls. Optimal (first best) tolls are tolls which
3The value of α should be strictly larger than β, so that for a fixed departure time, a user would always
want to arrive as early as possible to minimize their cost, and no detouring to postpone arrival is induced.
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minimize the average generalized cost of the users, amongst all possible tolls. Note that
they do not in general minimize the average generalized price. In Chapter 3 of this thesis
we present an algorithm to compute them.
Hypercongestion. We now return to the two types of hypercongestion discussed earlier,
and give precise formal definitions.
Speed-flow hypercongestion. Consider the evolution of the (untolled) equilibrium. Plot
the inverse of the journey time `t(θ)− θ, against ∇ft(`t(θ)), the inflow rate into t at
time `t(θ), for all choices of θ. The inverse journey time can be viewed as a measure
of speed across the network as a whole.4
This plot is a macroscopic analogue of Figure 5.1d. Speed-flow hypercongestion is
manifest by the appearance of a backward-bending curve in this figure; a region
where the speed (inverse journey time) and the network throughput (flow rate into
t) are both decreasing.5
Throughput hypercongestion. This is straightforward: if the generalized price at equi-
librium under optimal tolls (recall this is identical for all users) is strictly smaller
than the cost (including both journey time and scheduling costs) experienced by all
users in the untolled equilibrium, throughput hypercongestion is exhibited, reflecting
a reduction in the peak duration and, equivalently, an increase in the time-averaged
(over the full peak) arrival rate.
5.3 An instance exhibiting hypercongestion
In this section we present an instance (Figure 5.2) where both forms of hypercongestion
occur, and we describe the evolution of the dynamic equilibria both when no tolls are
present, and when first-best pricing is applied.
Evolution without tolls. For concreteness, we will fix the free transit times, link ca-
pacities, and the total mass Q to fixed values (chosen for numerical convenience). Precisely
the same qualitative behavior holds for quite a large set of parameter choices; we discuss
this further in Section 5.4. Recall that we use the scheduling cost function given in Equa-
tion (1.1) with α = 2, β = 1, γ = 3. Let Q = 1760, T ∗ = 75, and capacities and free transit
times as in Figure 5.3.
4But note that it does not represent an averaged physical travel speed, since the actual distance traveled
depends on the route the user takes through the network.
5 One could also consider plotting some measure of density against network outflow, which would more
directly correspond to the macroscopic fundamental diagram of Figure 5.1d. The main difficulty is pro-
viding a generally appropriate definition of density that can sensibly be compared to network throughput
at a specific moment in time. The total number of users in the system at a particular time has little direct
relationship to the inflow rate at t at the same moment in time. This is not an issue in the bathtub model,
because of the assumed spatial homogeneity. While other definitions are possible, we prefer to stick to a
single notion.
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e1 : (ν1, τ1)
e3 : (ν3, τ3)
e4 : (ν4, τ4)
e5 : (ν5, τ5)
e2 : (ν2, τ2)
Figure 5.2: Instance where both forms of hypercongestion occur; the label of an arc
represent the capacity (first element) and the free transit time (second element). Thicker
arcs represent links with relative high capacity, and longer arcs represent links with relative
long free transit time as assumed in the numerical example.
e1 e2 e3 e4 e5
Capacity (νe) 30 10 20 10 20
Free transit time (τe) 0 5 0 0 25
Figure 5.3: Remaining parameters for the instance considered in this section.
The evolution of the dynamic equilibria when no tolls are present can be described
through six phases (see Figure 5.4). A single phase corresponds to a time interval where
(1) the rate of users departing s is constant, and (2) these users all make the same aggregate
route choices, i.e., the same fraction of users take any given path, for any given departure
time in this interval. Within a phase, queue waiting times on any given arc change linearly
over time. Of most interest to us will not be the rate of change of the queue length with
respect to time, but with respect to the time of departure from s. Since a user departing
from s at time θ would arrive at a vertex v at time `v(θ), the rate of interest for a queue




. This quantity is shown for each queue in each phase
in Figure 5.4; when it is positive, the queue is growing, and when it is negative, it is
depleting.
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e1 : (30, 0) e3 : (20, 0)
e4 : (10, 0)
e5 : (20, 25)

























































Figure 5.4: Chronological evolution without tolls: in blue the inflow into the network, the
routes that the drivers take and how these drivers split among these routes; in red, purple
and gray the queue waiting times that change for consecutive drivers and their rate of
change: in red the ones that increase, in purple the ones that decrease and in gray the
ones that stay constant.
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We now describe the six phases of the equilibrium.
(a). The first phase starts when the network is empty and the first agent departs, at time
6, taking the unique shortest path e1e3e4. Per unit of time, 20 drivers take this path
and hence a queue grows on e4 at rate 1: this means that a particle of this phase
appearing at s an ε amount of time later than the first one, experiences a queue
waiting time of ε on e4. Notice that the cost of these two particle is the same since
the latter pays 2ε more in journey delay cost and, arriving 2ε time later, pays 2ε less
in scheduling cost.
(b). At time 11, when the queue waiting time on e4 equals the free transit time of e2, the
situation changes. If phase 1 were to continue, the travel time on e4 would continue
to increase, meaning that e1e2 would be a strictly shorter route from a to t. Instead,
users start to take the path e1e2 in addition to the path e1e3e4. At this point the
inflow into the network also increases, from 20 to 40, with the effect that queues
simultaneously grow on e1, e2 and e4. Notice that, along these two paths, the total
queue waiting time grows at rate 1 and hence all the particles of this phase incur the
same cost, equal to that in phase (a).
(c). The situation changes again at time 40.5. The agent that departs at this moment
arrives at the destination at time T ∗. Since the penalty for being late is nonincreasing
over (arrival) time, the journey time has to decrease swiftly for agents departing from
this moment onward. As a consequence, the inflow into the network drops to 8. In
this phase the queue on e1 starts to deplete while the queues on e2 and e4 continue to
grow. This happens since the capacity (and hence the outflow) of the arc e1 is bigger
than the capacity of the arc e2 and e4 combined.
From this phase onward, the total queue waiting time decreases at rate 35 : a particle
departing an ε amount of time later pays 35αε =
6




5ε more in scheduling cost, keeping average cost constant as required for equilibrium.
The instance has been chosen so that due to the growing queue on e4, the travel time
on e4 eventually equals the free transit time on e5, at which point the phase ends.
(d). The next, fourth, phase is crucial and starts at time 43. The path e1e3e5 starts being
utilized, alongside all the paths that were used in the previous phase and thus the
inflow rate increases to 12. All the drivers of this phase will split evenly among the
three routes. At this point the queue lengths on e2 and e4 stay constant while the
queue on e1 continues to deplete. Note that this phase will cause an inflow rate into
t particularly high; equal to 30, the capacity of e1. The phase ends once the queue
on e1 empties.
(e) and (f). In the final two phases, all remaining queues gradually deplete, and route
choices consolidate to the shorter paths. Phase (e) starts at time 56+ 13 and phase (f)
at 89 + 23 . The final agent to depart arrives at t just at the moment when the queue
on e4 depletes, at time 98, thus experiencing again an empty network.
64
5.3. An instance exhibiting hypercongestion












Figure 5.5: Commuting cost of the different routes under the no-toll equilibrium. The
horizontal axis represents the departure time. A route is active when its cost is equal to
the minimum.
Figure 5.5, displaying how average cost evolves over time for routes when they are and
when they are not used, confirms that the patterns described jointly provide a dynamic
equilibrium, in departure time and route choice.
The outflow over time is shown in figure Figure 5.6a. After T ∗ the outflow of the
network does not behave monotonically: it first increases and then decreases. Since the
schedule delay cost increases over time, after T ∗ the journey time of the agents arriving at
t decreases over time. Hence, after T ∗, we have an increase in the outflow with an increase
of speed (inverse journey time), as shown in Figure 5.6b. Therefore, the instance exhibits
speed-flow hypercongestion.





























Figure 5.6: On the left the plot showing the outflow of the network in any given time; the
letters indicates the phase to which the outflow is associated to. On the right the plot
indicating the relation between the outflow of the network and the speed (inverse journey
time) for the agents arriving after T ∗.
This result does not rely on our choice of measuring the passing flow at the sink of
the network; it is in fact quite robust. For instance, we see exactly the same behavior
if we compare the inflow into the network at a given moment with the speed (inverse
journey time) of the agents departing at the same moment. The inflow over time is
shown in Figure 5.7a; after time 40.5 (which is the departure time of the agent arriving at
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destination at time T ∗), we again see that there is a moment where the inflow increases.
Since the journey time (meaning the inverse speed) of agents departing from s decreases



























Figure 5.7: On the left the plot showing the inflow of the network in any given time; the
letters indicates the phase to which the outflow is associated to. On the right the plot
indicating the relation between the inflow of the network and the speed (inverse journey
time) for the agents departing after time 40.5.
Remark. The textbook exposition of the backward-bending speed-flow relation (Fig-
ure 5.1a) assigns at most one flow level to each positive speed. This is not the case for
the effective speed-flow relation in our example. Speeds (inverse journey times) within an
appropriate interval are seen twice; once before the desired arrival time and once after.
For some speeds, the arrival rates at these two corresponding moments differ. This does
not occur in the setting of a single link, or multiple parallel links, and represents another
noteworthy feature of general networks from the conceptual viewpoint. Moreover, this
could be one reason—among others—that empirical plots of flow versus speed display so
much scatter.
Evolution with optimal tolls. Under optimal pricing all three paths from s to t are
used, and no queue is ever formed. An example of optimal pricing is obtained by tolling
one arc per path and by increasing these tolls linearly at rate β until time T ∗ and then
decreasing it at rate −γ (see Figure 5.8). This way each tolled arc is in a unique path, and
that path is used continuously in the time interval where its arc is tolled. Chronologically,
the evolution can be described through six phases. Each phase indicates a time interval
in which the particles arriving at t take the same paths. The last three are mirrored but
scaled version of the first three: the scaling is due to the ratio of β and γ. In the first
and last phase (Figures 5.9a and 5.9f) agents arrive at t only from the path e1e3e4; in the
second and fifth phase (Figures 5.9b and 5.9e) they come from paths e1e2 and e1e3e4 and
in the third and fourth (Figures 5.9c and 5.9d) they arrive from all the paths e1e2, e1e3e4
and e1e3e5.
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Figure 5.9: Chronological evolution with tolls: in orange the routes that the agents arriving
at t have taken.
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In both the equilibria the first agent that arrives at t takes the same path e1e3e4 and
incurs no cost in tolls, but the arrival time is later when first-best pricing is applied: 6 under
no toll and 11 under optimal pricing (Figure 5.10). This implies that his general price, and
hence that the general price of all the agents, is lower under first-best pricing. Similarly, the
very last driver arrives at 98 under no toll and 96 + 13 under optimal pricing (Figure 5.10).
With optimal tolls, the peak duration is therefore shorter and, as a consequence, the time-
averaged throughput is higher. This occurs because the path e1e3e5 is active over a longer
period with optimal tolling than without. Thus, the instance also exhibits throughput
hypercongestion: the time averaged arrival flow is higher, the arrival window shorter and
the generalized price is lower in the optimum compared to the no-toll equilibrium.

















Figure 5.10: Outflow over time of the no-toll and of the best-pricing equilibria.
5.4 Sensitivity analysis




e1 : (ν1, τ1)
e3 : (ν3, τ3)
e4 : (ν4, τ4)
e5 : (ν5, τ5)
e2 : (ν2, τ2)
Figure 5.11: Instance where both forms of hypercongestion occur.
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The following theorem specifies a set of parameter choices for which both forms of
hypercongestion occurs in this network.
Theorem 5.1. Suppose all the following conditions are satisfied, for an instance of the
network shape shown in Figure 5.11:
τ3 + τ4 < τ2 < τ5 (5.1)
α
α−β · ν4 ≤ min{ν1, ν3} (5.2)
ν3 ≥ max{ν1 − ν2, αα+γν4} (5.3)
ν5 ≥ ν3 − ν4 (5.4)
ν2 + ν4 < ν1 < αα−β · (ν2 + ν4). (5.5)
Then there exists a nonempty interval6 of total demand for which both speed-flow and
throughput hypercongestion occur.
Notice that constraint (5.1) says that e1e3e4 is the shortest path and e1e3e5 is the
longest one; constraint (5.2) says that e4 has relative small capacity while constraints (5.3)
and (5.4) say that e3 and e5 cannot have a capacity that is too small; finally, constraint
(5.5) gives a lower and an upper bound to the capacity of e1.
These constraints ensure that the constructed equilibria (both untolled and tolled)
have a sequence of phases analogous to the ones considered in the previous section (see
Figures 5.4 and 5.9). Analogous in the sense that, within a phase, users take the same
paths and queue grow and deplete on the same arcs, even though the rate of change of
the queues and the length of the phases differ. We omit an explicit proof of the theorem
since it’s very computational.
Theorem 5.1 implies that after fixing the graph structure for the instance, there is a
range of parameters that produce the two forms of hypercongestion, confirming that the
occurrence is not a peculiarity that requires a very specific, fine-tuned combination of
parameters.
From an efficiency viewpoint, throughput hypercongestion most clearly reflects the
inefficiency involved. The fact that time-averaged throughput is in fact higher in the
optimum, and the generalized price consequently lower, adds a clear second “dividend” to
the implementation of pricing, on top of the well-known favorable impact on queues. It
also suggests that social support for pricing might be higher than often thought, as also
without recycling of tax revenues and also if bottleneck capacities exhibit no “drop” due
to queuing, users may already benefit from the imposition of optimal tolls. It is therefore
of interest to see how this type of hypercongestion varies with some key parameters of the
model.
Figure 5.12 shows the ratio, for the instance of Figure 5.3, between the generalized price
of the equilibrium without tolls and the generalized price of the equilibrium with optimal
pricing as a function of the total users demand, using α = 2, β = 1, γ = 3. At first, the
ratio is equal to 1. This scenario reproduces the behavior on a single bottleneck link, since
all the agents takes only the shortest path. As the total demand increases beyond a critical
6Such an interval is (Ia, Ib) with Ia = (τ2− τ3− τ4)αν4( 1β +
1
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value of around 1200, the generalized prices ratio first increases and then decreases, but it
always remains strictly above 1. The red region demarcates the boundary of the range of
choices for the total demand where speed-flow hypercongestion occurs. This shows that
throughput hypercongestion can occur while speed-flow hypercongestion does not.











1.08 generalized price no tolls
generalized price opt tolls
Figure 5.12: Ratio between the generalized price of the equilibrium without tolls and the
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Figure 5.13: The ratio between the generalized prices of the equilibrium without tolls and




Figure 5.13 shows, again referring to the instance of Figure 5.3, the ratio between
the generalized price of the equilibrium without tolls and the generalized price of the
equilibrium with optimal pricing as a function of α and the total demand. Here the value
of α varies in (β, γ) = (1, 3). The ratio tends to increase when α becomes smaller, which
is intuitive as a lower α would lead, ceteris paribus, to longer equilibrium queues. Given
α, we observe a maximum ratio for some intermediate value of total demand, just as in
Figure 5.12.
Separating the two forms of hypercongestion, and hypercongestion before the
peak. As already noted, the previous example shows that throughput hypercongestion
can occur without the presence of speed-flow hypercongestion. The opposite can also
happen: speed-flow hypercongestion can occur while throughput hypercongestion does
not. An example is obtained on the network of Figure 5.11 with Q = 750, T ∗ = 100 and
capacities and free transit times shown in Figure 5.14.
e1 e2 e3 e4 e5
Capacity (νe) 9 4 6 4 4
Free transit time (τe) 0 20 0 0 20
Figure 5.14: Further parameters for an instance exhibiting speed-flow, but not throughput,
hypercongestion.
Figures 5.15a and 5.15b shows that the instance exhibits speed-flow hypercongestion:
there is a period of time before the desired arrival time where the throughput in the equilib-
rium decreases. Since, at this point, the journey time of the agents arriving at t increases
over time, we have a decrease in the outflow with a decrease of speed (inverse journey
time). Figure 5.16 shows that the instance does not exhibits throughput hypercongestion.



















Figure 5.15: Speed-flow hypercongestion of the instance described in Figure 5.14: On the
left the outflow in any given time; On the right the relation between the outflow and the
speed (inverse journey time) for the agents arriving before T ∗.
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Figure 5.16: Outflow over time of the equilibrium of the instance described in Figure 5.14,
both without tolls and under optimal pricing.
This last example also demonstrates that speed-flow hypercongestion can occur before
the peak (recall that our main example in Section 5.3 exhibited speed-flow hypercongestion
after the peak). Since in the empirical literature on hypercongestion at the network level
(e.g., [Geroliminis and Daganzo, 2008, Daganzo et al., 2011]), the effects do not seem to
be restricted to occurring only after (or only before) the peak, this is important.
Simpler network topologies. The examples discussed so far are not the smallest ones
to exhibit hypercongestion. The following instance (Figure 5.17) with three links also
exhibits both forms of hypercongestion, with the usual choice of α, β, γ along withQ = 400.
We have chosen T ∗ = 15.
s a t
e1 : (30, 0)
e2 : (20, 0)
e3 : (10, 5)
Figure 5.17: The label of an arc represent the capacity (first element) and the free transit
time (second element).
Figures 5.18a and 5.18b shows that the instance exhibits speed-flow hypercongestion,
and Figure 5.19 that it exhibits throughput hypercongestion.
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Figure 5.18: Speed-flow hypercongestion of the instance described in Figure 5.17: On the
left the outflow of the network in any given time; On the right the relation between the
outflow of the network and the speed (inverse journey time) for the agents arriving after
T ∗.











Figure 5.19: Outflow over time of the equilibrium of instance described in Figure 5.17,
both without tolls and under optimal pricing.
The fact that hypercongestion occurs for such a simple network topology provides
further evidence that hypercongestion is not rare for this type of model.
We remark that we have focused on the slightly larger five-arc instance in order to
exhibit some phenomena beyond the existence of the two forms of hypercongestion. In
particular, our observations that (i) that the two forms of hypercongestion are distinct:
either form can occur without the other; and (ii) that speed-flow hypercongestion can
occur before the peak rely on our larger example.
5.5 First-best pricing can strictly increase the gener-
alized price
The fact the optimal tolling decreases the generalized price is remarkable, and runs counter
intuition. It also is at odds with results from other dynamic models of traffic congestion,
including the conventional single-link bottleneck model, where the generalized price does
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not change when an optimal toll is implemented, and models of flow congestion such as
the one proposed by Chu [1995], where the generalized price would increase. That raises
the question of whether, for other parameter combinations or networks, the current model
could also produce instances where the generalized price rises instead of falls.
In this section we show through an illustration that first-best pricing does not always
decrease the generalized price, and can in fact cause it to strictly increase. For this we
consider the network of Figure 5.20. Figure 5.21 shows the ratio between the generalized
price of the equilibrium without tolls and the generalized price of the equilibrium with
optimal pricing, as a function of the total users demand (using α = 2, β = 1, γ = 3 as
before). At first, the ratio is equal to 1. This occurs since all the agents takes only the
shortest path and hence we have the same behavior we would have on a single bottleneck
link. As the total demand increases, the generalized price ratio first decreases sharply, and








(30, 10) (20, 0)
Figure 5.20: Instance where optimal tolls increase the generalized price.











generalized price no tolls
generalized price opt tolls
Figure 5.21: Ratio between the generalized price of the equilibrium without tolls and the




In this chapter we showed that hypercongestion can occur as a purely emergent effect of
the network interaction of multiple selfish users, all aiming to minimize their travel costs.
For this we considered link congestion dynamics that do not exhibit hypercongestion and
do not produce spillback effects (we considered Vickrey bottlenecks with spaceless vertical
queues). In this work we used the model and algorithm defined in Chapters 3 and 4.
We distinguished two instructive aspects of hypercongestion that generally coincide for
regular single-link models. One is related to the “macroscopic” versions of the fundamental
traffic diagram and the other is exhibited when the imposition of optimal (first-best)
pricing leads to an increase in the (time-averaged) arrival flow at the destination and
therefore to a reduction in the generalized price, i.e., the total cost that each agent pays.
These findings are of interest because they show how the same flow can be reached
at a higher-speed, lower-density configurations, thus eliminating queuing. Moreover, the
second form of hypercongestion that we considered shows how optimal pricing may not
only eliminate queuing but in addition decrease generalized prices before toll revenues are
redistributed. As opposed to the bottleneck models for heterogeneous users where some
users can gain from the imposition of optimal pricing to the detriment of other users’
costs, in this chapter we assumed homogeneous users and thus the reduction in travel
price comes from an increase in the physical network usage. This is an important result
for the political and social acceptability of pricing. However, we also showed that this is
not always the case and that there are instances where optimal pricing can increase the
generalized price. Finally, our pricing policy is not defined to be homogeneous over space,
as in the case of other models that study hypercongestion, but it is differentiated over
key links and bottlenecks in the whole network, as it is likely to be implemented in real
applications.
Fully understanding the causes of hypercongestion as empirically observed remains a
challenging task. It is unclear how the form of the network—for instance, it’s topology—
effects the prevalence of hypercongestion. It is well know that it does not occur in parallel
link networks and our construction shows that it may occur in very simple networks, but
little is known beyond that. It would be interesting to investigate what happens in the
Vickrey bottleneck model on instances more indicative of real city networks, and with
multiple origin-destination pairs. It is also natural to ask what impact other specifics of
the model have on hypercongestion. For example, one can consider user heterogeneity, in
the value of time or in scheduling preferences; or models where there is uncertainty in the




Revisiting the corridor problem with
discrete bottlenecks
The results in this chapter are being prepared for publication and were obtained thanks to
the collaboration of Neil Olver and Erik Verhoef.
6.1 Introduction
The corridor model, in its original form, introduced by Arnott [2001] and considered in
detail by Arnott and DePalma [2011b], is a model of traffic congestion on a highway
entering a city during the morning rush hour. Their model is continuous in both space
and time; a residential density along the highway is prescribed, from which the total
amount of traffic that will enter the system within any interval can be determined. All
users wish to travel to the CBD, which is located at the end of the highway. (Here, the
morning rush hour is being modeled; one can of course consider the evening rush hour as
well, in which case users will all depart the CBD, and leave at various locations along the
corridor.) Users can choose their departure time, and suffer the usual α-β-γ costs; the
journey time cost is α, and there is a scheduling cost of γt incurred by arriving t time units
late, or βt for arriving t units early. The kinematic LWR model is then used to describe
the congestion on the corridor. That is, there is a partial differential equation involving
flow and density on the corridor through space and time, with a flow-speed relationship
prescribed.
The resulting model turns out to be challenging, and unsatisfactory in some key re-
spects. In particular, Arnott and DePalma find that in general, an equilibrium need not
exist in their model. In fact, they showed that unless the residential density satisfies cer-
tain conditions (that the residential density is zero in some neighborhood of the CBD),
no equilibrium is possible; and they were not able to derive sufficient conditions for exis-
tence. They were able to give some interesting insights on the qualitative behavior of an
equilibrium in their model (if it exists); but a satisfactory treatment of the model seems
out of reach. The LWR model alone, involving a partial differential equation, is already
very difficult to handle. Coupling this with equilibrium conditions of the corridor model
appears to make things dramatically more difficult.
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Given the complexity inherent in the LWR model, a natural direction is to consider
instead a simpler model of congestion. Consider, instead, a highway modeled as a sequence
of many Vickrey bottlenecks with vertical (spaceless) queues. The nodes between consec-
utive bottlenecks will represent discrete entry points into the corridor; we will call these
on-ramps. Instead of a residential density distribution, we have a residential demand vec-
tor indicating the total mass of users that wish to enter on each on-ramp. In two respects,
the model we consider goes beyond the original Arnott-DePalma corridor model:
• We allow for arbitrary capacities on the corridor links.
• We allow for fairly general scheduling cost functions (which describe the disutility
experienced by a user arriving at the CBD at a certain time, in addition to their
journey time cost). Essentially any convex, piecewise linear function may be consid-
ered.
This model, essentially, was introduced and discussed in some detail by Akamatsu
et al. [2015] (we will refer to their paper as AWH in what follows). However, while they
introduce their model in continuous time, all their analysis is actually on a variation
of the model which is discrete not only in space (in terms of a finite number of on-
ramps) but discrete time as well. They consider this discrete-time variant primarily as an
approximation to the continuous time model that is more amenable to their techniques.
Without defining this in detail, we will call this the discrete time Vickrey corridor, to
distinguish with the continuous time Vickrey corridor that we will consider in this chapter.
A further feature that they consider in their model, which we will not, is a form of user
heterogeneity. All users have the same “base” preferences (in terms of desired arrival time,
per-unit journey time cost, and scheduling cost function). However, they allow for (and
for some results, require) that the actual disutility experienced by a user is not just the
base disutility, but the sum of this with an additional random component. This random
perturbation to a user’s scheduling cost is drawn from a fixed distribution; since there are
a continuum of users, this means that a given perturbation will be experienced by a fixed
density or proportion of users at any given location. Some of their results require that
this distribution admits a density (ruling out the homogeneous case).
Our results. We now summarize the main results of our work, and compare in particular
with AWH. We will only consider the morning rush hour (AWH consider both the morning
and evening rush hour). There is no particular difficulty with the evening rush hour, which
could also be dealt with using our approach (and in fact is easier in certain respects). But
we prefer to focus our discussion on the (more prevalent) morning peak.
• Existence. AWH do prove existence of equilibria for the discrete time Vickrey cor-
ridor. Their result applies for both homogeneous and heterogeneous users (in the
restricted sense discussed above), and for morning and evening rush hour.
We prove existence in the continuous time Vickrey model (with homogeneous users).
While AWH somewhat suggest that their discretization is to avoid “unnecessary
mathematical complications”, it is not that clear to us whether existence results for
the continuous model can be derived from their approach to the discrete model.
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• Uniqueness. AWH also consider uniqueness, and obtain some significant results in
this direction. However, they are not able to show uniqueness of equilibria in the
discrete time Vickrey corridor with homogeneous users. They require heterogeneity,
in the form discussed above: the utility of a user is subject to a random perturbation,
drawn from a distribution that admits a density.
While the heterogeneity assumption that AWH make can certainly be motivated, we
think that the model we consider—homogeneous users, continuous time—is the most
basic and natural one, so we believe that uniqueness for this model is of significant
interest.
• Structural and algorithmic insights. Perhaps the most important contribution of this
chapter is that our perspective gives a rather clear perspective on the structure of
equilibria. We can give a qualitative description of how equilibria behave.
We also provide an efficient algorithm for computing an equilibrium. AWH give
an algorithm for the discrete case based on solving linear complementarity problems
(LCPs). These are not known (and not believed) to be efficiently solvable in a the-
oretical sense (in particular, the problem of computing an equilibrium of a bimatrix
game can be formulated as an LCP), though in practice they are relatively tractable.
The LCPs they require solving, grow in size depending on the number of time steps
in the instance, however. We give an efficient (polynomial time) algorithm for the
continuous-time version. It’s running time is O(n(n + ω)), where ω is the number
of breakpoints in the scheduling function. In practice, for moderately large corridor
sizes we expect the algorithm to be extremely fast. So our algorithm results seem
more satisfactory, both from a theoretical standpoint and a practical one.
Our approach. We cleanly separate two difficulties by developing first a model with
sensitive demand, where each user have some fixed disutility that they are willing to
suffer, and otherwise will not travel. This disutility threshold is the same for all users
at a given location on the corridor, but may differ between locations. This turns out
to be substantially easier than the case of insensitive demand at each location, and the
structural results are derived in this context. In particular, we observe that the sensitive
demand model is completely equivalent to a situation where all users have not only the
same destination, but the same origin, but in an augmented network. This augmented
network does have multiple possible routes between origin and destination however, so we
trade the complexity of multiple origins with the complexity of route choice.
Fortunately, we can build on existing insights into this single-origin single-destination
model in general networks. This stream of literature has its roots in the theory of flows
over time in combinatorial optimization, which concerns questions like sending as much
flow as possible from an origin to a destination in a network before a given deadline
(see Section 1.2 and Chapter 2).
We remark that there is a connection with the approach AWH take in terms of using
what they call a “Lagrangian-like coordinate system”. Essentially, this means that the
main measure of “time” at some location in the corridor is not the real “wall clock” time
at that location, but the time a user would arrive at the CBD in the equilibrium if departing
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at the given moment. This is indeed exactly the viewpoint taken in the above stream of
literature that our approach draws on.
After obtaining detailed results for the sensitive model, we elucidate the relationship
between the sensitive and insensitive demand models. We show that there is a one-to-
one map between demand vectors in the insensitive model, and disutility thresholds in the
sensitive model. This allows us to deduce existence and uniqueness in the insensitive model
as a consequence of these for the sensitive model. It also allows us to import qualitative
observations of the equilibrium structure from the sensitive model to the insensitive model.
Outline. We begin by formally introducing the model in Section 6.2. We introduce
not only the insensitive Vickrey corridor model that is our main motivation, but also the
variants we will use in order to pursue our analysis; the sensitive version.
In Section 6.3, we develop an understanding of equilibria in the sensitive model. As
well as demonstrating existence and uniqueness, we will obtain a detailed understanding
of the structure of equilibria. This will be crucial for our main results on the insensitive
model (including existence and uniqueness), which are obtained in Section 6.4.
Finally, in Section 6.5 we show some examples of equilibrium behavior, and discuss
our structural insights at a high level.
6.2 Model and preliminaries
Some notation. We write [z]+ for the nonnegative part of z, i.e., [z]+ = max{0, z}. R+
denotes the nonnegative real numbers, and R++ the strictly positive real numbers. For a
positive integer n, we use [n] as shorthand for the set {1, 2, . . . , n}.
A function g : R→ R has a property almost everywhere if there is a function g̃ satisfying
the property that differs from g on a set of measure zero. A function g is piecewise constant
on a compact interval I if I can be partitioned into a finite collection of intervals such that
g is constant on each interval. A function is piecewise constant (on R) if it is piecewise
constant on every compact interval. Similar definitions apply for piecewise linear.
6.2.1 The insensitive demand model
Our corridor is described by a directed graph with vertex set 1, 2, . . . , n, n+ 1 = t, where
node t represents the CBD, with arcs (i, i + 1) for each i ∈ [n]. We will always envision
the CBD as being to the right, and nodes 1, 2, . . . , n+ 1 located from left to right in that
order. Arc (i, i+ 1) is a Vickrey bottleneck with free-flow travel time τ(i,i+1) and capacity
ν(i,i+1), which we abbreviate to νi for convenience. We also make the definition ν0 := 0.
There is a given mass Qi of users at location i, for i ∈ [n], all desiring to reach the
CBD t. (We don’t assign any mass to t; this would be superfluous.) Each (infinitesimal)
user experiences a per-unit journey time cost α for time spent commuting. In addition,
they experience a scheduling cost that is a function of their arrival time at the CBD; let
ρ denote the scheduling cost function. We will require that this is piecewise linear and
convex, with ρ′(θ) > −α for all θ. Also ρ should satisfy limθ→−∞ ρ(θ) = limθ→∞ ρ(θ) =∞;
this also implies that ρ is bounded from below. We make the final assumption that ρ
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has a unique minimizer, which we denote by T ∗. (This assumption is not necessary—
essentially the same results can be obtained without this assumption—but it avoids some
distracting complications.) Note that the usual α-β-γ scheduling cost function, given in
Equation (1.1), falls within the class of allowable scheduling cost functions.
We are interested in equilibria: all users departing from i ∈ [n] should pay a common
disutility (considering both their journey time cost and their scheduling cost), and have no
options to modify their departure time to incur a lower disutility. We will formalize this
later. For now, we make two remarks. First, it is easy to see that mass departures are not
possible in an equilibrium (agents leaving just before and just after a mass departure would
necessarily incur different disutilities). As such, we do not consider this in our model; a
solution can be described by the departure rate from each location at each moment in
time. Secondly, we can assume that τ(i,i+1) = 0 for all i ∈ [n], because these values have
no impact whatsoever on the equilibrium. Modifying τ(i,i+1) by some amount only has the
effect of changing the actual costs paid by agents departing from 1, 2, . . . , i by the same
amount. We make this assumption for the remainder.
6.2.2 The (purely) sensitive demand model
Now consider the following variant. Instead of specifying the total mass Qi at i, we
consider that there are an unbounded mass of agents at each location, whose utility for
commuting is some given value Ci. That is, an agent at location i will commute if their
total cost for doing so is strictly below Ci, and is indifferent to commuting or not if this
cost is exactly Ci, but will not commute at any larger cost.
Define an auxiliary graph G by adding a new source node s, along with arcs (s, i) for
i ∈ [n]. Let C ≥ maxi∈[n] Ci. We give arc (s, i) length τ(s,i) := (C − Ci)/α and infinite
capacity. Observe that a user starting at s at time θ, traversing (s, i), and then departing i
at time θ+τ(s,i), experiences disutility precisely ατ(s,i) = C−Ci more than a user departing
i at time θ + τ(s,i). Thus, an equilibrium solution to the original problem with users at
i experiencing disutility Ci maps to a situation in G where all flow experiences disutility
C—in other words, an equilibrium of the single-origin single-destination instance defined
by G. We use the model discussed in Section 4.2, which considers general networks with
a single origin and destination, to describe the behavior of equilibria in the augmented
network G.
Recall that we assume τ(i,i+1) = 0 for all i (this remains without loss of generality for
the sensitive demand model as well, though of course adjusting τ(i,i+1) requires adjusting
Cj for j = 1, 2 . . . , i). As such, we will use τi as shorthand for τ(s,i).
We may assume that τ1 ≤ τ2 ≤ · · · ≤ τn. The reason is that if τi > τi+1, the time on
the path (s, i, i+ 1) will always be strictly larger than the direct path (s, i+ 1) (exploiting
that (s, i+ 1) has infinite capacity and hence no queue). This implies that, in such a case,
there will never be flow on (s, i), and node i can be removed from the instance; the arc
replacing (i− 1, i) and (i, i+ 1) should be given the smaller capacity of the two arcs.
Notice that adding some constant δ to C and to ατi for all i ∈ [n] has no impact; the
equilibrium remains completely unchanged. We can exploit this symmetry to drop the
requirement that free-flow travel times are nonnegative: we can interpret such an instance
by shifting values up by a large enough value.
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6.3 Equilibria in the sensitive demand model
6.3.1 Equilibrium conditions and existence in the sensitive model
We refer to Section 4.2 for the link dynamics, the earliest arrival functions, the dynamic
shortest path networks, the user costs and choices, the equilibrium conditions and the
Endogenous Thin Flow with Resetting (ETF).
Observe that users that depart first, as well as users that depart last, experience no
queueing delays. This is for the same reason as with a single bottleneck; for first departures,
it is of course trivial, and for last departures, if a user encounters a queue, they could
deviate to a later starting time without affecting their arrival time, for a strictly smaller
disutility. Thus, since the commute time without queues is precisely τ1, the departure
times in an equilibrium are supported on the set
[a1, b1] := {θ : ρ(θ + τ1) + ατ1 ≤ C}.
We can also determine the arrival time of a user that departs at time θ ∈ [a1, b1] (if any
users do—it will turn out to be the case that users do depart throughout the interval).
A user that departs s at time θ and arrives at t at time θ′ experiences a total cost of
α(θ′ − θ) + ρ(θ′). Since ρ′(θ′) > −α for all θ′, and hence ξ → ρ(ξ) + αξ is strictly
increasing, we can deduce that θ′ is the unique solution of the equation
ρ(θ′) + α(θ′ − θ) = C.
Let (f, `) be an equilibrium of the augmented graph G. Notice that the arcs (s, i), for
all i ∈ [n], never grow queues since they have infinite capacity and that all horizontal arcs
are active throughout [a1, b1]. By the ETF conditions (Definition 4.5) and by the specific










for all i ∈ [n] and almost every θ. Finally, to reach i, either we can go directly from s,
taking time τi, or we can find the earliest arrival to i− 1, and then (possibly) spend some
time in the queue on arc (i − 1, i). This implies that `i(θ) = θ + τi if (s, i) is active and
that
`′i(θ) = 1 for almost every θ for which (s, i) is active. (6.2)
6.3.2 Equilibrium structure
Throughout this section, we will consider an arbitrary equilibrium f , with associated labels
` and queueing delays q.
Define θ∗ so that `t(θ∗) = T ∗ (recall T ∗ is the unique minimizer of ρ). We record some
simple properties of `t.
Lemma 6.1. `′t(θ) > 1 for θ < θ∗ and 0 < `′t(θ) < 1 for θ ≥ θ∗. Further, `′t(θ) is
nonincreasing.
82
6.3. Equilibria in the sensitive demand model
Proof. This is an immediate consequence of Lemma 4.4, the assumptions on ρ (in partic-
ular, that ρ is convex with ρ′(θ) > −α for almost every θ) and the definition of θ∗.
We are only interested in the situation where all vertical arcs do become active at
some point, and in fact for a strictly positive amount of time; for otherwise, some arcs can
simply be removed, without impacting the equilibrium behavior. We call instances that
satisfy this property inclusive.
Clustering
We can certainly have that some τi’s are equal, and this will be very important later.
However, it is rather easy to see that to understand the equilibrium structure, it will
suffice to understand the case of strictly increasing τi’s, as the following definition and
lemmas will make clear.
Lemma 6.2. For i > 1, if q(i−1,i)(`i−1(θ)) < τi − τi−1, then (s, i) is not active at time θ.
In particular, if τi−1 < τi and there is no queue on (i− 1, i) at entrance time θ, then (s, i)
is not active at time θ.
Proof. Under the given conditions,
`i(θ) < (`i−1(θ)− τi−1) + τi ≤ θ + τi,
where the second inequality is obtained by considering the direct route from s to i − 1,
given that (s, i− 1) has no queue. This implies that (s, i) is inactive.
Lemma 6.3. All inclusive instances satisfy the following property:
For all 1 < i < j ≤ n with τi−1 < τi = τj, νj−1 ≥ νi−1. (6.3)
Proof. Suppose not; let i, j be a pair violating the property, with j chosen as small as
possible. Thus νk−1 ≥ νi−1 for i ≤ k < j, since otherwise our choice of j was not minimal.
We show that (s, i) is never active.
So fix some time θ. If q(i−1,i)(`i−1(θ)) = 0, then (s, i) is inactive at time θ by Lemma 6.2.
Otherwise, the outflow from arc (i−1, i) is exactly equal to the capacity νi−1 on an interval
[`i(θ) − ε, `i(θ)] for some positive ε. Since νj−1 < νi−1 and νk−1 ≥ νi−1 for all i ≤ k < j,
the inflow into j − 1 exceeds νj−1 for some interval [`j−1(θ) − ε′, `j−1(θ)], meaning that
q(j−1,j)(`j−1(θ)) > 0. But then the delay on the path from s to i to j is longer than that
of the direct path from s to j, and so (s, i) cannot be active at time θ. So (s, i) is never
active, contradicting that the instance is inclusive.
Lemma 6.4. If G is inclusive and τi = τj, then for the equilibrium labelling `, `i = `j.
Proof. It suffices to show the claim assuming τi−1 < τi or i = 1, by transitivity. Observe
that as long as none of the arcs (s, r) for i ≤ r ≤ j are active, there cannot be a queue
on any arc between i and j, since νi−1 is not larger than the capacity of any of these arcs
(this holds also when i = 1, since then ν0 = 0). It follows that the first time θ1 (if any)
that any (s, r) for i ≤ r ≤ j becomes active, all of them become active. However, it is
also true that if (s, i) is active at some time θ, then so is (s, j): `j(θ) ≥ `i(θ), but also
`j(θ) ≤ θ+ τj = θ+ τi = `i(θ). Thus no queues ever form on arcs between i and j, and so
`i(θ) = `j(θ) for all θ.
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Define the clustering of the instance G to be the partition C of [n] such that τi = τj for
all i, j in the same part, and τi 6= τj otherwise. We will call the parts of C clusters. Consider
now the instance obtained by contracting each cluster into a single node, which we will
denote G/C. By the above lemma, we can unambiguously define the image of ` under this
contraction, which we will denote `/C (so for any cluster C ∈ C, (`/C)C = `i for any i ∈ C).
We can also define the image f/C of f under the contraction: if C = {i, i+ 1, . . . , j} ∈ C,
then the flow from s to the cluster C in G/C at some time θ is given by summing f(s,r)(θ)
for i ≤ r ≤ j.
Lemma 6.5. If G is inclusive, then (f/C, `/C) is an equilibrium of G/C.
Proof. By Lemma 6.4, there are no queues in G in the horizontal arcs that are contracted
to form G/C. Thus disutilities for any given choice of route and departure time are the
same in (f/C, `/C) as in (f, `), and so the equilibrium conditions are satisfied.
Strictly increasing travel times
We will now discuss the equilibrium structure in the case τ1 < τ2 < · · · < τn; we will call
such instances strict. To summarize the main insights about an equilibrium that we will
obtain in this section:
• for any i ∈ [n], the arc (s, i) is active for an interval of time;
• the set of times that there is some queue to the right of a node i is also an interval,
and
• on this interval, the flow f(i,i+1) is almost everywhere nonincreasing, and can be
described quite explicitly in a recursive fashion.
Define, for any θ ∈ [a1, b1), (r(θ), r(θ) + 1) to be the rightmost arc that either has a
queue at time θ, or is growing a queue at time θ. This is well-defined; if θ ∈ (a1, b1), there
must be a queue by the equilibrium conditions, and for θ = a1, some arc must be growing
a queue. Also observe that by (6.1),
`′r(θ)+1(θ) = f(r(θ),r(θ)+1)(θ)/νr(θ) for almost every θ. (6.4)
Let
R := {j ∈ [n] : νk ≥ νj for all k ≥ j}. (6.5)
Lemma 6.6. For all θ ∈ [a1, b1), r(θ) ∈ R.
Proof. Let j = r(θ). Suppose for a contradiction that k > j with νk < νj. Let I be an open
interval containing θ in which (j, j + 1) has a queue throughout. Then by (6.1), `′j(θ′) =
f(j,j+1)(θ′)/νj for almost every θ′ ∈ I, whereas `′k(θ′) ≥ f(k,k+1)(θ′)/νk ≥ f(j,j+1)(θ′)/νk.
Hence `′k(θ′) > `′j(θ′) for almost every θ′ ∈ I, implying that there is a queue to the right
of j throughout I. This contradicts the definition of r(θ).
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For i ∈ [n], let Ai be the set of times where (s, i) is active, and Si the set of times
where there is some queue to the right of i:
Si := {θ ∈ [a1, b1] : `i(θ) < `t(θ)}
Ai := {θ ∈ [a1, b1] : (s, i) is active at time θ}.
We will eventually show that Si and Ai are both intervals. Recall that we define θ∗ so
that `t(θ∗) = T ∗.
Lemma 6.7. Ai is contained in the closure of Si for each i ∈ [n].
Proof. Suppose not; then we must be able to choose a nonempty interval [θ1, θ2] ⊆ Ai \Si.
We can choose θ1, θ2 so that either both are at least θ∗, or both are at most θ∗. But then
the disutility of a user using (s, i) departing at time θ1, namely ρ(`t(θ1)) + τi, differs from
that of a user departing at time θ2, namely ρ(`t(θ2)) + τi, contradicting the equilibrium
conditions.
Lemma 6.8. For all i ∈ [n], Si is a nonempty open interval whose closure contains θ∗.
Proof. Since S1 = (a1, b1), the claim holds for i = 1. So assume i > 1. By Lemma 6.6, if
i− 1 /∈ R, then Si−1 = Si (the rightmost arc with a queue is never i− 1). Thus it suffices
to prove the claim assuming that i− 1 ∈ R.
Let θ1 = inf Si. Then a queue must be growing on some arc (k, k + 1) with k ≥ i at
time θ1; since νj ≥ νi−1 for all j ≥ i, it follows that (s, i) is active at time θ1 (no arc (s, j)
with j > i can be active, since (j−1, j) has no queue at time θ1.) Thus ρ(θ1 +τi)+ατi = 0.
Since ρ(θ+τi) < ρ(θ1 +τi) for all θ1 < θ < θ∗, we can deduce from the equilibria conditions
that `i(θ) < `t(θ) in this same interval, otherwise a strictly improving deviation is possible.
Let θ2 = inf{θ ≥ θ∗ : θ /∈ Si}. By the equilibrium conditions, for any j ≥ i we have
ρ(θ2 + τj) +ατj ≥ 0. Thus, since ρ is strictly increasing from θ∗, ρ(θ+ τj) +ατj > 0 for all
θ > θ2, and hence (s, j) is inactive for all θ > θ2. It follows that no queues to the right of
i can increase from time θ2 (using again that νi−1 ≤ νj for all j ≥ i). Since `i(θ2) = `t(θ2),
we must have that `i(θ) = `t(θ) for all θ ≥ θ2.
We can now deduce that Si = (θ1, θ2). Since [θ1, θ2] contains Ai by Lemma 6.7, which
is nonempty by the inclusivity condition, θ1 < θ2.
We state a useful claim that we will use often. Informally, it tells us that the flow
f(i−1,i) on arc (i − 1, i) is strictly above νi−1 just before (s, i) becomes active, is fixed at
value νi−1 as long as (s, i) remains active, and then is strictly below νi−1 immediately after
(s, i) deactivates.
Claim 6.9. Suppose (θ1, θ2) is an interval in which (i− 1, i) has a queue throughout. Let





• If (s, i) is active at both times θ1 and θ2, f̄ = νi−1.
• If (s, i) is active at time θ2 but not θ1, f̄ > νi−1.
• If (s, i) is active at time θ1 but not θ2, f̄ < νi−1.
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Proof. If (s, i) is active at time θ, then `i(θ) = θ + τi; otherwise, `i(θ) < θ + τi. So
`i(θ2) − `i(θ1) − (θ2 − θ1) is zero if (s, i) is active at both θ1 and θ2, strictly positive if it
is active only at θ1, and strictly negative if it is active only at θ2.
Since (i − 1, i) has a queue in (θ1, θ2), we have that `′i(θ) = f(i−i,i)(θ)/νi−1 for almost
every θ ∈ (θ1, θ2), by (6.1). Integrating over the interval and combining with the above
observation yields the claim.
We now come to our main structural lemma. From now on, we will write (ci, di) for
the interval Si.
Lemma 6.10. The following holds for all i ∈ [n].
(i) Ai = [ai, bi] for some ai < bi.
(ii) f(i,i+1)(θ) is an almost everywhere nonincreasing piecewise-constant function on Si =
(ci, di).
(iii) an < θ∗, and if i < n, ai < ai+1 ≤ bi.
Proof of Lemma 6.10. We first argue that if (ii) holds for some i, then (i) holds for i as
well. Consider two disjoint intervals (θ1− ε, θ1) and (θ2, θ2 + ε), such that (s, i) is inactive
within both intervals, but active at times θ1 and θ2. We will show that then necessarily
θ1 < θ2; this clearly implies that Ai must be an interval.
The average value of f(i−1,i) over the interval (θ1− ε, θ1) is strictly larger than over the
interval (θ2, θ2 +ε), by Claim 6.9. On these intervals, f(i−1,i) and f(i,i+1) are the same, since
(s, i) is inactive and thus sending no flow. By Lemma 6.7, θ1 and θ2 are both in the interval
[ci, di], and f(i,i+1) is almost everywhere nonincreasing on this interval by assumption. So
indeed θ1 < θ2.
We will proceed by induction on i to prove claim (ii). For i = n, f(n,n+1)(θ) = `′t(θ)νn
for all cn ≤ θ < dn; this is nonincreasing by Lemma 6.1. So suppose i < n, and that
f(i+1,i+2) is nonincreasing on [ci+1, di+1). So we also have that Ai+1 = [ai+1, bi+1].




`′t(θ) min{νi, . . . , νn} ci ≤ θ < ai+1
νi ai+1 ≤ θ < bi+1
f(i+1,i+2)(θ) bi+1 ≤ θ < di+1
`′t(θ)νi di+1 ≤ θ < di
. (6.6)
Here, we are using that
- for all θ < ai+1, by (iii) no arc (s, j) with j ≥ i + 1 is active, and so r(θ) must have
minimum capacity amongst arcs to the right of i;
- for all ai+1 ≤ θ < bi+1, (i, i + 1) has a queue and `′i+1(θ) = 1, yielding a flow of νi on
(i, i+ 1);
- for all bi+1 ≤ θ < di+1, f(i,i+1)(θ) = f(i+1,i+2)(θ); and
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- for all di+1 ≤ θ < di, r(θ) = i.
It is clear (also using the inductive assumption) that within each of the subintervals
defining (6.6), f(i,i+1) is almost everywhere nonincreasing and piecewise constant. It re-
mains to confirm that the flow is nonincreasing between subintervals, at the moments ai+1,
bi+1 and di+1 (note that some of these subintervals may be empty).
At times ai+1 and bi+1, this is immediate from Claim 6.9, along with the fact that
f(i,i+1) is almost everywhere piecewise constant. At time di+1, there is nothing to prove if
either di+1 = bi+1 or di+1 = di, so assume bi+1 < di+1 < di. Then r(di+1) = i, and so we
must have that i ∈ R by Lemma 6.6. Now choose θ′ ∈ (bi+1, di+1) so that the following
properties hold:
• f(i−i,i)(θ) = f(i−1,i)(θ′) for almost every θ ∈ [θ′, di+1). This is possible, since f(i−1,i)
is piecewise constant almost everywhere in [ci, di).
• None of the arcs (s, i + 1), (s, i + 2), . . . , (s, n) are active in the interval [θ′, di+1).
Certainly (s, i + 1) is not active for θ′ > bi+1; for the remaining arcs, observe that
Lemma 6.2 implies that (s, j) is inactive if the queue on (j−1, j) is sufficiently small,
and there are no queues on any arcs to the right of i+ 1 at time di+1.
Let j := r(θ′); j ≥ i+1 by definition of di+1. Since (s, i+1) is inactive at time θ′, we must
have f(i,i+1)(θ′) = f(j,j+1)(θ′). But f(j,j+1)(θ′) = `′t(θ′)νj (by (6.4), since j = r(di+1)). Thus
f(i,i+1)(θ′) = `′t(θ′)νj ≥ `′t(θ′)νi = f(i,i+1)(di+1),
with the inequality coming from the fact that i ∈ R and `′t is nonincreasing. So f(i,i+1) is
indeed nonincreasing almost everywhere on [ci, di).
Finally, we argue (iii). There are two cases.
• Case 1: νi ≥ νi−1. Then no queue can form on (i, i+ 1) until (s, i) becomes active,
by Lemma 6.2. If i = n, we immediately see that an < θ∗, otherwise (s, n) will not
be active for an interval of nonzero length.
So suppose i < n. Then q(i,i+1)(`i(ai+1)) ≥ τi+1− τi > 0 by Lemma 6.2. But because
νi ≥ νi−1, it is impossible to grow a queue on (i, i + 1) without sending flow along
(s, i). It follows that ai+1 > ai. Since f(i,i+1)(θ) = νi for almost every θ ∈ (ai+1, bi+1),
it follows from (ii) that f(i,i+1)(θ) ≥ νi for almost every θ ∈ (ci, bi+1). Thus by
Claim 6.9, (s, i) remains active on the interval [ai, bi+1], and so bi ≥ bi+1 > ai+1.
• Case 2: νi < νi−1. If i = n, then f(i,i+1)(θ) = `′t(θ)νi < νi−1 for almost every θ ≥ θ∗,
and so bn ≤ θ∗. Thus by the inclusivity assumption, an < θ∗.
Now suppose i < n. Then for almost every θ ∈ (ai+1, di+1), f(i,i+1)(θ) ≤ νi < νi−1.
By Claim 6.9, we can deduce that (s, i) is not active within this interval, and hence
that f(i−1,i) is equal to f(i,i+1) on this interval. So f(i−1,i)(θ) < νi−1 for almost every
θ ∈ (ai+1, di+1), and hence by Claim 6.9 bi ≤ ai+1. Hence ai < bi < ai+1.
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6.3.3 Uniqueness and a bound on the number of phases
The following is a fairly immediate consequence of our structural results.
Lemma 6.11. Any equilibrium of an instance of size n (strict or not) has at most 3n+ω
phases, where ω is the number of breakpoints in the scheduling function.
Proof. It suffices to consider strict instances, given Lemma 6.5.
By Lemma 6.10, f(i,i+1) is almost everywhere piecewise constant on [ci, di]. For any θ
outside of the interval [ci, di], (s, i) is not active, and so f(i,i+1)(θ) = f(j,j+1)(θ), where j < i
is chosen maximally so that (s, j) is active. It follows that f(i,i+1) is almost everywhere
piecewise constant throughout the evolution. To bound the number of breakpoints of f ,
observe that by (6.6), any breakpoint of f(i,i+1) within (ci, di) that is not a breakpoint of
either (i) ρ, or (ii) of f(i+1,i+2) within the interval (ci+1, di+1), is among ai+1, bi+1 and di+1.
It follows that f has at most 3(n−1) breakpoints that are not breakpoints of ρ, and hence
3(n − 1) + κ breakpoints in total. This gives a bound of 3n + κ − 2 on the number of
phases.
Given this, we can dispense with some awkward technicalities, and also argue that
equilibria are unique. In an equilibrium (f, `), on any phase f is almost everywhere
constant, and ` is linear. It follows that we can modify f on a set of measure zero so
that it is simply constant on each phase. This makes f piecewise constant (here we use
that there are a finite number of phases) and right-continuous, and ` piecewise linear and
right-differentiable. It follows by the arguments shown in Section 4.3 that ` is unique.
Theorem 6.12. In any strict instance, both f and ` are unique (up to measure zero
changes in the case of f). In any instance (not necessarily strict), ` is unique.
Proof. Suppose that (f (1), `(1)) and (f (2), `(2)) are both equilibria, with f (i) piecewise linear
and right continuous for i = 1, 2, and suppose for a contradiction that they are distinct.
Let θ1 = inf{θ : f (1)(θ) 6= f (2)(θ)}. Then `(1)(θ1) = `(2)(θ1). Also let ε > 0 be chosen so
that [θ1, θ1 + ε] is contained within a single phase of both equilibria; so f (1) and f (2) are
both constant on this interval. Then (f (1)(θ1 +ε), `(1)′(θ1 +ε)) and (f (2)(θ1 +ε), `(2)′(θ1 +ε))
are both solutions to the ETF instance (see Definition 4.5 determined by `(1)(θ1). However,
according to Theorem 4.9, this has a unique solution. This means that f (1) and f (2) agree
on [θ1, θ1 + ε], contradicting the maximality of θ1.
Uniqueness of ` follows immediately from uniqueness of f , and by Lemma 6.5, this
applies to non-strict instances as well.
From this point further, we will always assume that f is piecewise constant and right-
continuous.
Activation times
In what follows, we will consider the vertical arc delays τ to be variable, keeping all other
parameters of the instance (ν and ρ) fixed. As such, we will parametrize some values such
as the activation times ai by τ as well when needed; e.g., ai(τ), bi(τ).
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The main insight from this section is that it will be more convenient to describe a
strict instance by the activation times ai; given a valid choice of activation times, there
will be a unique corresponding choice of τ that we can determine if necessary. The main
reason that activation times are more convenient is that it turns out that, as long as ai−1
is strictly less than ai,
• the interval [ai, bi] depends only on ai, ai+1, . . . , an, and
• the flow f(i,i+1) on the interval [ci, di) is a function only of ai+1, . . . , an (note that
there is no dependence on ai). A subtlety here is that the interval [ci, di) does depend
on the entire vector of activation times.
This will be absolutely crucial when we return to the insensitive model, since it will allow
us to build up an equilibrium “from right to left” in an inductive fashion.
Lemma 6.13. Let i ∈ [n] and ãi < ãi+1 < · · · < ãn < θ∗ be given. Then there exists
f̃(i,i+1) : R→ R+, with f̃(i,i+1) depending only on ãi+1, . . . , ãn, so that the following holds.
For any τ for which aj(τ) = ãj for all j ≥ i and ai−1(τ) < ãi (if i > 1), and
taking (f, `) to be the resulting equilibrium,
(i) f̃(i,i+1)(θ) = f(i,i+1)(θ) for all θ ∈ [ci(τ), di(τ)), and
(ii) bi(τ) = b̃i := max{θ : ρ(`t(θ)) ≤ ρ(`t(ãi)) and f̃(i,i+1)(θ) ≥ νi−1}.
Proof. For i = n, it is of course clear that we can choose f̃(n,n+1)(θ) = `′t(θ)νn. The
argument for (ii) for i = n follows the argument for general i, so we postpone this. So
suppose that i < n and assume inductively that f̃(i+1,i+2) has been defined and that the
claimed properties hold for i+ 1.
We make the following definition, with d̃i+1 still to be determined, but only depending
on ãi+1, . . . , ãn:
f̃(i,i+1)(θ) =

`′t(θ) min{νi, . . . , νn} θ < ãi+1
νi ãi+1 ≤ θ < b̃i+1
f̃(i+1,i+2)(θ) b̃i+1 ≤ θ < d̃i+1
`′t(θ)νi d̃i+1 ≤ θ
. (6.7)
Then comparing to (6.6), it is clear that as long as d̃i+1 = di+1(τ), then f̃(i,i+1)(θ) =
f(i,i+1)(θ) on [ci, di). However, we cannot choose such a d̃i+1, because di+1 does depend
on the entire vector τ . Instead, we will give a definition of d̃i+1 satisfying the following
weaker property:
Either d̃i+1 = di+1(τ), or d̃i+1 ≥ di+1(τ) = di(τ). (6.8)
This suffices: in the latter case, the error in our definition of d̃i+1 is harmless within the
interval [ci(τ), di(τ)), and so the definition of f̃(i,i+1) remains correct.
We consider two cases.
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• Case 1: i /∈ R. Then r(θ) is never equal to i for any θ, by Lemma 6.6, and hence
di(τ) = di+1(τ). Thus we simply set d̃i+1 =∞ in the definition of f̃(i,i+1), and (6.8)
is certainly satisfied.
• Case 2: i ∈ R. We will set d̃i+1 to the first time θ > ãi that `i+1(θ) = `t(θ), under
the assumption that `i(θ) < `i+1(θ) for θ ∈ [bi(τ), di(τ)). We first see how this can
be computed, and then argue that this choice for d̃i+1 satisfies the desired property
given in (6.8).
Observe that because i ∈ R, we must have that `i+1(ãi+1) = `t(ãi+1); there is no
way any queue could grow to the right of i + 1 whilst no arc (s, j) for j ≥ i + 1 is
active. This information will allow us to determine the moment that all queues to
the right of i+ 1 empty out, as follows.
Consider a user departing at time b̃i+1 = bi+1(τ) and using the arc (s, i+1). This user
must experience the same cost as a user departing at time ãi+1 using arc (s, i + 1),
and so
ρ(`t(b̃i+1)) + α(`t(b̃i+1)− `i+1(b̃i+1) + τi+1) = ρ(`t(ãi+1)) + α(`t(ãi+1)− `i+1(ãi+1) + τi+1)
= ρ(`t(ãi+1)) + ατi+1.
Hence
`t(b̃i+1)− `i+1(b̃i+1) = 1α(ρ(`t(ãi+1))− ρ(`t(b̃i+1)).
Now since we are assuming that (i, i + 1) is resetting for all times θ′ ∈ [b̃i+1, di(τ)),














From this, we can determine the correct value of di+1(τ) under the assumption, and
hence fix d̃i+1.
What if the assumption that does not hold? Since Si is an interval and ãi ∈ Si, it
must be that di(τ) = di+1(τ). Moreover, `′i+1(θ′) can only be larger than the value
of f(i,i+1)(θ′)/νi that we assumed in the above argument, implying that our estimate
of `i+1(di+1(τ)) based on the assumption is too small. Thus our estimate of di+1(τ)
that we used to fix d̃i+1 was too large, and (6.8) is satisfied.
We now come to (ii); here we will allow i = n as well. Let z = max{θ : ρ(`t(θ)) ≤
ρ(`t(ãi)}. If i − 1 /∈ R, consider j > i minimal with νj−1 < νi−1; then bi(τ) ≤ aj(τ),
since f(i,i+1)(aj(τ)) ≤ f(j−1,j)(aj(τ)) = νj−1. This implies, firstly, that bi(τ) ≤ θ∗ ≤ z; and
secondly, that f̃(i,i+1)(θ) = f(i,i+1)(θ) for θ ∈ [ci(τ), bj(τ)). Since aj(τ) < di(τ), it follows
from Claim 6.9 that indeed bi(τ) = b̃i.
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So suppose i−1 ∈ R. Since i−1 ∈ R, there are no queues to the right of i before or at
time ãi. The equilibrium conditions then imply that bi(τ) ≤ z, since a user departing later
than z and using arc (s, i) would experience a strictly larger disutility than one departing
at time ãi. Further, di ≥ z, since otherwise a user departing at time di would experience
strictly smaller disutility.
Thus f̃(i,i+1) matches f(i,i+1) on [ci(τ), z); since also bi(τ) ≤ z, Claim 6.9 implies that
bi(τ) = b̃i.
Extending this result to non-strict instances is straightforward. Given ã1 ≤ ã2 ≤ · · · ≤
ãn, we have (from Lemma 6.4 and Lemma 6.10 (iii)) that the clustering C is precisely the
partition into equal activation times. Considering the contracted instance, we deduce the
following.
Corollary 6.14. Let i ∈ [n] and ãi ≤ ãi+1 ≤ · · · ≤ ãn < θ∗ be given. Let i′ be maximal
with ãi = ãi′. Then there exists f̃(i′,i′+1) : R → R+, with f̃(i′,i′+1) depending only on
ãi′+1, . . . , ãn, so that the following holds.
For any τ for which aj(τ) = ãj for all j ≥ i and ai−1(τ) < ãi (if i > 1), and
taking (f, `) to be any equilibrium to the instance given by τ ,
(i) f̃(i′,i′+1)(θ) = f(i′,i′+1)(θ) for all θ ∈ [ci(τ), di(τ)), and
(ii) bi(τ) = bi+1(τ) = · · · = bi′(τ) = b̃i, where b̃i = max{θ : ρ(`t(θ)) ≤
ρ(`t(ãi)) and f̃(i′,i′+1)(θ) ≥ νi−1}.
We can now observe that the activation vector a uniquely determines τ ; as such, we
can choose to describe an instance via activation times rather than the vector τ , which we
will frequently do in the next section.
Lemma 6.15. The map τ → a(τ) is 1-1.
Proof. Since, as already noted, the clustering is fully determined by the activation vector
a, it suffices to prove the claim for strict instances. Suppose for a contradiction that
a(τ) = a(τ ′), with τ 6= τ ′ being strict and both inducing inclusive instances. Write
a = a(τ) and a′ = a(τ ′), and let I, I ′ refer to the instances associated with τ and τ ′
respectively.
Let j be minimal such that τj 6= τ ′j; assume without loss of generality that τj < τ ′j.
Consider any θ < aj. None of the arcs (s, i) for i ≥ j are active in I at time θ, by
Lemma 6.10 (iii). Since (s, j) is not active in I and τ ′j > τj, (s, j) is not active in I ′, and
so again by Lemma 6.10 (i), (s, i) is not active in I ′ at time θ. Thus the equilibrium labels
are identical for I and I ′ until time aj. At this point, (s, j) is active in I, but not in I ′,
and so a′j > aj.
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6.4 Existence and uniqueness with insensitive demand
We now turn to the insensitive demand model. For any choice of activation times, we can
obtain the equilibrium for the corresponding sensitive demand instance. If it happens to
be the case that we choose the activation times precisely right, such that the resulting
equilibrium sends precisely the desired mass Qi from location i for each i ∈ [n], then we
have found an equilibrium for the insensitive instance. The challenge is to determine the
correct choice of activation times. In order to show existence for the insensitive model, we
must show that a good choice of activation times always exist; and to show uniqueness,
that this choice is unique.
Our approach will provide a quite explicit description of the mapping between activa-
tion times and demand vectors. More precisely, for a given vector a of activation times,
we will find a description for the set of demand vectors which can be obtained in an equi-
librium for a. The reason that there is in general a set of matching demand vectors, rather
than just one, is because we do not require a to define a strict instance. This means that
equilibria are unique with respect to labels, but not flows; indeed while the total amount
of flow departing a single cluster is unique, there is a lot of flexibility in the way in which
this flow is distributed between the locations in a cluster. Understandings this structure
is one of the main technical challenges.
Once we have this description, we will be able to show that the demand sets corre-
sponding to two different activation vectors are disjoint, which will imply uniqueness. We
will also provide an algorithm to find the correct activation time vector for a given demand
vector, demonstrating existence at the same time.
Let
A = {a(τ) : τ defines an inclusive instance}.
(Note that we do not require τ to be strict). For any a ∈ A, let Qa be the set of all
possible demand vectors (Q1, . . . , Qn) ∈ Rn++ that can be obtained in an equilibrium for
the instance defined by the activation vector a. (As with our restriction to inclusive
instances, the restriction to strictly positive demands is mostly for convenience. If Qi = 0
for some i, we can simply remove i from the instance, and contract whichever of (i− 1, i)
and (i, i+ 1) has smaller capacity, to obtain a completely equivalent instance.) We begin
by giving a completely explicit description of this set.
Definition 6.16. For all 0 ≤ j < r ≤ n and ar < ar+1 ≤ ar+2 ≤ · · · ≤ an (note the first





Here, f̃(r,r+1) is as in Corollary 6.14 for the activation times ar+1, . . . , an, and
zr := max
{
θ : ρ(`t(θ)) ≤ ρ(`t(ar))
}
. (6.10)
Note that Mj,r depends only on ar, ar+1, . . . , an; we will write Mj,r(ar, ar+1, . . . , an) if we
wish to make this dependence explicit. The interpretation of Mj,r(ar, . . . , an) (as will
become clear) is the total amount of demand sent from location j + 1, . . . , r in a solution
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where j+1, j+2, . . . , r are all in the same cluster, but j is not (i.e., aj+1 = aj+2 = · · · = ar
and aj < aj+1).
Define, for convenience, an+1 :=∞ and a0 := −∞.
Proposition 6.17. For any a ∈ A,
Qa =
{
Q ∈ Rn++ :
r∑
i=j
Qi ≥Mj−1,r ∀j ≤ r ∈ [n] : aj = ar < ar+1,
r∑
i=j
Qi = Mj−1,r ∀j ≤ r ∈ [n] : aj−1 < aj = ar < ar+1
}
.
Further, given any Q ∈ Qa, there is an efficient algorithm to find an equilibrium (f, `)
corresponding to Q.
Note that as well as specifying precisely how much demand emanates from each cluster
(the equality constraints), there are also constraints on how this demand can be distributed
within a cluster. Given a cluster these constraints are lower bounds on how much of the
demand can come from any rightmost portion of the cluster {j, j+1, . . . , r}, or equivalently,
an upper bound on the demand that can come from any leftmost portion of the cluster.
This makes sense intuitively; only during the period when the cluster is active can demand
be sent from it, and since the horizontal arcs within the cluster cannot grow queues, they
act as bottlenecks to the demand in the portion of the cluster to their left.
Proof of Proposition 6.17. Let D denote the set of demand vectors satisfying the claimed
description of Qa.
Qa ⊆ D. Fix any equilibrium (f, `) of the instance corresponding to a. Consider any
j ≤ r ∈ [n] with aj = ar < ar+1. By Lemma 6.5, we have bi = br for j ≤ i ≤ r, since
τj = · · · = τr. The arcs (s, i) for j ≤ i ≤ r are thus active precisely on the interval [ar, br].
We have f(r,r+1)(θ) = f̃(r,r+1)(θ) and f(j−1,j)(θ) ≤ νj−1 for all θ ∈ [ar, br) . Moreover, if














[f̃(r,r+1)(θ)− νj−1]+dθ by (6.10),
with the inequality being an equality if aj−1 < aj. Thus Q satisfies all constraints for D.
Qa ⊇ D. Given Q ∈ D, we wish to demonstrate an equilibrium (f, `) corresponding to a
for which Q is the resulting demand vector. We will also make sure to provide an efficient
algorithm to construct f . (Once f is known, ` is easily computed.)
We will consider each cluster of equal activation times separately. Fix j, r ∈ [n] with
aj−1 < aj = ar < ar+1. We need to determine f(s,i)(θ) for j ≤ i ≤ r and θ ∈ [ar, br);
93
Chapter 6. Revisiting the corridor problem with discrete bottlenecks
this uniquely determines the entire flow via flow conservation. Note that f(j−1,j)(θ) = νj−1
and f(r,r+1)(θ) = f̃(r,r+1)(θ) are determined for θ ∈ [ar, br). We will work from left to right
within this block. Begin with i = j. We set f(s,i)(θ) = f̃(r,r+1)(θ)−f(i−1,i)(θ) for θ ∈ [ar, δi)














ensures that δi exists and is bounded by br. Once this has been determined, f(i,i+1) =
f(s,i) + f(i−1,i) is determined as well. We increase i and repeat this process, until all flows
in the block have been determined.
The resulting flow satisfies flow conservation by construction, and is clearly nonneg-
ative. For all j ≤ i ≤ k and θ ∈ [ar, br), we have f(i,i+1)(θ) ≤ νj−1 ≤ νi (the final
inequality by Lemma 6.5). This ensures that no arcs inside the cluster grow a queue: By
(6.1), `′j+1(θ) = max{`′j(θ), f(j,j+1)(θ)/νj} = `′j(θ), and similarly for all other nodes in the
cluster.
The following technical “triangle inequality” lemma will be useful.
Lemma 6.18. For any a ∈ A and any j < k < r with ak < ak+1 and ar < ar+1,
Mj,k +Mk,r ≥Mj,r.
Proof. It suffices to prove the claim under the assumption that ak+1 = ar, since repeated
applications then yield the claim in its full generality. So we assume ak+1 = · · · = ar and















[f̃(r,r+1)(θ)− νj]+dθ = Mj,r.
Here, the last inequality follows by observing that:
• either θ < br, in which case f̃(k,k+1)(θ) = νk, and the triangle inequality for [·]+ can
be applied,
• or θ ≥ br, in which case f̃(k,k+1)(θ) = f̃(r,r+1)(θ) and the first term alone suffices.
Next, we observe some additional constraints satisfied by demand vectors in Qa. Note
that in the following, no restrictions on j aside from j ≤ r are present.
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Proof. We proceed by induction on j; the claim clearly holds whenever aj = ar, and
in particular when j = r. Otherwise, let k ≤ r be minimal such that ak > aj. Then
inductively, ∑ri=kQi ≥ Mk−1,r. We also have ∑k−1i=j Qi ≥ Mj−1,k−1 by Proposition 6.17.
The claim then follows from Lemma 6.18.
We now describe an algorithm that, given Q ∈ Rn++, determines an activation time
vector a ∈ A such that Q ∈ Qa. We will show that this algorithm always succeeds, and
also show that the returned vector a is the unique possible choice.
Algorithm 1 Determining an activation time vector a with Q ∈ Qa.
Require: Demand vector Q ∈ Rn++.
Ensure: Activation vector a ∈ A so that Q ∈ Qa.
1: r ← n.
2: while r > 0 do
3: Choose y minimally such that ∑ri=j Qi ≥Mj−1,r(y, ar+1, . . . , an) for all j ≤ r.
4: Choose k minimally such that ∑ri=kQi = Mk−1,r(y, ar+1, . . . , an).
5: Set ak = ak+1 = · · · = ar = y.
6: r ← k − 1.
7: end while
8: return a.
Theorem 6.20. Algorithm 1 always succeeds, for any Q ∈ Rn++.
Proof. We will proceed by induction. We will show that the following invariant holds
throughout the algorithm, whenever r < n:
r∑
i=j
Qi > Mj−1,r(ar+1, ar+2, . . . , an) ∀j ≤ r. (6.11)
So assume that ar+1, . . . , an have been fixed. Note that Mj−1,r(y, ar+1, . . . , an) is a
continuous and decreasing function of y. Given that the invariant holds for r (or r = n),
we can deduce that y < ar+1, and also the existence of the index k (if no constraint is tight,
y cannot be minimal). By the choice of k, ∑ri=kQi = Mk−1,r(ar, . . . , an) and ∑ri=j Qi ≥
Mj−1,r for all k < j ≤ r. Thus (taking into account the induction) all constraints of the
description of Qa indexed by j′ ≤ r′ with r′ ≥ r are satisfied.
Finally, we observe that the invariant (6.11) holds for the next iteration. Applying









Qi > Mj−1,r −Mk−1,r ≥Mj−1,k,
as required.
Theorem 6.21. If a 6= a′ ∈ A, then Qa ∩Qa′ = ∅.
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Proof. Suppose for a contradiction that Q ∈ Qa and Q ∈ Qa′ . We’ll useMj,r as shorthand
for Mj,r(ar, . . . , an) and M ′j,r as shorthand for Mj,r(a′r, . . . , a′n).
Let k be chosen maximally so that ak 6= a′k; assume, without loss of generality, that
a′k < ak. Choose r so that ak = ar < ar+1, and j so that aj−1 < aj = ak.
First, we observe that M ′j−1,k > Mj−1,k. Since Q ∈ Rn++, M ′j−1,k > 0; exploiting that
f̃(k,k+1)(θ) is decreasing, we must then have that f̃(k,k+1)(ak) > νk−1. By Lemma 6.5,




[f̃(k,k+1)(θ)− νj−1]+dθ > 0, and so M ′j−1,k > Mj−1,k.
By Lemma 6.19 applied to Qa′ ,
∑k










Qi > Mj−1,k +Mk,r ≥Mj−1,r,
contradicting (via Proposition 6.17) the assumption that Q ∈ Qa.
6.4.1 Algorithmic issues
We now discuss the details of implementing Algorithm 1 and computing an actual equi-
librium flow, and the running time of the algorithm.
Theorem 6.22. The time required by Algorithm 1 is O(n(n + ω)). Furthermore, all the
values (f, `) can be computed in O(n(n+ ω)) time.
Proof. For the first part of the statement, our goal is to show that Algorithm 1 runs at
most n iterations, each with amortized complexity O(n+ ω).
For each choice of r we compute the piecewise constant function f̃r,r+1. For this we
proceed as in the proof of Lemma 6.13, specifically as in Equation (6.7), by setting d̃r+1
to infinity if r /∈ R or, otherwise, to the first time θ > ãi that `i+1(θ) = `t(θ), under the
assumption that `i(θ) < `i+1(θ) for θ ∈ [bi(τ), di(τ)). Since the number of phases is at
most 3n+ω (Lemma 6.11), it follows that f̃(r,r+1) can assume at most 3n+ω values. This,
together we the fact that f̃(r+1,r+2) was previously computed, implies that f̃(r,r+1) requires
O(n + ω) time (for the case r = n we just need to examine ρ, requiring thus only O(ω)
time).




in time O(n+ ω).
To compute Mj−1,r, for j ≤ r, in addition to F̃r,r+1(θ) we also need to calculate zr. Let
ς : R→ R be the function for which ς(ar) = zr. This function is also piecewise linear and
to compute it we need to examine ρ, requiring thus O(ω) time. Additionally, it does not
depend on r and thus can be computed just once.
Let z′j be the point at which f̃r,r+1(θ) drops below νj−1, and let ςj(y) = min{ς(y), z′j).
Notice that
Mj−1,r(y, ar+1, . . . , an) = F̃r,r+1(ς(y))− F̃r,r+1(y)− νj−1 · (ς(y)− y). (6.12)
Now we show how to determine the values of y and k satisfying the properties indicated
in Line 3 and 4 of Algorithm 1. We start with k = r and we proceed as follows:
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• We compute the value of y such that Qr = Mr−1,r(y, ar+1, . . . , an). This also requires
O(n+ω) time: from Equation (6.12), from the piecewise linearity of ς and from the
fact that F̃r,r+1(θ) has at most 3n + ω, it follows that y → Mk−1,r(y, ar+1, . . . , an)
is piecewise linear with O(n + ω) breakpoints. We compute these breakpoints and
then examine them in order, until we find the interval containing the solution we
seek. At that point we perform a linear interpolation to find the exact value of y.
• Once we have this y, we check if the constraints ∑ri=j Qi ≥ Mj−1,r(y, ar+1, . . . , an)
hold for all j < k (and also, whether they are tight). This can be done in constant
time using Equation (6.12).
• If the constraints do hold, then we know that we have found the correct value of y,
and we set k minimally so that the constraint is tight. If not, then we know that
k ≤ r − 1. Therefore, we set k = r − 1 and we repeat the procedure.
This means that the total work we do for any fixed value of k is O(n + ω), and since
there are only n values of k, we get a complexity of O(n(n+ ω)) for Algorithm 1.
For the second part of the statement, once we have the activation vector, the entire
equilibrium (f, `), as well as the corresponding τ vector, can be easily computed in time
O(n(n + ω)). First, we can compute the flows f(i,i+1) in their entirety for all i with
ai < ai+1 (and i = n): for θ ∈ [ci, di), f(i,i+1)(θ) = f̃(i,i+1)(θ), with f̃ already computed
during Algorithm 1; and for θ not in this interval, f(i,i+1)(θ) = f(j,j+1)(θ) = f̃(j,j+1)(θ),
where j is maximal such that (s, j) is active. For horizontal arcs within a cluster, where
ai = ai+1, the proof of Proposition 6.17 provides one possible choice of f(i,i+1).
Once f has been fully determined, it is straightforward to compute `: for each phase,
(6.1) provides the derivative of `. The vector τ corresponding to a (and hence the disutility
experienced at each location) can then be determined from the equilibrium conditions.
6.5 Some examples of equilibrium behavior
In this section we present three examples of instances that provide nice insights into the
equilibrium behavior. In all the examples we assume the most common scheduling cost
function, the one defined in Equation (1.1), with α = 2, β = 1 and γ = 4 (so `′t(θ) = 2
for θ < θ∗ and `′t(θ) = 1/3 for θ > θ∗). The difference among the instances lie in the arc
capacities of the network. In one all the horizontal arcs have same capacity, in an other
they are decreasing and in the last one they are increasing.
In all the examples we will first discuss the behavior in the case that the clustering is
trivial—that is, the sensitive instance that corresponds to the given demand vector is strict.
Alternatively, it can be viewed as discussing the behavior on the appropriate contracted
instance. As such, each individual location should be understood to potentially represent
a number of locations in the original instance. The clustering itself will depend on the
demand vector Q. As we have seen, this correspondence is quite complicated, but we will
make some qualitative observations, in particular regarding what clusterings are possible
in each of the three examples.
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All corridor capacities equal. Here we consider the setting in which all horizontal arcs
have equal capacity, which we take to be one without loss of generality. Figure 6.1 shows
the evolution of an equilibrium in a typical instance of this type, with a trivial clustering.
For this restricted setting, the structure is simplest; in addition to the structural results
already discussed that hold in general, the following key properties hold.
• Aside from (s, 1), which sends flow throughout, there is at most one other vertical
arc with positive flow at any moment in time.
• The first part of the peak. Let (s, i(θ)) denote the rightmost vertical arc sending
flow at time θ, for θ ∈ [a1, θ∗). Then i(θ) is an increasing function of θ, and all arcs
(s, 1), (s, 2), . . . , (s, i(θ)) are active (though only (s, 1) and (s, i(θ)) are sending flow).
The queue on the arc (i(θ), i(θ)+1) increases, and all other queues remain constant.
• The second part of the peak. After θ∗, the only active vertical arc (and hence only
location sending flow) is (s, 1). Queues empty out from left to right: a queue only
begins to empty once it is the leftmost remaining queue.
Let us observe how these follow from our previous structural insights. Consider the
situation in the first part of the peak, and assume inductively that (s, 1), (s, 2), . . . , (s, i)
are all active, and that none of the horizontal arcs to the right of i+ 1 have a queue; here
i = i(θ). Then all horizontal arcs to the left of i must have a queue (by Lemma 6.2),
and the flow on all these arcs must be 1, the corridor capacity. Thus f(s,1)(θ) = 1 and
f(s,j)(θ) = 0 for all 1 < j < i. All queues to the left of i will thus remain constant. On
the other hand, (i, i+ 1) will be growing a queue; `′i+1(θ) = `′t(θ) > 1. The current phase
will only end due to reaching θ∗, or a new vertical arc becoming active; this can only be
(s, i + 1). Thus the claimed structure is preserved in all phases of the first part of the
peak.
At time θ∗, all horizontal arcs have queues. But now `′t(θ) < 1 for θ < θ∗, and
f(n,n+1)(θ) = `′t(θ) < 1. Since then f(i,i+1)(θ) < 1 for all i, we must have that `′i(θ) < 1
for all i > 1. So no vertical arcs aside from (s, 1) can remain active after time θ∗, and all
flow departs via (s, 1) from this point forward, at rate below 1. It is clear that queues will
then empty from left to right; as long as (i − 1, i) has a queue, the outflow from this arc
has unit rate, and so the queue on (i, i+ 1) will not change.
We now consider possible clusterings. Here, they are very restricted: only the leftmost
cluster may be nontrivial; all other clusters must be singletons. For suppose {j, j+1, . . . , r}
were a cluster of the sensitive instance corresponding to a demand vector Q ∈ Rn++, with
1 < j < r. Because all capacities are equal, we have that Mj−1,r = Mr−1,r. But then by
Proposition 6.17, ∑ri=j Qi = Mj−1,r = Mr−1,r ≤ Qr. This implies that Qj = Qj+1 = · · · =
Qr−1 = 0, a contradiction.
So perhaps surprisingly, in this case we have a potentially large group of locations, far
from the CBD, which experience the same disutility. As we proceed towards the CBD
from this cluster, the disutility strictly decreases.
The size of this single nontrivial cluster will of course depend on the demand vector.
While there is no clear way to determine it aside from executing the algorithm, one can
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get some intuition from the following thought experiment. Suppose we fix Q2, . . . , Qn and
vary Q1. As long as Q1 is large enough, location 1 will form a singleton cluster (this
can be argued from Proposition 6.17). Conversely, keeping in mind that (s, 1) is active
throughout the evolution, if Q1 is very small then this will not be possible; 1 will be
part of a larger cluster. Generally, as Q1 is decreased, the cluster containing 1 will grow
monotonically. All of this can formally be deduced from Proposition 6.17.
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Figure 6.1: Evolution of the equilibrium of an instance with all capacities equal. Times
θ are chronological, with a to cbeing for θ < θ∗, and d to f being for θ > θ∗. Legend:
Values in blue indicate the flow values fe(θ); values in red, purple and gray show the rate
of change of queue waiting times. Red is used for increasing queues, purple for decreasing
queues, and gray for queues whose length is staying constant.
Corridor capacities decreasing towards the CBD. We now consider the setting
where capacities decrease monotonically from left to right: νi+1 < νi for all i ∈ [n − 1].
As before, we begin the discussion assuming that all clusters are singletons. This implies
that in fact the decrease in capacity from left to right is not too large: νn > ν1/2. For
otherwise, a queue on (1, 2) at some time θ would imply `′t(θ) > 2, which is not possible.
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Figure 6.2 shows a typical equilibrium. Similarly to the setting of equal capacities, it
remains true that only (s, 1) as well as at most one other vertical arc are sending flow
at any one time. However, we now have that all horizontal arcs grow queues at the very
start of the evolution. Indeed, as long as some arc (i − 1, i) does have a queue, the arc
immediately to the right will be growing a queue, since the outflow of arc (i − 1, i) is
greater than the capacity of (i, i+ 1). Queues can begin to dissipate during the first part
of the peak, however; necessarily, this occurs from left to right.
In terms of possible clusterings, the situation is essentially the same as for the equal
capacity case: the only possible nontrivial cluster is of the form {1, 2, . . . , j}. The reason
is essentially the same, exploiting this time that Mj−1,r ≤Mr−1,r for any j ≤ r.
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Figure 6.2: Chronological evolution for an instance where capacities decrease towards the
CBD. a to d show behavior before θ∗, and e to f behavior after. Legend: See Figure 6.1.
Corridor capacities increasing towards the CBD. Now consider the situation
where corridor arcs have strictly increasing capacity from left to right. See Figure 6.3
for a typical evolution (again, with all singleton clusters). During the first part of the
peak, all but one queue remains constant, and a single queue increases in length. This
growing queue moves from left to right as the equilibrium evolves. But now flow is sent
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along many vertical arcs: all locations to the left of the growing queue will be sending flow
(and none of the locations to the right).
During the second part of the peak, the situation is very different to the previous two
settings. We may have flow on vertical arcs aside from (s, 1). If at some moment (s, i)
is the rightmost active vertical arc, then all queues to the left of i will remain constant,
while queues to the right will dissipate. However, these dissipating queues need not empty
in any particular order; this will depend on the specifics of the instance.
This time, there is much more flexibility in the possible clusterings—essentially any
clustering is possible, depending on the demand vector Q.
s
v1 v2 v3 vn t
2ν1
2ν1 2ν1 2ν1 2ν1
(a)
s






ν1 2ν2 2ν2 2ν2
(b)
s



















































Figure 6.3: Chronological evolution of the equilibrium in an instance with arcs capacities
that increase towards the CBD. a to c show behavior before θ∗, and d to f show behavior
after. Legend: See Figure 6.1.
Comparison with the Arnott-DePalma corridor model. Let us now recall the
corridor model in the form introduced by Arnott and DePalma [2011b], where the LWR
model is used for modelling traffic congestion, and residential density is distributed con-
tinuously in space. They consider only the situation in the first part of the peak, and with
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uniform corridor capacity; so we will compare only with the Vickrey corridor model with
all corridor capacities equal (we denote their common capacity by ν1).
Arnott and DePalma make a number of observations about equilibrium properties in
their model; here we discuss some of these properties, and what qualitative similarities
there are with our structural results. They pay particular attention to the shape of the
departure set, which is the set of pairs (x, θ), where x is a location in the corridor and θ a
moment in time, for which users departing at position x leave at time θ.
• The upper boundary of the departure set is a vehicle trajectory. A cursory look
back at Figure 6.1 shows that is clearly not the case in the Vickrey corridor model.
However, there is a sense in which it is almost true: all vertical arcs are active at
time θ∗, the end of the first part of the peak. If we perturb the capacities very
slightly, so that they increase every so slightly as one gets closer to the CBD, then
we instead have the situation shown in Figure 6.3, where indeed all locations (more
precisely, all clusters) are sending flow at time θ∗.
• At any location, the departure set at that location is an interval. Further, the de-
parture set is connected and does not contain holes. Consider a trivial clustering.
We have seen that this is indeed the case (even more generally for arbitrary corridor
capacities).
With a nontrivial clustering, the flexibility we have in choosing the departure pattern
within a cluster means that this is generally not true; it is necessary to consider the
contracted instance instead.
• At any location, the departure rate in the departure set is constant. (This is slightly
modified from the statements in [Arnott and DePalma, 2011b], where there is some
difficulties involving the lower boundary that we can ignore for this discussion.) If
the clustering is trivial, then this does hold. For consider some (s, i): for the interval
in which flow is sent from (s, i), (s, i) is the rightmost active vertical arc. Thus
f(s,i)(θ) = f(i,i+1)(θ) − f(i−1,i)(θ) = ν1`′t(θ) − ν1 throughout this interval. (This fails
the moment corridor capacities are even slightly unequal, however; witness again
Figure 6.3.)
If the clustering is not trivial, then the claim only holds if the aggregate flow from
an entire cluster, rather than a single location in the cluster, is considered.
• Horn-shaped departure set. Consider the lower boundary of the departure set in the
Arnott-DePalma corridor model. They argue that the earliest departure time from
a location must be larger for locations closer to the CBD. This holds in the Vickrey
corridor model as well.
6.6 Conclusion
In this chapter we used the model and the algorithm discussed in Chapter 4 to study a
particular network topology – the one of the corridor model.
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We proved existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium, we developed a polynomial
time algorithm for computing it and we provided a description of its structure.
Our results showed that, despite the simplicity of the network topology, the equilibrium
behaviour is surprisingly involved.
One of the main insight of this work is that the sensitive version of the model is actually
easier to deal with and we can completely separate out the additional difficulties needed
to map the relationship between the sensitive and insensitive models. An interesting
research direction might be exploring this methodology on more general topologies, like
trees (multiple origins and single destination) for example.
Finally notice that, following an approach similar to the one of Chapter 5, one could
compare the standard (untolled) equilibrium with the one under optimal pricing; the
former computed with the algorithm presented in this chapter and the latter with the
one of Chapter 3. This could provide interesting insights on the impact of pricing in this




Long term behavior of dynamic
equilibria with exogenous departure
time choice
This chapter contains unpublished results obtained thanks to the collaboration of Neil Olver.
7.1 Introduction
In this chapter we study the long term behavior of dynamic equilibria with exogenous
departure time choice – equilibria where users do not choose their departure time but are
released at a constant inflow rate. The cost of a user is just its journey time and, as
a consequence, a dynamic equilibrium occurs when each particle travels along a shortest
path, taking into account congestion delays caused by other users. This model, as discussed
in Section 1.2, was characterized by Koch and Skutella [2011] and further elaborated by
Cominetti et al. [2015].
Cominetti et al. [2017] showed that the equilibrium flow reaches a steady state in finite
time when the inflow rate into the network is a constant not bigger than the capacity
of the minimum s-t-cut of the network1. They define a steady state to be a nonending
time interval in which the queue delay and transit time of any link do not change. With
this definition the assumption on the inflow rate into the network is a necessity since,
otherwise, there would always be some queue growing.
In this chapter we slightly modify the definition of steady state so that it still matches
the one of [Cominetti et al., 2017] when the inflow rate into the network is not bigger than
the capacity of the minimum s-t-cut but that can also be applied when the inflow rate
is bigger. Namely, we say that a steady state is a nonending time interval in which the
rate of change of the transit time of any link does not change. This means that the queue
lengths either remain constant or increase linearly over time.
1Given a graph where s ant t are connected, i.e. where there is a path from s to t, an s-t-cut C is a
subset of the arcs whose removal disconnects s from t. The capacity of a cut is the sum of all the capacity
of the arcs of C, namely
∑
e∈C νe. A minimum s-t cut is an s-t cut with minimum capacity.
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With this new definition we conjecture that an equilibrium with constant inflow rate
always reaches a steady state.
Our results. In this chapter we drop the assumption on the inflow rate into the net-
work and we provide a more general characterization of steady states which lead to the
definition of a potential function that is quite natural and that generalizes the one used
by Cominetti et al. [2017]. However, we could not prove that the potential function is
always monotone along the evolution of the equilibrium but, instead, we found a network
and a queue lengths configuration for which the potential function is not monotone. The
queue lengths configuration is quite unnatural: the shortest path network consists in only
one s-t-path where all the arcs host a queue, even the arcs that have bigger capacity than
their predecessors. We do not know if the equilibrium ever attains such configuration and
we suspect that further insights into the relation between the thin flows of consecutive
shortest path networks are needed in order to solve this problem.
Outline of the chapter. We formally define the model in Section 7.2. In Section 7.3
we provide the characterization of steady states. Finally in Section 7.4 we introduce the
aforementioned potential function and counterexample.
7.2 Model and preliminaries
The link dynamics, the earliest arrival functions and dynamic shortest path network are
defined as in Section 4.2.
User choices, dynamic equilibria and induced cumulative flow. As in the en-
dogenous case, each individual user is considered to control a negligible fraction of the
total flow, so that there are an infinite number of infinitesimally small, divisible users.
Starting from time 0, users are released into s over time at a constant rate ν0 and each
user seeks to arrive at the sink t as early as possible. Thus the cost of a particle is simply
its journey time and we have an equilibrium when each particle travels along a path in
the shortest path network.
For this setting, Condition 4.1, Equation (4.7) and Lemma 4.2 of Section 4.2 fully
characterize the equilibrium flow [Cominetti et al., 2015].
Derivatives of a dynamic equilibrium. For almost every θ, let x′ := dx
dθ
and `′ := d`
dθ
be the derivatives of the cumulative flow (xe)e∈E and the earliest arrival functions (`v)v∈V .
By differentiating Equation (4.7) we see that x′(θ) is a static flow. Moreover, by the
Bellman equations (4.5) and by the equilibrium conditions (4.1), (4.2), (4.3) and (4.4) we
have that x′, `′ fulfill the following definition2.
2This definition can be found also in Definition 4.6, in Chapter 4 of this thesis.
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Definition 7.1 (Normalized Thin Flow with Resetting (NTF)[Cominetti et al., 2015]).
We say that the pair (x′, `′) is an Normalized Thin Flow on Gθ = (V,E ′θ, E∗θ ) if:





η(`′v, x′vw) ∀v ∈ V \ {s}











vw /∈ E∗θ .
Steady State. We say that a dynamic equilibrium is in a steady state at time θ if the
shortest path network and the label derivatives (`′v)v∈V do not change for any ϑ ∈ [θ,∞).
7.3 Characterization of steady states
In this section we give a characterization of the steady states. We first describe the
derivatives of the equilibrium in a steady state and then we identify, and show how to
compute the set of queue lengths that induce a steady state.
7.3.1 Derivatives of the equilibrium in a steady state
The derivatives of the equilibrium in a steady state are described through the following
theorem:
Theorem 7.2. The equilibrium is in a steady state at time θ if and only if the NTF on
the shortest path network Gθ = (V,E ′θ, E∗θ ) equals a NTF on (V,E,∅).
Proof. This proof consists of two parts, one for each direction.
For the first direction we need to show that, if the equilibrium is in a steady state at
time θ, then the NTF (x′, `′) on Gθ = (V,E ′θ, E∗θ ) corresponds to a NTF on (V,E,∅).
Since (x′, `′) is a NTF on Gθ, we know that x′ is a static flow on G = (V,E) with value
ν0 and that `′s = 1.
To show that
`′w = η(`′v, x′vw) = max{`′v,
x′vw
νvw
} ∀vw ∈ E with x′vw > 0 (7.1)
we need to show that `′w = max{
x′vw
νvw
, `′v} for all vw ∈ E∗θ . Consider an arc e = vw ∈ E∗θ
and a point in time ϑ ≥ θ; since `′w =
x′vw
νvw
we just need to show that `′w ≥ `′v. By definition
we know that the resetting arcs are the arcs that host queues and that in a steady state
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the rate of change of the transit time of a link does not change. As a consequence the













= `′w − `′v ,
implying that `′w ≥ `′v.










} ∀v ∈ V \ {s} .
Hence, to show that
`′w = min
vw∈E





} ∀v ∈ V \ {s}
we just need to show that `′w ≤ `′v for all vw ∈ E \ E ′θ. Consider an arc e = vw ∈ E \ E ′θ;
clearly x′e = 0 and, by the steady state definition, `w(ϑ) < `v(ϑ) + τe for any ϑ ∈ [θ,∞),
implying that `′w ≤ `′v and concluding the first part of the proof.
For the second direction we need to show that, if the NTF (x′, `′) on Gθ = (V,E ′θ, E∗θ )
equals a NTF on (V,E,∅) then the equilibrium is in a steady state at time θ. Our goal is
thus to show that the queues on E∗θ never fully deplete and that an arc e = vw ∈ E \ E ′θ
never joins the shortest path network.
The former holds by Definition 7.1 and since (x′, `′) is a NTF on (V,E,∅), which imply







`′w − `′v ≥ 0.
Consider now an arc e = vw ∈ E \ E ′θ. Since e /∈ E ′θ implies that `′w ≤ `′v (by
Definition 7.1) and `w(θ) < `v(θ) + τe (by definition of shortest path network), the arc e
never joins the shortest path network.
7.3.2 Queue lengths of a steady state
In the following we characterize the possible queue lengths that can occur at some moment
of a steady state.
Given a NTF (x′, `′) on (V,E,∅), consider the graph Ḡ = (V, Ē) obtained from G by
modifying each arc capacity as follows: the capacity of arc vw in Ē is ν̄vw = νvw · `′w. Let
(P) be a min-cost flow problem on Ḡ where the costs are represented by the transit time
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∀v ∈ V \ {s, t}
if v = s
if v = t
(7.2)
ge ≤ ν̄e ∀e ∈ E (7.3)
ge ≥ 0 ∀e ∈ E




s.t. dw ≤ dv + τe + qe ∀e = vw ∈ E (7.4)
qe ≥ 0 ∀e ∈ E
We are going to show that an optimal solution to (P) corresponds to a NTF of a steady
state and that an optimal solution to (D) provides us the queue lengths to assign to the
arcs of the network to obtain a steady state.
Let g∗ be an optimal solution to (P) and (d∗, q∗) be an optimal solution to (D). Let
G+ = (V,E+) where E+ = {e ∈ E : g∗e > 0}. Finally, recall that we defined (x′, `′) to be
an NTF on (V,E,∅). For the remainder of the section our goal is to prove the following
theorem.
Theorem 7.3. If, for a fixed θ, the waiting time qe(`v(θ)) = q∗e for each e ∈ E+, then the
equilibrium is in a steady state at time θ and (g∗, `′) is a NTF of the steady state.
To prove Theorem 7.3 we will need some supporting lemmas.
Lemma 7.4. `′t = max{`′v : v ∈ V } and `′s = min{`′v : v ∈ V }
Proof. Consider an arbitrary s-t-path in G that uses only arcs in E+. The statement holds
since `′w ≥ `′v for any arc vw ∈ E+.
Lemma 7.5. For any arc e = vw ∈ E, if `′v 6= `′w then x′vw = g∗vw.
Proof. Consider an arc vw ∈ E such that `′v 6= `′w; let z = min{`′v, `′w} and let Vz be the
set of vertices with labels `′ not greater than z, i.e. Vz = {u ∈ V : `′u ≤ z}. Note that, by
Lemma 7.4, we have that Vz contains s and does not contain t. Let δout(S) and δin(S) be
the set of arcs in E with, respectively, tail and head in S ⊂ V . Since (x′, `′) is a NTF on
(V,E,∅), by Definition 7.1 we have that the total amount of flow x′ entering Vz is zero




νe · `′w (7.5)
and
x′(δout(Vz)) = ν0 . (7.6)
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νe · `′w by definition of ν̄e
= ν0 by (7.5) and (7.6).
On the other hand, by Equation (7.2), g∗(δin(V \ Vz)) ≥ ν0 and, therefore
g∗(δout(Vz)) = ν0 .
This equality, together with Equation (7.2), implies that g∗ sends no flow inside Vz and
that g∗vw = ν̄vw = νvw · `′w = x′vw for every vw ∈ δout(Vz), concluding the proof.
Corollary 7.6. (g∗, `′) is a NTF on (V,E,∅).
Proof. In order to prove the statement we have to show that the conditions of Definition 7.1
hold. By Lemma 7.5, we just need to show that these are not violated by an arc e = vw ∈





With the next lemma we show that, if we assign to the arcs the queue lengths q∗, then
g∗ is positive only along the shortest paths of the network.
Lemma 7.7. If, for a fixed θ, the waiting time qe(`v(θ)) = q∗e for each e ∈ E, then
`v(θ) = d∗v for any v ∈ V and g∗e is positive only if the arc e belongs to a shortest path.
Proof. First of all notice that the transit time of any s-v-path in G+ with queue waiting
time q∗ is equal to d∗v: by complementary slackness, g∗e > 0 implies d∗w = d∗v + τe + q∗e and,
as a consequence, the transit time of any s-v-path in G+ is equal to d∗v.
Our goal is thus to show that if a s-v-path contains arcs in E \E+ then its transit time
is not strictly smaller than d∗v.
Let’s proceed by contradiction and consider a shortest s-t-path in G which contains a
v1-v2-subpath P1 consisting only of arcs in E \ E+ and with a smaller transit time than
the one of a v1-v2-path P2 in G+. If we modify g∗ by redirecting a positive amount of flow
from P2 into P1, i.e. by reducing the flow on P2 and increasing the flow on P1 by ε > 0,
we obtain a solution to (P) that has a smaller cost than g∗ (the transit time represents
the cost in (P)), a contradiction to the optimality of g∗.
We are now ready to prove Theorem 7.3.
Proof of Theorem 7.3. Let E∗ be the set of arcs where q∗ is positive, i.e. E∗ = {e ∈ E :
q∗e > 0}. Using Lemma 7.7 and Theorem 7.2, we just need to show that (g∗, `′) is a NTF




for all vw ∈ E∗. But this holds by complementary slackness: q∗e > 0 implies
g∗e = ν̄e = νe · `′w for any arc e = vw ∈ E∗.
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7.4 Candidate potential function
Let (x̂′, ˆ̀′) be a NTF on (V,E,∅) and consider the following potential function
Φ(θ) = ν0(`t(θ)− `s(θ))−
∑
e=vw∈E
νe · ˆ̀′w · qe(`v(θ)) .
Note that Φ(θ) is inspired from the objective of the previous dual program (D) and
generalizes the potential function used in [Cominetti et al., 2017], where ˆ̀′w = 1 for any
w ∈ V .
With the following lemmas we show that Φ(θ) is bounded and that Φ′(θ) = 0 if the
equilibrium is in a steady state at time θ.
Lemma 7.8. Φ(θ) is bounded.
Proof. First of all, (P) is clearly bounded and it always admits a solution since an optimal
one corresponds to a NTF on (V,E,∅) (Corollary 7.6) and this always exists [Cominetti
et al., 2015]. Then, from the earliest arrival functions definition (Equation (4.5)), the
point (d, q) with dv = `v(θ) for all v ∈ V and qe = qe(`v(θ)) is feasible for the dual (D).
Therefore Φ(θ) corresponds to the value of a feasible solution of (D) and is bounded by
the optimal value of (P).
Lemma 7.9. For a NTF on (V,E,∅), Φ′(θ) = 0.
Proof. Let E+ = {e ∈ E : x′e > 0} and let (x′, `′) be a NTF on (V,E,∅). Let P be the
set of all simple s-t-paths and consider a path-decomposition (x′P )P∈P of x′ 3. Then:
Φ′(θ) = ν0(`′t − `′s)−
∑
e=vw∈E+
νe ˆ̀′w(`′w − `′v)






= ν0(`′t − `′s)−
∑
e=vw∈E+:`w 6=`v
x′e(`′w − `′v) by Definition 7.1





x′P (`′w − `′v)
= ν0(`′t − `′s)−
∑
P∈P
x′P (`′t − `′s)
= ν0(`′t − `′s)− ν0(`′t − `′s)
= 0 .
Given that Φ′(θ) can take on only a finite number of values, depending on the NTF
and more precisely on the current shortest path network, if Φ(θ) were strictly increasing
3 A path-decomposition (xP )P∈P of x is a collection of flow such that




where e ∈ P indicates if path P contains that arc e ∈ E.
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for any θ where the equilibrium is not in a steady state, then we would know that the
equilibrium reaches a steady state in finite time. Unfortunately, as shown in the next
example, we found a network and a queue lengths configuration in which the potential
function decreases. However, we don’t have an example of an evolution starting from an
initially empty network where Φ′ becomes negative and we suspect that it never does.
Example 7.1. Consider the graph G = (V,E) of Figure 7.1, where
V = {s, t, a1, a2, . . . , a10, b1, b2, . . . , b15}
and




2−4 if e = sa1
2−4−i if e = aiai+1, i ∈ [9]
2−14 if e = a10b1
2−14+i if e = bibi+1, i ∈ [14]
2−2 if e = b15t
∞ if e = sb1
∞ if e = sb15
∞ if e = a1t .
We remark that there are smaller instances where the change in potential in negative
but we chose this graph for numerical convenience.
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Figure 7.1: Graph of Example 7.1. The dash arcs represent paths and the label of an arc
indicates the capacity.
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The minimum s-t cut is {sa1, b15t} and thus, for a NTF (x̂′, ˆ̀′) on (V,E,∅) with inflow
ν0 = 1, the label ˆ̀′v is
ˆ̀′
v =
3.2 if v ∈ {a1, . . . , a10, t}1 if v ∈ {s, b1, . . . , b15} .
Let Ē be the subset of E containing all the arcs with finite capacity, namely Ē =
{aiai+1 : i ∈ [9]} ∪ {bibi+1 : i ∈ [14]} ∪ {sa1, a10b1, b15t}. If at some point θ the current
shortest path network contains all and only the arcs in Ē and these are all resetting,
formally if Gθ = (V, Ē, Ē), then the change in potential is negative: an NTF (x′, `′) on
(V, Ē, Ē) sends flow only along the arcs of Ē (see Figure 7.2), and consequently we have
that
Φ′ = ν0(`′t − `′s)−
∑
e=vw∈Ē
νe ˆ̀′w(`′w − `′v)























Notice that, in this specific instance, the evolution starting from an empty network
never reaches a phase where Φ′ is negative.
7.5 Conclusion
This is the only chapter in the thesis where users do not choose their departure time but
are released at a constant inflow rate. As seen in Chapter 4, this setting is a special case
of the more general setting that has been treated in the rest of the thesis; for this reason,
understanding the structure of the equilibria in this framework would provide important
insights to the endogenous one.
Here, we studied the steady states of equilibria when the inflow rate into the network
exceed the capacity of the minimum s-t-cut. We provided a full characterization of the
steady states and we explore a technique to verify whether an equilibrium always reach
such a state (as in the case where the inflow rate is bounded by the capacity of the
minimum s-t-cut).
Unfortunately our technique did not bring the hoped results: we found a network and
queue lengths configuration where it fails. However, we suspect that steady states are
always attained and that a deeper understanding of the relationship between consecutive



























Figure 7.2: Example of a NTF for which Φ′ < 0. The label of an arc represents the




In this thesis we made significant progress in understanding the structure of dynamic
traffic equilibria.
One of the main contributions has been introducing (in Chapter 4), using methodolo-
gies from the optimization literature, a framework to study equilibria on general networks
where agents have route and departure time choices. This is of interest not only for the
optimization community, that considered similar models but only with route choices, but
also for the transportation economics community, that considered similar models but on
simple networks. Moreover, this model is not only interesting from an academic point of
view but can also be implemented by network designers to run simulations for real-world
scenarios. Indeed, this framework provides compelling insights into the dynamics of the
equilibrium behavior; it allows us to keep track of how much traffic is on each link of the
network per any given time even when the number of vehicles is massive.
A clear example of this is given in Chapter 6, when it is used to provide a clear explicit
characterization of the evolution behavior in particular network topologies, the ones of the
corridor model.
Furthermore, we showed that this framework can represent empirically observed be-
haviors like the one of hypercongestion (Chapter 5), one of the most severe types of traffic
congestion. Identifying the causes of hypercongestion is extremely valuable since it can
help in the design of better road networks or in the formulation of better policies that
partially or fully prevent congestion.
Regarding policies, we showed, in Chapter 3, how to compute tolls that induce an
optimal equilibrium – the equilibrium that maximizes the social welfare – for both the
setting with and without departure time choice.
Some fundamental questions in both the settings with and without departure time
choice still need to be settled. For example, some technical issues in the proofs of existence
and uniqueness of equilibria still need to be resolved. Another unsolved fundamental query
is the one regarding the complexity of the thin flow with resetting and the complexity of
computing the entire equilibrium behavior. Regarding the latter we do not even know yet
if it can be computed in finite time. We believe that the crux of these latter questions, as
well as of the long term behavior studied in Chapter 7, lies on the dependencies between the
thin flows and the sets of active and resetting arcs of consecutive shortest path networks.
In addition to these open problems there are many possible research directions. For
example, in this thesis we considered homogeneous agents and a single origin-destination
pair. It would be very interesting to extend our study to settings with user heterogeneity,
for example in the value of time, in scheduling preferences or in the origin-destination pairs.
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Other possible directions would be to investigate Braess’s paradox on our framework or
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